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Abstract 
This dissertation develops goal conflict theory and its application to intergovernmental public 
policy through state-level empirical analysis of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) from 1999-2007. This program was selected for analysis because it is a program in which 
goal conflict has been readily manifest, particularly during the 2007 SCHIP reauthorization attempts.  
Goal conflict in SCHIP is operationalized as enrollment of higher-income children and of adults, 
and is examined in terms of fiscal impact on the federal government and on various measures of 
program success including enrollment of low-income children in SCHIP.  
Enrollment of adults was found to increase federal costs within a state (federal funding formulas 
notwithstanding). Further analysis showed that rules governing the fiscal impact of enrollment 
expansions significantly affected the choice to engage (or not engage) in these activities. 
In examining the effect of enrollment of non-targeted populations on federal spending between 
and within states, the analysis demonstrated that while formula factors—not enrollment choices—
drive federal spending between states, enrollment of adults increases spending within states and 
enrollment of higher-income children appears to decrease spending within states.  
In fixed-effects models estimating the impact of enrollment of adults and higher-income children 
on enrollment of targeted children, enrollment of adults was consistently found to negatively impact 
enrollment of targeted children and enrollment of higher-income children was found to improve 
enrollment of targeted children.  
A final empirical analysis focused on the policy choices of adult and higher-income child enrollment 
as dependent variables. Goal conflict variables, in addition to capacity variables, were shown to be 
significant predictors of these state policy choices even after controlling for state (random) effects.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Theory 
Introduction 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) has the stated goal of 
“[providing] funds to States to enable them to initiate and expand the provision of child 
health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in an effective and efficient manner 
that is coordinated with other sources of health benefits coverage for children”.1 An 
entitlement to the states, SCHIP is a joint implementation program requiring involvement 
by federal and state governments (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sanford, 1967; 
Goggin et al., 1990). For states that share the ideology of the federal legislation, rank it as 
a high enough priority to merit allocation of resources, and have sufficient resources to 
allow for such allocation, intergovernmental management consists primarily of 
completing the federal-state financial transaction by drafting and facilitating the approval 
of the necessary state plans, making expenditures, and receiving funds. States receive 
benefits for their ideological alignment with the federal government, and the federal 
government adds resources to the accomplishment of its aims within states. However, this 
joint implementation approach invites the potential for goal conflict2 in states where 
provision of public insurance for children from low-income households is not a 
sufficiently high priority to warrant independent state action. In these cases, the federal 
entitlement serves primarily as an inducement for states to become aligned with the 
ideology of the federal legislation and the intergovernmental management process 
                                                 
1
 Social Security Act Sec. 2101. [42 U.S.C. 1397aa] 
2
 Conflict is not assumed to be an active engagement or embodiment of will in a sociological sense as 
envisioned by Simmel (1964), but is rather the passive incompatibility of goals more consistent with the 
views of Sanford (1968) and Parsons and Shils (2001). Nonetheless, conflict is envisioned as a positive 
entity, something that can be observed and measured. In this sense, conflict is compatible with Simmel’s 
most basic conception of the phenomenon. 
 
2 
becomes burdened with the need to ensure that this induced goal alignment achieves the 
ends intended by the federal legislation. This necessity enters the intergovernmental 
arrangement in the form of specification and monitoring costs (Waterman and Meier, 
1998). 
Despite the potential presence of conflict with the stated federal goal of the SCHIP 
program, states may be pressured to adopt the SCHIP program due to mimetic pressures 
(Light, 1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) or because of a desire to leverage federal 
funds. Ingram (1977) suggests that the inducement offered by federal grants may entice 
state governments into a form of bargaining arrangement, but that such grants are not 
sufficient for altering the policy behavior of states unless the state already has compatible 
goals. Goal conflict may thus manifest not as a failure to adopt the program (as indeed all 
states have), but rather as conflicts over the use of funds (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004), 
problematic implementation decisions (Goggin, et al., 1990), or low output performance.  
The aim of this dissertation is to identify potential goal conflict in the SCHIP context 
and to determine what, if any, effect observable goal conflict between the federal 
government and the states may have on the use of federal resources (chapter 3), program 
outputs and outcomes (chapter 4) and state policy decisions (chapter 5).  
This chapter focuses on the potential for measurement of goal conflict and the utility 
of this construct in predicting various relevant outcomes in administration of the SCHIP 
program. A diversity of conceptualizations, definitions, applications, and operational 
approaches for organizational goals, “goal conflict,” and related constructs (e.g. goal 
ambiguity, goal commitment) will be considered specifically in the context of federal-
state joint implementation. This synthesis integrates perspectives from systems analysis, 
3 
agency theory, stewardship theory, fiscal federalism, political economy, governance 
theory and intergovernmental relations. Though some form of goal conflict is 
fundamental to the interrelationships described by most of these theories and approaches, 
measurement and empirical application of the construct have garnered less attention than 
deserved, and conflict is often treated as an assumption rather than a variable (Waterman 
and Meier, 1998).  
The literature: An overview 
Goal conflict has made prominent appearances in public management literature in terms 
of political control of the bureaucracy (e.g. McCubbins, 1985; McCubbins, Noll and 
Weingast, 1998) and principal-agent applications to government contracting (e.g. Van 
Slyke, 2006). Waterman and Meier suggest that “[o]ver time [states]3 may seek to alter 
established policy toward their preferred objectives, which may or may not be the same as those 
of the [federal] legislation … Even if no policy disagreement exists, principal-agent theory 
suggests that [state agents] are likely to shirk, to produce outputs at a higher than needed cost, or 
to produce a level of outputs that is lower than desired” (1998, 176). This thesis about the 
potentially counterproductive nature of agent behavior—arising from active policy 
disagreement or passive failure to achieve desired ends in the most efficient or effective 
manner—is the core of goal conflict.  
Defining goal conflict in a public administration setting proves challenging, 
particularly in comparison with the private sector application where the concept was 
originally developed. “In the marketplace, principals and agents clearly have different 
goals and/or preferences. Obviously, agents want to make as much money as possible 
                                                 
3
 Insertions to adapt the original text to an intergovernmental context are added for emphasis and to focus 
the discussion offered by Waterman and Meier (1998) on the particular context addressed here. 
4 
while principals want to pay as little as possible for services. But in the bureaucratic 
setting, with a focus on policy instead of profit, goal conflict may not always exist 
between principals and agents. Principals and agents may disagree over policy, or they 
may not. If they do, as Mitnick (1986, 4) noted, principals are forced to ‘expend 
resources both in trying to instruct the agent what to do and in monitoring and policing 
the agent's behavior.’ If agents have the same policy goals, however, the need for 
policing and monitoring should logically be reduced.” Thus, goal conflict might manifest 
as a diametric opposition to a policy, willingness to abide inefficiencies in its execution, 
or anywhere between.  
For the research and theory that follows, goal conflict is defined as a diversion of 
resources from pursuit of the interest of the principal to pursuit of the interest of the 
agent. In a federal-state principal/agent dyad4, the resources intended by the federal 
government for one outcome are diverted to an outcome embraced by the state.5 In 
circumstances in which pursuit of the interest of the principal is identical to the pursuit of 
the interest of the state, no goal conflict exists. 
In political economy, some recent initial attempts at quantifying goal conflict in a 
political economy paradigm have inspired renewed discussion about “new” and “fiscal” 
federalism and their place in modern policymaking (Oates, 2005). Meier has repeatedly 
criticized goal conflict as an assumption in various models. In particular, Waterman and 
Meier (1998) explicitly call for consideration of goal conflict and information asymmetry 
as variables (rather than as assumptions) in applications of agency theory to the 
governmental context. A few studies (e.g. Ingram and Schneider, 1990; Slocum, Cron 
                                                 
4
 I acknowledge that such a dyadic conception is oversimplified, as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
5
 Note that given this conception of goal conflict, the outcomes may be closely related, increasing the 
complexity of monitoring costs and the demand for information. 
5 
and Brown, 2002; Chun and Rainey, 2005b) have linked goal conflict constructs to 
performance, but lack of a systematic framework for goal conflict in the 
intergovernmental context has prevented similar analysis from being performed in the 
intergovernmental policy context. 
Ingram (1977) observes that state goals play a pivotal role in determining the 
accomplishment of federal objectives through grant programs. Ingram is not alone in her 
emphasis on the importance of goals. Meier and his coauthors have consistently called for 
more study of goal conflict in administration of government programs (most prominently 
in Waterman and Meier, 1989). While progress has been made in this area, (e.g. Matland, 
1995) the construct has only recently been used in an empirical application to its role in 
federal-state relationships through grantmaking (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004).  
A case could be made that goals are not only encompassed in the implementation of 
public policy, but that they comprise the better part of it. “A case of implementation...is a 
series of political and administrative actors’ goal-directed choices and actions” (Goggin, 
1986, 336).  
Goggin et al. (1990) consider goals a component of organizational structure that has a 
mediating effect on organizational capacity: “Implementing organizations have goals, and 
the program being implemented may or may not fit neatly with these goals. Agencies are 
more likely to have communication and coordination problems with each other when the 
units do not see eye to eye on the program. Such organizations are more likely to screen 
out important elements of the policy message and to perform in a less-than-ideal fashion 
when the policy message deals with goals that are not of particular concern to the 
implementers; therefore, the greater compatibility among the goals of the implementing 
6 
agencies and the concerns of the implementers, the greater the expected success of a 
program within a state.67 Also, the greater the compatibility of the goals of the 
implementing agencies with those expressing the policy message, the greater the success 
of a program within a state”(127). Though among the variables suggested for inclusion 
by Goggin et al. (1990), measures of goal congruence/conflict have oft been excluded 
from implementation studies.8 This exclusion is likely due to the challenge presented by 
measurement of the construct.9 
Goal conflict would be expected to have varying effects in varying policy contexts, 
impacted by such factors as intergovernmental arrangement and inducements, policy 
topic, ambiguity of goals, and others (Goggin et al., 1990; Volden 2007). It is therefore 
useful to observe this particular variable, and to explore issues related to its measurement, 
validity and impact, in a single context where variation in intervening variables can be 
minimized. It is also important to select a policy context in which some qualitative 
evidence of goal conflict can be observed. This lends, at the least, face validity to the 
inquiry itself. Because the inquiry focuses on federal-state goal conflict, the policy must 
be a product of federal-state joint implementation. In order to isolate goal conflict as a 
variable, the goal of the policy must be relatively unambiguous and its achievement must 
be empirically observable. Federal control over state behavior must not be complete; in 
order to observe some variation in outcomes as regards goal conflict, states must have 
                                                 
6
 This approach is consistent with Parson and Shils’ (2001) discussion of goal achievement in social 
systems: “the achievement of goals is often possible in a social system only through collaboraton in 
complementary role situations” (200). 
7
 Note that there may be differences in goals or outcomes intended by the principal, goals or desired 
outcomes articulated by the principal, and perception of goals or intended outcomes as received by the 
agent. Though these three may differ, distinctions between them are not made in this analysis. 
8
 Cleaves (1980) is a notable exception.  
9
 Other constructs related to organizational goals in government have only recently become a focus of 
careful quantitative measurement. See, for example, Scott (2003) and Chun and Rainey (2005). 
7 
some level of discretion in implementation of the program and the application of federal 
inducements. While multiple policies may fit this particular set of criteria, the policy 
selected for this analysis is the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.  
The remainder of this chapter contains a background describing the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, a presentation of the three primary frameworks to be used in 
empirical analysis accompanied by a more extended review of relevant literature, and a 
brief outline of the dissertation. 
Background: State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
In August 1997, with bipartisan support, Congress enacted the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program (SCHIP) as part of Title XXI of the Social Security Act.  SCHIP is a 
federal formula grant program that gives states three options for providing public health 
insurance to targeted children: designing a separate SCHIP program; expanding the 
Medicaid program within a state; or a combination of both strategies. The program 
enrolled 2.5 million children nationwide during the first three years of its existence 
(Simon, 2001). The SCHIP program is a federally mandated, state administered program 
similar in nature to Medicaid, Medicare, and other social welfare programs in the United 
States, but is structured as a categorical grant to the states rather than as an individual 
entitlement. Categorical grants are “grants that must be used for particular—very often, 
quite narrow—objectives as specified by the donor and agreed to by the recipient. In the 
United States, most federal grant programs are of this kind” (Salamon, 2002, 343).10 The 
                                                 
10
 Various media outlets mistakenly refer to SCHIP as a formula grant. Though SCHIP does allocate 
funding based on formulas (thus an “entitlement” to the states), SCHIP funding is limited to a particular set 
of approved expenditures, whereas a true formula grant would provide money that is not confined to a 
specific project. The classification of SCHIP funds as a block grant is more appropriate, as the latitude for 
spending projects—the primary distinction between a categorical grant and a block grant—differs 
8 
responsibility for design, implementation, and administration of the program therefore 
rests solidly on the states. Though the structure of this program provides a great deal of 
flexibility to the states (Nicholson-Crotty, 2007), the federal intent to affect the spending 
and policy practices of the states invites application of the biting commentaries regarding 
the coercive and/or ineffectual regulatory nature of such intergovernmental arrangements 
(Hale and Palley, 1979), the failure of the redistributive purpose of such grants (Kincaid, 
1990), and the inability of federal actors to recognize the specialized needs of the states 
(Sanford, 1967). Salamon (2002), however, describes such grants as an indirect tool of 
government action, and hails them as “relatively noncoercive” (342). The flexibility of 
state administration of such grants does help to mitigate accusations of federal coercion, 
but it is nonetheless true that federal funds come with “strings attached.”  
One challenge identified in fiscal federalism is the imposition of federal intentions on 
state-level resources, thereby limiting the ability of state governments to tax and spend 
according to their own priorities because the federal tax reduces the supply of 
disposable/taxable income and the mandate to engage in federally sanctioned activity also 
demands use of state resources (Oates, 1999). Dahrendorf (1958) described policy 
conflict as emerging from a perceived zero-sum environment in which objectives are 
incompatible and actors rely on one another for some aspect of policy execution. 
Behaviors in which actors engage may result as much from strategic behavior as from 
behavior rooted in true differences in reaction to the ideology of a policy. Regardless of 
the motivation for behavior, the legislative and administrative environment results in 
winners (those who receive resources) and losers (those who do not). This zero-sum 
                                                                                                                                                 
somewhat over time depending on regulations placed on SCHIP spending by plans arranged by state and 
federal agencies and broad federal guidelines that may differ from one political administration to another. 
9 
environment is also described by Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2006) in their discussion of the 
impact of intergovernmental grants on state budgetary priorities.  
In policy areas related to SCHIP, states have been accused of diverting federal funds 
to projects of higher priority to the states (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004; GAO, 2007; Chubb, 
1985). Alternately, states may use federal funds to replace their own funds, providing the 
slack necessary to accomplish goals unrelated to the federal grant. These types of fund 
diverting behaviors have been observed in the Medicaid program. Testimony before the 
House oversight committee describes the systematic rulemaking and policymaking 
measures taken to discover and reduce loopholes and/or fraudulent means of increasing, 
spending or diverting federal matching funds from the Medicaid program that appeared to 
be in widespread practice among the states (GAO, 2007). The fund diversion hypothesis 
is also applied to Medicaid funding and tested in Nicholson-Crotty’s piece on goal 
conflict in federal grants to the states (2004), where he found evidence in support of the 
fund diversion hypothesis. These empirical findings support Ingram’s (1977) assertion 
that federal aims are unlikely to be accomplished through grant programs in the absence 
of state-level agreement with federal goals. 
In an empirical analysis of factors correlating with Medicaid enrollment rates, 
Kronebusch and Elbel (2004) found that the policy content of Medicaid mandates had 
greater impact on outcomes than did federal matching rates, and also reduced the 
observable variation in enrollment across states. This suggests that, consistent with the 
conceptions of goal conflict described here, the ideology—or goal alignment—associated 
with policy content has a significant impact on the overall success of the endeavor. 
10 
Rhetoric accompanying the 2007 legislative battle to reauthorize the SCHIP program 
made federal-state goal conflict readily apparent. In a radio address following his veto of 
the first SCHIP reauthorization bill in October of 2007, President George W. Bush said, 
“One important commitment of the Federal government is to help America's poorest 
children get access to health care…[but] many States are spending SCHIP funds on 
adults. In fact, based on their own projections for this fiscal year, Minnesota, Illinois, 
New Jersey, Michigan, Rhode Island, and New Mexico will spend more SCHIP money 
on adults than they do on children. And that is not the purpose of the program” (Bush, 
2007).   
In February of 2008, five state governors testified before the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee regarding SCHIP and its reauthorization. Governors Patrick of 
Massachusetts, Strickland of Ohio, and Gregoire of Washington  lamented recent CMS 
guidelines aimed at reigning in states that used, or wanted to use, SCHIP funding to cover 
uninsured children above 250 percent of FPL. It could be said that for these states, their 
goal of enrolling uninsured children exceeded the target set by the federal government 
and created a form of goal conflict.  
Governor Perdue of Georgia indicated concern over mismatch between federal intent 
and some cases of state implementation, yielding gridlock in SCHIP reauthorization: “I 
have been vocal because a program that works, a program that has a ten year record of 
proven success, is up for reauthorization and we can’t agree on how to continue…Some 
states have expanded their programs to include health insurance for other groups, even 
childless adults. But the goal of this program all along was to provide an answer to an 
insurance need for our most vulnerable population: low-income children” (Perdue, 2008). 
11 
Similarly, Governor Barbour of Mississippi alleged that states with SCHIP expansions 
covering childless adults were hijacking federal funds that should have supported 
programs for children in other states: “instead of sending that money back to Washington, 
other states started expanding their SCHIP programs. Instead of covering low-income 
children as Congress intended when [it] created the program, other states began covering 
adults, even adults that did not have any kids!...I cannot support a bill that does not give 
Mississippi enough money to fulfill the original intent of the program while allowing 
other states the opportunity to expand their programs to cover higher-income children and 
adults who don’t have any children” (Barbour, 2008). 
This rhetoric surrounding SCHIP reauthorization and the observations of scholars 
regarding the potential for divergent SCHIP goals at the state level (Shi, et al. 2000) 
contribute face validity to the case for SCHIP as a good laboratory for inquiries regarding 
state-federal goal alignment in intergovernmental policy. SCHIP also has other 
characteristics that make it a desirable case, including a relatively unambiguous federal 
goal and readily available data. The recency and popularity of the program provide 
additional incentive to study the program.11 
SCHIP has an unambiguous primary goal at the federal level: to increase the 
enrollment of children from low-income families in medical insurance programs. More 
specifically, to enroll targeted children—uninsured children who are ineligible for 
Medicaid but below 200 percent of the federal poverty level—in public health insurance 
                                                 
11
 In addition to these reasons for selection of SCHIP as a policy focus, child health policy has been a 
common platform for implementation studies, allowing for some continuity in the development of 
implementation theory within what is arguably a single policy context. Goggin (1986) focused his early 
implementation research on child health policy, and suggested many compelling reasons for focusing on 
this particular policy area, including the history of disenfranchisement of children in American health 
policy. His 1999 piece on SCHIP also forms a strong complement to the work proposed here. 
12 
programs (Nicholson-Crotty, 2007). SCHIP legislation demands that participating states 
make every effort not only to encourage enrollment of uninsured low-income children in 
health insurance programs, but to specifically encourage enrollment in public programs 
for which they are eligible, including SCHIP. This approach to social welfare, in which 
enrollment in the program itself is considered an outcome, is unlike other social programs 
such as Welfare to Work or Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF) the ultimate goal 
of which is arguably to eventually remove individuals from public assistance.  
State goals for SCHIP, on the other hand, may be significantly more diverse. In 
addition to some states’ expansion of the program to cover children in higher income 
families and other expansions to cover low-income parents and in some cases childless 
adults, a range of desired outcomes and evaluative measures have been adopted by the 
states, displaying a variety of objectives beyond the federal impetus to provide more low-
income children with health insurance (Shi et al. 2000). 
It is also important to note that the issues of goal alignment are of particular and 
timely interest in this reauthorization era of SCHIP, in which federal legislative action is 
required if federal appropriations are to continue. The apparent unwillingness of the 
states to allocate additional funding at the state level without continued federal matching 
(Wolf, 2007) and the political rhetoric of federal-state conflict surrounding the 
president’s veto of SCHIP renewal legislation provide strong examples of the policy 
implications of goal conflict across legislative units. 
The history of SCHIP is long enough to observe some trends over time and to observe 
the effects of goal conflict through pooled analysis over nearly a decade of observation.12 
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 This said, there are still some data limitations based on the availability of data for all program years. The 
limited number of time points also limits panel data analysis, but the time horizon does at least allow for 
13 
The SCHIP program also displays variation in state implementation, including various 
state legislative actions expanding or limiting spending on the program, providing an 
opportunity to view a variety of implementation strategies and goal levels for a single 
public policy (Shi et al., 2000; Blewett and Davern, 2007). 
Frameworks 
The policy context of intergovernmental programs like SCHIP is layered and 
complex and multiple frameworks often apply (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001). Choosing 
parts of these multiple frameworks based on their relevance to the policy problem at hand 
allows for synthesis in implementation research without allowing the number of variables 
to increase exponentially as might occur if we tried to apply all frameworks at once 
(O’Toole, 2000; Goggin, 1986).  One challenge to overcome is the recognition that policy 
formation can be understood as an institutional phenomenon in which institutions act and 
react to one another, and simultaneously as a social phenomenon in which individuals act 
and react to one another. Institutional actors may be individuals or groups and operate in 
roles and capacities that are largely symbolic and prescribed by complex rules and have 
rather limited ranges for goals. Individual actors, on the other hand, fill those roles and 
also operate as autonomous, sentient beings with a variety of competing internal and 
external interests (Parsons and Shils, 2001). While it is recognized that the institutional 
actors at play are comprised of individual actors, the focus of this inquiry will be on 
institutional actors and variables relating to those relevant institutional actions. Though 
this choice discards some of the nuance of the policy history and the impact of policy 
entrepreneurs, it also has the benefit of narrowing the scope of variables (Goggin, 1986) 
                                                                                                                                                 
some observation of heteroskedastic and trending tendencies, allowing for appropriate corrections. To see 
data in-hand, refer to table 2. 
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and mildly improving generalizability.13 The synthetic framework for the empirical 
research employed in this dissertation will be founded on a careful combination of three 
sets of theory:  
1. Agency theory and its political economy counterpart, the approach 
embraced by Chubb (1985), Waterman and Meier (1998), and Nicholson-Crotty 
(2004), will form the primary conceptual framework for notions of goal conflict 
in the SCHIP policy arena. The primary work of the dissertation will be refining 
and applying goal conflict concepts in the SCHIP context. 
2. Intergovernmental theory,14 particularly the Josselin and Marciano (2004) 
federate framework, organizational arrangements identified by O’Toole and 
Montjoy (1984), and an original extension of these frameworks that incorporates 
the agency perspective. This modified joint implementation framework (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1984; Goggin, et al., 1990) will provide a contextual framework 
for narrowing the focus of the broader agency theory and political economy 
literatures to a specific federal-state context.  
3. A systems theory approach to conflict in multi-actor systems (Liu, et al., 
1998) will be utilized in generating operational definitions for goal conflict and 
understanding definitional differences between various goal conflict measures.  
                                                 
13
 As a research endeavor exploring a single policy, external validity is already significantly limited. 
However, inasmuch as the analysis remains at the institutional level, particularly in dealing with institutions  
that are relatively stable (i.e. state legislatures and Congress), the analysis remains useful for comparison 
with research in other policy areas, similar policies at different points in time, and the like. 
14
 I am using this term rather liberally here; as demonstrated by the discussion to follow, there are a few 
specific frameworks from theory on federalism and intergovernmental relations that adequately allow for 
application in a goal conflict context, and the structure of which matches the policy environment of the 
SCHIP program. 
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Conceptual framework: Principal-agent and related paradigms 
Agency theory provides a useful paradigm for systematic exploration of the issues of 
state-level implementation of national-level policy. The governmental system in the 
United States has been described as a principal-agent chain wherein citizens elect 
legislatures, legislatures direct administrative bodies, and these administrative bodies 
perform tasks of import to the citizenry (Wilson, 1989; Nicholson-Crotty, 2004, 
Waterman and Meier, 1989; Moe, 1984, Goggin et al., 1990). This application of the 
principal-agent model to government introduces an important perspective to the study of 
governance; namely, that the success of policy is reliant on the congruence of goals in 
multiple governmental systems. If goal conflict exists between any two links of the 
governmental chain, the goals and intent of the policy can be displaced by the goals of 
agents functioning further down the implementation chain (Moe, 1984; Wilson, 1989; 
Nicholson-Crotty, 2004).  
Goal conflict theory is fundamentally based in legal contract theory and relates to the 
goal congruence of various actors within a system. Generally couched in the principal-
agent paradigm, such research is generally more focused on transaction costs than on goal 
congruence as an outcome in and of itself, but this stream of research is nonetheless 
significant due to its focus on the competing goals that may exist (and, indeed are 
expected to exist) between organizations—in this case, between each element of 
government and the next (Miller, 1990; Waterman and Meier, 1998).  
Application of the agency problem to the legislative-bureaucratic relationship is 
widespread; indeed even Waterman and Meier’s (1998) proposed expansion of the theory 
for adaptation in a government context is designed explicitly for interactions between the 
legislative and bureaucratic arms of government. However, relatively few scholars have 
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applied the paradigm to the interactions between Congress and the states. The guiding 
assumption for this analysis is that the paradigm applies: that goal conflict is possible, 
observable, and has an impact at least on government actors if not the outcomes of the 
policies themselves. Nicholson-Crotty’s (2004) work suggests that this is indeed a 
reasonable set of assumptions. Informed by the demands of Waterman and Meier, 
however, goal conflict ought not be assumed but rather measured.  
Intergovernmental relations in the United States are particularly vulnerable to goal 
conflict, and such conflict is a major factor in explaining the failure of public programs 
(Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). This tension can be described not only in the conflict 
between policy elites and lawmaking bodies, but also as a passive tension between beliefs 
aggregated across the states and made manifest in Congress and beliefs aggregated within 
states and made manifest in state legislatures (Sanford, 1967). The aggregation of voter 
preferences at the state and federal levels results in a set of nested preferences that may 
conflict when these preferences are expressed across governmental institutions (Keiser, 
2003; McGinnis, 2003). Goal conflict between mandating legislatures are particularly 
observable in federal mandates resulting in grants to the states (Nicholson-Crotty, 2004).  
Contextual framework: Intergovernmental theory 
In an article applying the principal-agent paradigm to the field of sociology, Shapiro 
(2005) elegantly states, “Only the rare agent has the luxury of aligning her interests with 
a single principal. Conflict of interest is hardly about shirking or opportunism with guile; 
it is about wrenching choices among the legitimate interests of multiple principals by 
agents who cannot extricate themselves from acting for so many” (278). 
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Josselin and Marciano (2004) describe multiple potential principal-agent relationships 
between citizens and state and federal governments. They essentially make the 
aggregation argument described in the previous section of this chapter, but do so in a 
framework of geographic and functional alienability of government functions and the 
assignment of responsibilities among central and local governments. They describe a 
range of possible federal arrangements including what they deem a pure Tiebout 
approach of perfect competition among geographical agents (Citizens act as principals 
and distinct jurisdictional governments compete for agency); a confederate framework in 
which citizens act as the primary principals and member states the primary agents, states 
the secondary principals and the federal government the secondary agent; and a federate 
framework in which citizens are the primary principals, the federal government the 
primary agent, and states the secondary agents to the federal (secondary) principal. This 
federate framework best describes the approach taken here. 
Like the intergovernmental relations framework, the proposed analysis of SCHIP goal 
conflict/congruence focuses in part on policy and its directionality and trade-offs in 
policy priorities among various governmental actors. It also borrows interest in 
mission/purposes and the use of inducements, areas of focus appropriate to the 
framework of federalism (Wright, 1990). Based on the organizational arrangements 
suggested by O’Toole and Montjoy (1984), SCHIP would best be termed a sequential-
reciprocal arrangement. This arrangement allows for the hierarchical inducements offered 
by the federal government in hopes of triggering state action on the behalf of target 
beneficiaries, and allows for some degree of flexibility in this process when the interests 
of the federal and state actors are not aligned. This simplified model, however, ignores 
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the role of citizen-level principal preferences in affecting the behaviors of the federal and 
state agents as described by the federate framework of Josselin and Marciano (2004). 
This added complexity provides depth to the concept of legislative goals at each level of 
government by recognizing that goals are not exogenous factors, but are endogenous 
variables affected simultaneously by past and present action on the part of all actors 
(Krane, 1993). This observation is made rather poetically by Sanford (1967): “The 
national government cannot effectively reach its goals without the power of the sates. The 
states cannot serve all their people without the power of the national government… The 
national government needs the power of the states. It cannot afford to see them scuttled. 
Neither can the states go it alone. They need the power of the national government” (97-
98; see also Ingram, 1977). 
These frameworks of joint implementation bring a richness of context to the inquiry 
regarding goal conflict which might be lost in a strictly traditional principal agent 
paradigm. However, due to the explicit focus on goal conflict, the principal-agent 
approach should be married with, rather than supplanted by, these alternate frameworks 
for the conceptualization of intergovernmental relationships in SCHIP. This research 
assumes a modification of the federate framework in which citizens are the primary 
principals for both the federal and state governments, and the federal government serves 
as a secondary principal and the states as a secondary agent.15  
                                                 
15
 A tertiary principal-agent relationship exists between the states and the administrative mechanisms 
employed for implementation (which may include re-delegation to county or other governments or directly 
to state-level agencies). 
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Operational framework: A systems perspective on conflict 
The federal arrangement in the United States has been described as a system with 
multiple principals and multiple agents (Wildasin, 2004). A series of papers on systems 
analysis produced by researchers at the University of Texas at Austin (Liu, et al. 1998; 
Barber, Liu and Ramaswamy, 1998; Barber, et al. 1998; hereafter dubbed “the Austin 
team”) describe some specific characteristics of such a multi-actor16 system: 
“Conflicts may arise due to two reasons: (i) if certain [actor] goals depend on 
one another, or, (ii) if these goals cannot coexist…conflicts may also arise due 
to resource sharing problems. In addition to goal conflicts, plan conflicts 
(interference of [actors]’ individual plans) and belief conflicts ([actors] hold 
incompatible beliefs) can also occur…” (Barber, Liu, Ramaswamy, 1998, 2) 
 
The Austin team has defined three classes of conflict in multi-actor systems: belief 
conflicts, priority conflicts17 and plan conflicts. Each type of actor conflict has a unique 
role in the implementation process and a distinct theorized interaction with other types of 
conflict in the system. Beliefs support plans and goals and describe resources. Plans are 
designed to achieve priorities and schedule resources. Achievement of priorities requires 
resources but serves to determine the pre- and post-conditions necessary for execution of 
plans (Liu et al, 1998).  
Belief conflicts are “inconsistent descriptions about facts or incompatible evaluation 
statements…different structures to represent their beliefs, or if their beliefs are at 
different abstraction levels” (Barber, Liu, Ramaswamy 1998, 8). Belief conflicts are of 
                                                 
16
 The terminology actually used by the Austin team defines goal conflict within a “multi-agent system.” 
However, this discrepancy is just an artifact of terminology and is to be understood as an independent and 
empowered actor in the process of solving an optimization problem. Particularly given the employment of 
agency theory in this paper, for the purpose of clarity, all references to multi-agent systems have been 
“translated” into the frameworks operant in this paper, wherein they are best understood as actors (being 
either principals or agents). 
17
 The Austin team refers to priority conflicts as “goal conflicts,” but for the purpose of clarity, this 
terminology has been altered for the purposes of this paper. Belief, priority and plan conflicts are 
considered subsets of the larger goal conflict framework derived from agency theory. 
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secondary concern and only cause conflict inasmuch as they affect plans or goals (Liu et 
al, 1998, 4). In the federal-state context, belief conflict neatly describes the phenomenon 
of conflict at the level of preference aggregation, where citizens and coalitions express 
their beliefs through direct and indirect mechanisms of influence on the political and 
governmental institutions in place. These expressions may conflict at the most grassroots 
level, but this conflict is manifest primarily through its impact on the expressed goals and 
plans of the government structures erected to represent them. The belief conflict of 
particular interest in state-administered federal policy is the conflict resulting explicitly 
from levels of aggregation—where state-level preference conflicts with national-level 
preference. This belief conflict is likely to cause goal conflict and plan conflict when the 
legislative expressions of these beliefs interact. Nicholson-Crotty’s (2004) conception of 
goal conflict, which he operationalizes in terms of a citizen ideology scale based on 
measures of liberalism/conservativism, may be classified as a belief conflict.  
Priority conflict is described as conflict “involved with a goal’s property, which may 
or may not be represented as ordering constraints or conditions.” (Barber, Liu, 
Ramaswamy 1998, 8). Conflicts occur when the two goals cannot be simultaneously 
achieved (Liu et al, 1998, 4). Priority conflict is highly compatible with the observations 
of Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) regarding potential conflict in joint implementation. 
They identify incompatibility with other programs, preference for other programs, 
simultaneous commitments to other projects, and lack of urgency among the reasons for 
lack of goal alignment in joint implementation arrangements.  
Ekenberg (2000) contributes a slightly modified conception of the use of the term 
“goal” in a multi-actor context by providing the term “ultimate goal,” the plan that would 
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be executed by an actor in the absence of any interference from conflicting plans or goals 
from other actors.  Understanding a goal simply as the course of action that would be 
taken in the absence of interference is compatible with application to a legislative system 
generally, and is particularly compatible with classical interpretations of the problems 
associated with fiscal federalism.  
Plan conflict is conflict “in which certain preconditions of an [actor’s] intended 
actions…become invalid due to the post-conditions of other [actors’]  actions” (Barber, 
Liu, Ramaswamy 1998, 8). In this case, priorities may be compatible but the means of 
achieving them may not be (Liu et al, 1998, 4). The sentiment described by Ekenberg 
(2000) in another systems analysis framework is echoed in literature on the “new 
federalism.” Ekenberg writes: “[actors] are forced to abandon possible paths leading to 
goals because the utility is too low in a particular environment or when the probability to 
achieve them along a specific path is too long according to certain risk constraints” (600). 
This sentiment links the plan conflict described by the Austin team with the Ekenberg 
concept of an “ultimate goal,” This concept of an “ultimate” goal that is altered by inter-
actor interactions is useful for describing the effects of goal conflict on individual 
actors—in this case, on legislative bodies. It can be argued that it is plan conflict, and not 
priority conflict, that should directly affect the use of resources in achieving a certain set 
of goals. Belief and priorities, in turn, impact the development and coordination of plans. 
Conflict between state-aggregated and nationally-aggregated opinion may cause 
belief conflicts among citizens and coalitions. This conflict leads to a potential priority 
ambiguity (which set of preferences should take precedence?) that is transmitted to the 
respective legislative bodies and may be expressed in legislative priority conflict. 
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McCubbins (1985) suggests that high levels of political conflict motivate Congress to 
limit agent discretion. Bawn (1997) relates this political conflict directly to the public, 
suggesting that as importance of an issue to the public increases, so does legislative 
control. In the case of joint implementation, the nesting of the state constituency within a 
national constituency may pit two legislative bodies against one another in determining 
the balance of discretion between them. Thus, the citizen/coalition belief arena may be in 
conflict based on levels of aggregation and as such, may affect the goal arenas of both 
state and federal legislative bodies. This conflict would then potentially materialize as 
plan conflict, as each legislative body devises implementation mechanisms for the policy. 
During the federal-state negotiation phase (Ingram 1977), the ultimate goals of each 
legislature may conflict if the plan of the federal legislature is incompatible with the plan 
of the state government.18 At this point, the state government must also reconcile the 
interests of its constituencies with the interests of its principal. The state government is 
not without recourse: it can choose not to accept the federal inducement, or can negotiate 
through explicit means such as waivers (Volden 2007).  
Once a quasi-contract has been negotiated, the state becomes directly responsible for 
implementation of the plan. Implementation may be delegated to sub-state governments, 
to state agencies, or to private contractors, but it is the state that is held responsible by the 
federal principal. The state’s implementation procedures yield outputs and/or outcomes, 
which are then evaluated by the state and national populations, providing a feedback loop 
and affecting the citizen/coalition beliefs (Goggin et al. 1990). 
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 The term “government,” rather than “legislature,” is used because the negotiation process may involve 
not only legislative action but also rule negotiation between the state implementing body and the federal 
government through waivers and other administrative actions. The entire process of negotiating 
permissions in order to access federal funds while designing a state-level program is considered 
development of the “quasi-contract.” 
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Even if these three subtypes of goal conflict are not distinguishable through use of the 
proxy measures identified in this analysis, the multi-actor goal conflict framework is 
nonetheless useful for helping to identify variables of goal conflict/congruence that may 
otherwise have been overlooked. Use of the conflict measures proposed is well-supported 
by their presence in previous studies and the repeated call for consideration of goals and 
priorities in the intergovernmental policy process. This said, it is acknowledged that 
beliefs, priorities and plans are not necessarily exogenous and should not be considered 
fixed. However, if policymaking is considered an iterative process in which policies are 
made to respond to beliefs, priorities and plans as they exist at one point in time, they 
may be treated as exogenous for analytic purposes even if, strictly speaking, they 
continue to shift based on a rapidly changing environment19. 
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the policy mechanisms involved in SCHIP policy. The 
numbered relationships indicate actions taken—in rough chronological order—to make 
SCHIP available within a state. The lettered relationships are for convenience in further 
discussion of the principal-agent relationships evident in this complex political economy. 
The first relevant policy action is the expression of citizen preferences (belief-level 
action) through election of representatives to, and subsequent relationship of influence 
with, Congress (1,2) and the state legislature (3).  Note that state populations are nested 
within the national population and as such provide not only aggregate preferences to 
Congress (1) but also state-specific preferences to state Congressional delegations (2). In 
response to the preferences of the citizens (and the lobbies organized in their behalf), 
Congress enacts legislation (e.g. the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 authorizing SCHIP) 
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 This environment may include the policies that the beliefs, priorities and plans in question helped to 
influence and bring to pass. 
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and seeks Presidential20 approval21 (4). Once this approval is received, Congress may 
make federal funds available to the states through an appropriations process defined by 
Congress (5). The President provides the appropriate agency (in this case the Department 
of Health and Human Services) with rulemaking authority, subject to the constraints set 
forth by Congress (6,7). State legislatures passing bills authorizing SCHIP-related 
expenditures authorize state agencies to implement the necessary mechanisms for 
administering the program (8). This includes the necessity to submit SCHIP plan 
proposals to the responsible federal agency and to negotiate an approved state plan (9). 
This plan is then implemented through the state administrative body, yielding provision 
of services and assistance to the state public (10). 
This federal-state framework (see figure 1.1) identifies four distinct potential loci for 
goal conflict. The first is a belief-level conflict between the will of the citizens’ 
preferences as aggregated in (1) and those aggregated at the state level (2,3; see locus A). 
While these expressions are not de facto in conflict, they may nonetheless be in conflict. 
The conflict here is not so much between a principal and agent, but rather between two 
sets of principals. This conflict is fundamentally a belief conflict originating out of the 
aggregation problem, but in a Tiebout model of independent jurisdictions, such difference 
of belief would pose no conflict. The conflict arises out of the competitive nature of the 
primary agency problem in a multi-principal situation. Therefore, this source of conflict 
is distinct from the primary agency problem in that the conflict exists between two levels 
of citizen aggregation, but is expressed at the Congressional level. This underlying belief 
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 The President also being elected and thus beholden to citizen preferences. The difference in the 
presidential case is that citizen preferences are only expressed in aggregate form—as in (1)—rather than in 
state-specific units. 
21
 Approval may also be withheld in the form of veto, as evidenced in the 2007 SCHIP reauthorization 
attempts. 
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conflict feeds into the goal conflict in Congress but not to the goal conflict in state 
legislatures. 
A second locus for goal conflict derives from the citizen/legislature relationship in 
which citizens and/or coalitions serve as principals and legislatures as agents (B1, B2). 
This phenomenon has long been an interest of political scientists and is the focus for a 
strong and thriving field of research (e.g. Page and Shapiro, 1983).  
If we assume that the preferences of the national population are effectively 
represented by the federal legislature(s) and that the preferences of the state populations 
are effectively represented by the state legislatures (an assumption supported by the work 
of Page and Shapiro, 1983, and others), then the stewardship model is more appropriate 
than the principal-agent paradigm for describing each of these relationships and the only 
remaining conflict is a matter of balancing between the competing demands of the states 
on the federal legislature in a zero-sum environment. This is priority conflict as classified 
by the Austin team. One problem with this approach is that it assumes away the 
possibility of legislative goals and priorities distinct from those of the constituencies it 
represents. One such legislative goal is the idea of budgetary slack (Bourgeois 1981; 
Cyert and March, 1963), which would allow legislatures greater freedom in selecting 
among budgetary priorities. 
The agency problem also exists in the relationship between legislative bodies and the 
executive agencies responsible (either directly or through the mediating influence of the 
executive) for carrying out their will (Huber and Shipan 2007; Balla and Wright 2001; 
Furlong 1998). The will of Congress may conflict with the actions of the federal agency 
with which states apply for or negotiate access to federal funds (C1). The plans developed 
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and implemented by state agencies also have the potential to conflict with the will of their 
legislative principal (C2). This type of conflict would be classified as plan conflict. 
The point of negotiation between states and the federal government occurs at (D), 
during the plan approval phase. Approved state plans receive access to federal funds and 
denied plans do not; the plan negotiation process that takes place between the state 
agency and the federal agency is essentially the ground zero for expression of goal 
conflict. One major question that extends beyond the scope of the research endeavor 
described here is what roles each agency plays in the plan approval process—does the 
federal agency seek to please the President, Congress, or the states? This question enters 
the following analysis in terms of the outputs of that black-box negotiation process: the 
approval of state plans and waivers that appear—at least—to conflict with the purposes 
of SCHIP outlined by Congress. 
Supplemental Literature Review 
Related Frameworks: Stewardship Theory, Goal Ambiguity, and Organizational Goals 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) describe a situation in which a principal-
steward (as opposed to principal-agent) relationship may exist. The fundamental 
difference between agency and stewardship theory is the absence of goal conflict (also 
termed the “agency problem”). The distinction between the two theories is primarily 
descriptive, but the assumptions underlying the difference between the two theories 
yields an operationalization of the concept of goal conflict that has been used in error. 
According to agency theory, the presence of goal conflict necessitates coercive 
mechanisms for minimizing the incentive for an agent to pursue its own goals rather than 
the goals of the principal. In stewardship theory, the alignment of goals between the 
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principal and the steward render such mechanisms unnecessary. Thus, it might seem 
logical that the presence and/or activation of coercive mechanisms might indicate goal 
conflict whereas the absence of these mechanisms might indicate greater goal alignment. 
There is a fallacy (affirming the consequent) in this operationalization, however, because 
it is possible that goal conflict does exist, but that the principal has taken no effort to 
minimize it. In such cases, agency theory suggests that the outcomes will most closely 
match the interests of the agent.    
In a qualitative inquiry into the nature of government-nonprofit contracting 
relationships, Van Slyke (2006) contrasts agency theory and stewardship theory (drawn 
from Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 1997) in describing the nature of government-
nonprofit partnerships. In his description of the differences between the theories, he 
posits several differences in the behavior of the various actors, including the types of 
coercion that might be used to enhance contract performance. The comparison of agency 
and stewardship theory in government-nonprofits is salient to this discussion because 
Van Slyke’s theory suggests that conflict and transaction costs are minimized in contracts 
with nonprofit agents because, as quasigovernmental entities, nonprofits share goal 
congruence with government. This is the same fundamental argument for state 
implementation of federal programs. While Van Slyke’s comparison of agency and 
stewardship theories is complete and the application in an interorganizational 
environment appropriate and qualitative depth useful, his analysis nonetheless falls 
somewhat prey to the logical trap described above.  
The concept of goal conflict cannot be divorced from the underlying understanding of 
organizational goals nor from Chun and Rainey’s research agenda involving goal 
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ambiguity in the public sector. Conflict in goalmaking in the intergovernmental setting is 
subject to the general weaknesses of organizational goals and to the ambiguities 
explicated by Chun and Rainey (2005). Indeed, ambiguity of goals at any locus of 
potential conflict in a multi-agency model may affect the level of conflict observed.22 
Scott (2003) provides a useful discussion of organizational goals and the management 
literature associated with organizational goal setting. In his introduction to the concept of 
organizational goals, he writes, “The concept of organizational goals is among the most 
slippery and treacherous of all those employed by organizational analysis.” Among the 
problems associated with the concept of the organizational goal is the difficulty of 
interpretation and the multifaceted nature of goal interpretation. This multifaceted nature 
of goals is particularly evident in the public sector, where goals signal different intentions 
and interpretations to different stakeholders (Rainey 2003).  
Chun and Rainey (2005a) describe four distinct types of goal ambiguity in the context 
of federal agencies. These are comprehension, priority, directive, and evaluative goal 
ambiguity, the increase of ambiguity in each case increasing the amount of interpretive 
leeway allowed by the organizational goal or mission. The real distinction between the 
types of ambiguity, then, is the role of the goal or mission itself. Comprehension 
ambiguity relates to the role of an organizational goal in terms of “understanding, 
explaining, and communicating the mission.” Priority ambiguity focuses on the ability of 
a goal to indicate “priorities among multiple goals or goal-equivalents.” Directive 
ambiguity relates to the role of “guiding specific actions to be taken to accomplish the 
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 Goal conflict may be described in terms of the bureaucratic politics model originally described by 
Allison (1971) and Halperin (1974). This model suggests that the hallmarks of policy conflict include 
bargaining or coercion.  
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mission.” Evaluative ambiguity focuses on the role of “evaluating the progress toward the 
achievement of the mission” (5). 
Scott describes five uses for organizational goals: cognitive, cathectic, symbolic, 
justificatory, and evaluative.23 The cognitive use of a goal describes the intent to provide 
criteria for selecting among alternative courses of action (Simon 1946), a purpose 
particularly applicable to the interpretation of goal conflict as a conflict of alternative 
plans.  The purpose of the cathectic (motivational) role of organizational goals is 
ostensibly to bolster the intrinsic motivation of organizational employees. In contrast, the 
symbolic function of goals is to signal intent to external stakeholders, in the public 
context including citizens and coalitions, representing to them some understanding or 
acknowledgement of the preferences expressed through the political process. Justification 
and evaluation are two final purposes of goals, both of which are realized after the 
associated action has already occurred. Justification is the post-action correlate of the 
cathectic role of goals, providing post hoc motivations and reasoning in support of a 
course of action taken. Evaluation is the post-action correlate of the cognitive purpose of 
goals, providing “criteria for identifying and appraising selected aspects of organizational 
functioning” (Scott 2003).  
Chun and Rainey’s discussion of four aspects of goal ambiguity derives in part from 
the multifaceted nature of organizational goals. Evaluative goal ambiguity, for example, 
relates to Scott’s (2003) discussion of the evaluative role of goals, and directive goal 
ambiguity derives from Simon’s description of the cognitive role of goals (1964). Priority 
goal ambiguity, too, derives from a cognitive approach to goalmaking. Mission 
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 At least three of these are borrowed from the cultural symbol systems elucidated by Parsons and Shils 
(2001) originally described in 1951. 
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comprehension ambiguity best correlates with the vaguery of symbolic and/or cathectic 
goalmaking.24 
Synthesis of goal conflict and goal ambiguity: An update of Matland’s typology 
Matland (1995) relates the theories of goal conflict and goal ambiguity in a typology 
ostensibly describing a combination of top-down and bottom-up implementation 
approaches but—as is relevant here—provides a set of contextual clues that may describe 
variation across states in terms of mandate implementation. It also lays the groundwork 
for relating later work in goal ambiguity, such as Chun and Rainey’s (2005a,b) analysis 
to organizational performance in US federal agencies, to the popular literature in 
principal-agent model applications to government.  
As described by Matland (1995), despite a prevalent view that goal ambiguity has 
been made culpable for implementation failure, ambiguity provides useful political 
advantages in reducing policy conflict among stakeholders and allowing otherwise 
conflict-charged policies to garner sufficient support for passage. Ambiguous legislation 
may therefore be the result of political compromise and defers specific conflicts and may 
invite this conflict to arise in later stages of the implementation process. Matland’s 
typology places policy ambiguity and policy conflict on orthogonal axes.  
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 Gormley (1986) describes a typology in which the salience and complexity of a policy area may 
determine the type of environment in which it is engaged. While we are primarily concerned with policies 
that enter the federal-state plan arena regardless of how they arrived in this particular setting, it is useful to 
note that the technical complexity described by Gormley could contribute to the comprehension ambiguity 
described by Chun and Rainey (2005a) and likely plays a role in the selection of policies into this particular 
arena. Authors building on the work of Gormley have tested his typology in terms of legislative action in 
control of the bureaucracy (Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner, 2003). This approach to description and 
prediction of coercive mechanisms imposed on agencies has not yet been extended to the federal-state 
correlate. 
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In the typology, Matland describes the low ambiguity/low conflict arena 
(administrative implementation) as an arena in which outcomes are dependent on 
resources. Matland predicts normative coercion (Etzioni 1961) to be sufficient, and for 
major implementation problems to arise from technical difficulty, including insufficiency 
of resources, time, monitoring or sanction. The low ambiguity/high conflict arena 
(political implementation) is characterized by dissention due to goal incompatibility and 
fights over means.  Power is the key independent variable predicting outcomes in this 
arena. Compliance relies on coercive and remunerative mechanisms (Etzioni 1961). In 
the high ambiguity/low conflict arena (experimental implementation), context affects 
outcomes. Ambiguity leads to strong differences in policy implementation, and the lack 
of conflict keeps barriers to policy entrepreneurship low (presumably through reduced 
coercive measures).The final arena, high ambiguity/high conflict (symbolic 
implementation) in Matland’s typology depends on “coalitional strength” at the 
state/local level. This arena is typified by the salience of the symbols invoked, which may 
affirm commitment to new goals, old goals, or focus on values and principles. Like the 
experimental implementation arena, symbolic implementation evokes wide interpretation 
of the statute, but the conflictual element invites coercion or bargaining.  
Interpretation of the Matland framework in the context of Chun and Rainey’s 
explication of goal ambiguity, the Austin team’s description of goal conflict types, and 
the flurry of activity in drawing theoretical distinctions between stewardship theory and 
agency theory invite a synthesis and update of Matland’s original typology. A careful 
reading of Matland’s piece reveals that the ambiguity discussed in his framework is 
actually ambiguity of a specific kind—ambiguity that yields an increase in discretion. In 
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terms of the Chun and Rainey framework, this type of ambiguity is best described as 
mission comprehension ambiguity. The goal conflict described by Matland is also 
conflict of a specific kind, with an increase of conflict leading specifically to increased 
use of coercive and remunerative mechanisms to impose goal alignment. In terms of the 
Austin framework, this conflict is best described as plan conflict. Matland’s discussion of 
the use of coercive mechanisms in circumstances of high or low conflict (normative 
coercion for low conflict, punitive or remunerative coercion for high conflict situations) 
describes the fundamental distinction between stewardship and agency theories25. A 
synthesis of these more recent analyses of goal conflict, goal ambiguity and related 
theories is proposed in an update of Matland’s (1995) framework shown in figure 2. This 
adaptation describes Matland’s typology and conclusions as well suited for describing the 
phenomena in the federal-state plan arena within the larger federal-state policy 
framework. 
Fiscal Federalism: Potential outcomes of state-administered federal policy 
Based on the concept of an ultimate actor goal in a multi-actor system (Ekenberg 
2000), state and federal legislatures could be described as having a set of individual 
budget priorities that would be realized if there were no inter-agent interaction between 
the two bodies. The very design of a polycentric, nested system negates the possibility of 
                                                 
25
 Lowi’s (1972) typology of policies also focuses on the interplay between coercive mechanisms and 
resulting goal conflict, though it is more focused on the distribution and balance of costs and benefits 
among groups in society. His typology describes regulatory policy (costs narrowly distributed but benefits 
widely distributed; high coercion yielding high conflict;), distributive policy (costs widely but lightly 
distributed, benefits narrowly distributed but thought to be widely beneficial; lower conflict yielding an 
agent-client type relationship), and redistributive policy (reallocation of wealth among broad groups or 
classes; high conflict due to perceived zero-sum nature of interaction, variable coercion). This typology 
relates best to the type of goal conflict that occurs in the citizen/coalition arena, affecting the underlying 
beliefs and assumptions upon which all other institutional goals and plans are predicated. An understanding 
of the types and structures of regulatory, distributive and redistributive policies is necessary for capturing 
the interplay between belief conflicts and goal and plan conflicts. 
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such isolation, but certainly the magnitude of impact of one legislative system upon the 
other exists on some scale ranging from very small interference/impact to very large 
impact. In the case of state-implemented federal policy, this level of impact is assumed to 
be larger rather than smaller, because in this cooperative (coercive?) arena, the ultimate 
success of each agent’s goal relies at least in part on the behavior of the other agent. 
There are multiple hypothesized reasons for engagement in the federal-state policy 
arena for both the federal and state governments. Oates (1999) describes several in his 
essay on fiscal federalism, including improved responsiveness to the needs of citizens by 
moving discretion to a lower level of government, redistributive benefits based on the 
ability to tax all jurisdictions and use funding formulas to benefit states with the greatest 
fiscal need and least fiscal capacity, internalization of spillover effects for benefits that 
exceed the jurisdictional boundaries of the implementing jurisdiction, equity and 
efficiency of taxation, and improved incentive for policy experimentation across multiple 
jurisdictions. Oates proposes that the magnitude of gains in a decentralized system 
depends on the heterogeneity in demands across jurisdictions and interjurisdictional 
differences in costs.  
Hines and Thaler (1995) suggest that spending patterns differ based on whether 
money is derived from external sources (e.g. intergovernmental grants) or internally (e.g. 
from taxation). This “flypaper effect” suggests that states spend more of their own funds 
in areas supported by federal grants. Mixed research shows the effects of the withdrawal 
of federal funds: some researchers find that governments do not replace lost funds and 
may even reduce levels of their own contribution (Stine, 1994), while others find that 
governments increase their own spending in these areas to maintain benefit levels 
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(Gramlich 1987) and still others find no asymmetry in response to the granting or 
removal of intergovernmental monies (Gamkhar and Oates 1996). Each of these studies 
was performed in a different policy context; one potential reason for the discrepancies in 
this area of research is the absence of goal conflict/alignment variables. It would make 
sense to expect replacement of or increases in funds in areas for which there is strong 
alignment between the goal of the grant and the goal of the state legislative body. On the 
other hand, goal conflict might help to explain the failure to maintain programs once 
federal funds are withdrawn. 
The widespread interest in principal-agent theory and political economy models have 
induced what Oates (2005) calls a “second-generation theory of fiscal federalism” that 
includes “modeling of political institutions with explicit attention to the incentives they 
embody” (364). This synthesis of approaches provides the potential for strong explicit 
linkages between public management and public finance in ways that enhance the 
research endeavors in both fields. Public finance, in particular, may benefit from the 
implementation and institutional paradigms embraced by public management, and public 
management has the opportunity to expand its pantheon of dependent variables from 
heavy focus on efficiency, accountability and effectiveness to a host of potential 
outcomes related to the behavior of government—observable through fiscal and 
budgetary variables. Despite this potential, Oates acknowledges that the joining of the 
two approaches has not achieved completion—fundamental questions remain, including 
the basic “in such a public-sector context, who exactly is the ‘principal’ and who are the 
‘agents?’”(357). Oates provides a review of various approaches to principal-agent 
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applications, none of which adequately maps to the actual flow of fiscal and political 
input.  
Oates’ second generation fiscal federalism shares a great deal of common character 
with the intergovernmental relations framework described by Wright (1975, 1990). 
Wright describes a framework involving multiple entities (including federal, state, local 
and sub-local governments), interactions of officials (including beliefs and preferences, 
among others), continuous and cumulative patterns, contacts and relationships, officials 
(elected, appointed and peripheral), and a policy emphasis focused on fiscal issues, 
anchored in politics and suffused with policy. Indeed, the intergovernmental framework 
also resembles the governance framework. It may be possible that the theoretical models 
within the administrative and policy sciences are coming to some form of convergence. 
In any case, the intergovernmental and second-generation fiscal federalist frameworks 
have historically been associated with tensions between levels of government and the 
institutions that underlie them, making them indispensable in the current endeavor. 
Nonetheless, based on Wright’s (1990) comparison of federalist, intergovernmental 
relations and intergovernmental management perspectives, the structure of the theory and 
methods in this analysis take a decidedly federalist approach. 
Volden (2007) might be described as a second-generation fiscal federalist, though he 
is a political scientist and employs a decidedly economic approach. Volden relates 
national and subnational governments in terms of demand for spending, cost of provision, 
efficiency of taxation, policy constraints, grant size. Volden’s game theoretic model 
considers four implementation decisions: whether the national government offers a grant, 
determination of the grant conditions, subnational government acceptance of the grant, 
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and the subnational government determining policy (including spending levels) upon 
receipt. Volden’s four propositions (predicting effects on restrictions placed on grant 
recipients, grant size, quantity of goods provided and grant acceptance) describe useful 
variables for consideration in empirical analysis of specific intergovernmental policies. 
In an early treatise on intergovernmental fiscal relations (particularly grants) and its 
impact on the states, Wright (1975) posed several questions of continued relevance based 
on his in-depth qualitative analysis of the subject: “how rapidly and in what manner do 
legislatures authorize localities to participate in federal grant programs? Is the state itself 
authorized to participate fully in joint programs? Does the legislature provide itself 
…with adequate financial management controls over intergovernmental programs?” He 
also suggested using borrowing costs, legislative apportionment, revenue sharing 
mechanisms and state-local relationships as potential outcomes of federal grants to the 
states. 
This said, a variety of more traditional performance outcomes have also been tested in 
goal conflict-inclusive models. Ingram and Schneider (1990) identify, among their list of 
potential indicators for successful implementation, the potentially conflicting 
achievement of statute goals and local goals (others listed include compliance with 
directives and accountability). Slocum, Cron and Brown (2002) found that goal conflict 
(intra-goal conflict) affected performance through the intermediate variable of goal 
commitment, which they conceptualized after the manner of Hollenbeck, et al (1989), 
and goal-directed behavior. Though this study was focused on perceptual conflicts 
measured with survey instruments, it nonetheless established the logical link between 
goal conflict and performance, and finally, Chun and Rainey (2005b) link their 
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measurements of goal ambiguity (Chun and Rainey 2005a) to agency performance. The 
variables (particularly outcome variables) of fiscal federalism provide useful additions to 
these more traditionally management-oriented outcome variables. 
Application of goal conflict theory 
The discussion and frameworks presented above support the idea that there is value in 
quantifying and observing state goal conflict as it relates to resource, outcome, and policy 
variables in administration of the SCHIP program. This observation was made aptly by 
Shi, et al. (2000) in their expansion of the evaluative framework for SCHIP presented by 
Halfon et al. (1999). While Shi and colleagues introduce the idea of state-level goals, 
they fail to recognize two key points that will distinguish this analysis from those 
suggested by other authors. First, though the authors suggest structure and process 
measures as important evaluative tools, they fail to identify state behaviors at the macro 
level that may have broader implications for the framework within which more micro-
level policy decisions are made. Goggin et al. (1990) suggest avoiding subjective 
evaluations of implementation success or failure and suggest instead using three 
evaluative criteria: First, if the state has carried out the intent of the policy; second, at 
what point in time the policy was put into effect at the state level; and third, has the state 
modified the policy and, if so, “have the modifications helped or hurt the state’s chances 
of achieving programmatic goals…?” (46). Rather than focusing on state spending 
practices, implementation delays and major departures from stated program objectives, 
Shi and colleagues focus on delivery systems, primary care quality and utilization of 
various categories of medical care. Though these are valid structure and process variables 
that may contribute to individual-level outcomes and may be beneficial to states in 
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designing the details of their program, these have limited application to a broader policy 
context. The analysis proposed here, while similarly focused on a single policy, is more 
devoted to policy implementation characteristics that may more readily be borrowed as 
tools for understanding other programs administered in an intergovernmental context. 
The second major departure from Shi and colleagues is the shift of focus from state-
level goals to state-level goal conflict with stated federal goals. In other words, the focus 
is on goal conflict rather than simply on desired outcomes. The outcome measures 
explored by Shi and colleagues are essentially downstream effects that result from the 
stated federal goal of increasing health insurance enrollment. Such downstream goals 
include decreased morbidity rates, increased quality of life, reduction of preventable 
hospitalizations, and improvement in various other specific health statistics. These 
outcomes follow from increased health insurance enrollment, as documented by various 
studies (e.g. Skarr et al. 2002; Szilagyi et al. 2000). These outcomes do not, however, 
identify any departure from the federal goal for the program, and operate comfortably 
within the micro-level structure and process framework identified by the researchers. The 
research outlined in this dissertation identifies circumstances in which state goals depart 
from, rather than augment, the stated federal goal.  
Nominal, resource, and outcome conflict 
There are three major ways in which states may exhibit goal conflict. First, and most 
simply, it could provide coverage for individuals outside the federal target range for the 
program (i.e. children in families with higher incomes than targeted or childless adults). 
This represents a form of plan conflict, and expected contributing factors would include 
belief conflict and priority conflict in addition to other exogenous and endogenous 
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factors. In the absence of any other information about the impacts of this departure from 
federal goals, it can merely be observed that goal conflict exists at face value, based on 
the stated goals of the federal program and the actions of the state that operate outside of 
these goals (Etzioni 1961). We will refer to this kind of goal conflict—conflict at face-
value—nominal conflict. The presence of nominal goal conflict can be observed 
qualitatively; appropriate methods for uncovering nominal conflict might include 
statements made to or by the press, statements made by political actors, or content 
analysis comparing the stated goals of one actor with those of another. Nominal goal 
conflict is therefore subjectively identifiable but perhaps not objectively quantifiable 
except through the kinds of open coding, content analysis, and meta analysis common in 
qualitative research.  
Presence of nominal goal conflict within SCHIP can potentially be observed through 
the seeking of federal waivers or program amendments, identifiable program 
characteristics (such as enrollment eligibility requirements) and enrollment patterns (such 
as enrollment counts of childless adults or children of higher income families) that 
exhibit state operation of the federal program in a manner that is incongruous with the 
standard operation or intent of the program. This form of goal conflict may have little 
effect, however, on achievement of federal aims and may be of little consequence to the 
federal governing bodies. It is therefore useful to observe additional potential areas of 
substantive conflict beyond mere plan specification. 
Based on the discussion of waivers presented here and in chapter 2, nominal conflict 
is assumed in the context of SCHIP enrollment of non-targeted populations. Nominal 
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conflict has also been identified by other analysis, including analysis completed by the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO 2002; GAO 2004). 
Given the working definition of goal conflict for this analysis, a diversion of 
resources from pursuit of the interest of the principal to pursuit of the interest of the 
agent, plan specification that exhibits nominal goal conflict may thus also result in what 
will here be termed resource conflict, or significant expenditure of federal funds on 
objectives that lie outside the federal intent. States may seek to receive federal funds in 
order to divert them to other policy areas either directly (as in the Medicaid case; GAO 
2007, Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Chubb 1985) or through use of federal funds to replace 
expenditures that would otherwise be made by the state, allowing the state more slack for 
use in spending on other state priorities (as opposed to leveraging federal funds in order 
to increase state spending on child health insurance). This represents a type of priority 
conflict that may or may not be accompanied by observable plan conflict. Priority 
conflict is less directly observable due to issues identified by Chun and Rainey as forms 
of goal ambiguity (2005) and observation in empirical analysis relies heavily on analysis 
of the elasticity of federal funding (Oates 1999; Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2006; Nicholson-
Crotty 2004). States that are acting merely due to the federal inducement would be 
expected to freeze state spending levels at the amount required to access full federal 
funds (Volden 2007). States that have significant levels of priority conflict would be 
expected either to spend less than required for access to the full federal allotment, to 
spend at the level required for full (capped) funding and alter program characteristics in 
order to meet other state priorities (such as insuring adults or children from higher 
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income families) or to spend at the level required for full (capped) funding and divert 
funds to other programs.  
In this second type of federal-state goal conflict, as with the first, belief conflict and 
priority conflict are expected contributors to the dependent plan conflict outcomes. 
Resource conflict has implications for the federal funding structure of SCHIP, as 
significant expenditures resulting from state aims that conflict with federal objectives 
may represent a form of fund diversion and make sources of resource conflict a target for 
reform (Kronebusch and Elbel 2004). Unlike nominal goal conflict, increased use of 
federal funds can be quantitatively measured and is not necessarily as subjective in 
measurement as nominal goal conflict. However, the value of resource conflict in 
measuring real goal conflict and predicting program outcomes may be sensitive to the 
way in which it is measured. Efficiency measures, resource input measures, and other 
absolute and relative approaches may be employed to capture resource conflict and may 
be expected to yield different conclusions. 
Resource conflict may be identified if plan-level specification at the state level 
(nominal conflict) results in significant increases in federal spending within those states. 
However, resource conflict may be forgivable if the end result of the additional 
expenditure is an improvement in the achievement of overall program objectives, 
Matland’s assertion that outcomes are determined by resources notwithstanding (1995). 
In other words, if nominal and resource conflict result in improved outcomes, the ends 
may justify the means. If, however, nominal conflict also results in decreases in 
achievement of program objectives, this results in what will here be termed outcome 
conflict.  
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Outcome conflict can be measured by observing the outputs and outcomes of a policy 
relative to the original intent of the policy. In the case of SCHIP, outcome conflict can be 
observed if a state enrolls fewer low income children than expected given the resources 
allocated and other inputs. Outcome conflict, therefore, observes not just the means of a 
policy (as in nominal and resource conflict) but also the ends. If an agent appears to have 
goals that conflict with a policy or utilizes more resources in the process of engaging in 
the policy, the agent might be said to be diverting resources from the interest of the 
principal to its own ends. However, if the ends prove achievement of the desired goal of 
the principal, particularly relative to agents that may not have exhibited purported 
nominal or resource conflict, then the ends may justify the means. While efficiency 
(resource conflict) and compliance (nominal conflict) may still be important, in many 
ways the presence or absence of outcome conflict is the lynchpin of goal conflict 
analysis. 
Dissertation outline 
The choice of some states to enroll non-targeted populations, including adults and 
higher-income children, in SCHIP represents nominal conflict with federal goals. This 
assessment is supported on face-value and by the conflict evident during the 2007 SCHIP 
reauthorization attempts. This dissertation will focus on expanding our understanding of 
goal conflict by exploring resource conflict and outcome conflict in the context of 
SCHIP, determining whether such types of conflict can be observed in relation to the 
nominal conflict evident through enrollment of each of these non-targeted populations. 
Inasmuch as the nominal conflict resulting from enrollment of non-targeted populations 
is an important factor in concerns related to federal fiduciary responsibility and the 
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achievement of the primary objective of SCHIP—to enroll low-income children in 
federal health insurance programs—this dissertation will also focus on finding factors 
that may predict whether or not states engage in these nominally conflicting policies.  
Chapter 3 of the dissertation focuses on resource conflict, examining whether state 
enrollment of non-targeted populations has a significant impact on federal spending 
within a state. Chapter 4 of the dissertation focuses on factors affecting accomplishment 
of the federal SCHIP goal, enrollment of targeted children, evaluated at the state level. 
Outcomes are measured both in absolute terms (number of enrolled children) and in 
terms of the proportion of targeted children who are enrolled and/or who are uninsured. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates an attempt to use goal conflict theory to explore correlates of the 
policy choice to enroll non-targeted populations. The purpose of analysis is to find factors 
contributing to these implementation decisions that might indicate precursors to a state’s 
decision to implement policy in a way that departs from federal objectives.26 Among the 
predictive factors for these models will be measures of goal conflict (including belief 
conflict, priority conflict and, where necessary, plan conflict) as well as more traditional 
measures suggested by SCHIP evaluation frameworks (Halfon et al. 1999; Shi et al. 
2000).  Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of the data employed for this analysis, and 
chapter 6 provides some overall conclusions and directions for future empirical analysis 
and development of theory.  
                                                 
26
 The third dependent variable, delay in implementation, does not directly indicate departure from federal 
goals, but prior work by other scholars, particularly Goggin (1999), suggests that this is an important 
implementation decision that forms an important part of the goal conflict puzzle. Further, Goggin cites a 
memorandum sent by the Center for Medicaid and State Operations to states suggesting that one goal of the 
federal government implied by the timing of the legislation was a preference for rapid implementation of 
the SCHIP program: “the short time frame between the enactment of the bill and the effective date of the 
legislation requires that the States and the Department work together expeditiously so that States can begin 
implementing new programs as soon as possible…” (42). 
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Chapter 2: Data 
Introduction 
Data for this analysis consists of state-level data for the years 1999-2006, including 
general state characteristics, SCHIP policy characteristics, enrollment patterns, and 
financial data. All states, with the exception of Tennessee, are included in this analysis, 
resulting in a total of 392 observations for a strongly balanced panel of 49 states over 8 
years. Because federal policy prohibited enrollment of adults in SCHIP prior to 2001, 
some analysis is performed on a subset of the data consisting of 49 states over the 6 years 
from 2001-2006.  This chapter provides a discussion of the selection of states as the level 
of analysis, an overview of the state circumstances that are relevant to the discussion of 
SCHIP policy, detail the SCHIP funding and waiver processes, and provide summary 
statistics and source information for the variables used in the subsequent chapters. 
Level of analysis 
The selection of state-level, rather than individual level, dependent variables merits 
some discussion. As an entitlement to the states, SCHIP is a federal program designed to 
directly alter the behavior of the states in order to indirectly benefit the nation’s citizens 
through a causal chain linking higher insurance rates to better health outcomes. The 
purpose of SCHIP as both stated in its mandate and implied by its design is the increase 
of state capacity to enroll near-poverty children in public health insurance programs. 
Though by implication the desired end-result is a healthier U.S. child population and all 
its attendant benefits, the first evaluation that should take place is not at the unit level of 
individual outcomes but rather at the state level (Ingram 1977). 
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Because of the important role states and state actors have on the federal policy 
process, particularly in intergovernmental relations (Krane 1993), research on individual 
outcomes to the exclusion of state-level outcomes ignores the significant role and impact 
of state-level information. Focus on the outcomes at the end of the causal chain linking 
availability of public insurance to public health outcomes are valuable, but they are 
limited by shifts in political tides, changes in goal priority, and incompatibility of actor 
goals (Moynihan, 1969). Therefore, the more direct and appropriate program evaluation 
should take place by analyzing the behavior of the level of analysis at which the policy 
was targeted: states. By so doing, it may be possible to observe the effect of shifting goals 
on the proximal outputs that affect outcomes. It is therefore wholly appropriate to focus 
analysis of the SCHIP program solidly on observable state behaviors including state-level 
enrollment rates, implementation decisions, and spending patterns, that the program was 
designed to affect. Such dependent variables are often pejoratively termed “outputs” in 
contrast to the more desirable “outcomes,” but devaluing evaluation of the kinds of 
behaviors a policy was designed to affect is short-sighted and threatens to mire the 
practice of policy analysis in long causal chains with too many points of entry (Goggin 
1986); rather, analysis ought to be engaged in the work of carefully and precisely 
identifying the policy levers that cause both proximal and distal reactions in the 
mechanism of change. 
Single policy approach 
A potential criticism of the single policy approach is that it is too case-driven and 
context dependent. So-called “first generation” implementation studies have been 
criticized for being too case-driven; for providing little generalizable knowledge due to 
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the contextual constraints of the cases selected for observation. This criticism, however, 
could also be levied at the proposed remedy, so-called “third generation” implementation 
research (Goggin et al. 1990). This research, though decidedly more positivist and 
empirical in nature, is still tied heavily to the selection of programs for empirical 
evaluation. This illustrates the very nature of policy analysis in implementation research 
or otherwise: The context determines the constraints in which policies operate, the actors 
involved, and to a great extent affects the interpretation of empirical results. A 
comparative study of multiple policies, as offered by Goggin et al. (1990) is a product of 
the selection of specific policies and the results are hardly more generalizable than the 
careful examination of a single study, as the results could differ substantially if a different 
set of policies had been selected. The accumulation of single studies, in fact, may provide 
precisely the “cumulative effect” prescribed by third generation implementationists in the 
study of factors affecting policy implementation decisions and, ultimately, policy 
outcomes. Conversely, comparative studies can provide a false sense of 
comprehensiveness or universality that does not, in fact, exist. Such studies may be useful 
for identifying variables or trends, but ought not pretend to represent the universe of 
policy action or even a reasonable facsimile thereof, lest third-generation implementation 
research fall prey to first-generation pitfalls. For policies to be grouped together in a 
single study, a careful defense ought to be made regarding the selection of those policies. 
An altogether too common practice is the analysis of multiple policies simply because 
they fit in different quadrants of a popular typology. If comparison is to be done, rather 
than contrasting, there ought to be a case made regarding why disparate policies with 
disparate characteristics ought to be compared. In other words, some case must be made 
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regarding how these cases are comparable at all, let alone on a specific set of variables. In 
the absence of such justification, third-generation research is merely first-generation 
research with a new name and disguised in a shroud of false legitimacy. 
A great deal of variation requiring qualitative and highly subjective analysis would be 
required in expanding this inquiry to a larger number of cases. The comparative nature of 
a multiple-case analysis would be very sensitive to the nature of the policy, the actors 
involved, and a variety of additional variables that would complicate analysis. By using a 
single case, focus can be narrowed to a context that can be qualitatively understood and 
compared across the states, yielding adequate variation to explore the conceptualization 
and measurement of goal conflict across units and levels of government. This approach 
also mimics what little work has already been done on goal conflict in a policy setting 
(Nicholson-Crotty 2004). 
The Absence of Tennessee 
Tennessee is not included in any of the analyses in this dissertation. Because SCHIP 
was designed to enhance and not replace child Medicaid programs already in place, the 
enacting legislation specifically prohibited use of SCHIP funds to provide benefits 
already provided under existing state Medicaid programs. Tennessee was operating a 
Medicaid program, TennCare, that had no upper eligibility limit for enrollees under a 
section 1115 demonstration waiver granted in 1994, prior to the inception of SCHIP 
(Academy Health, 2008). Tennessee closed enrollment for its program in 1995, and in 
April of 1997 re-opened enrollment for children under age 18 without employer-based 
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insurance.27 Unlike Florida, New York and Pennsylvania, which had Medicaid expansion 
programs similar to SCHIP prior to the enactment of the SCHIP enabling legislation in 
1997, no provision was made for Tennessee in the text of the bill. All other early 
providers of children’s expansions for Medicaid received special provisions regarding 
access to SCHIP funds. TennCare faced serious financial struggles during its early years 
and was not able to access funds consistently during the study period due to massive 
reform efforts and political challenges that hampered TennCare during its first decade. 
TennCare continues to enroll children who would otherwise be ineligible for coverage 
under Medicaid. Through creation of a stand-alone SCHIP program called CoverKids, 
Tennessee has had approved SCHIP plans at various times in the 1999-2006 study period. 
However, the qualitatively different nature of public child health insurance in Tennessee 
over this period and its sporadic association with SCHIP rendered it an outlier relative to 
this discussion, and would have created an unbalanced panel due to missing data. Data 
that could be interpolated in order to address the balanced panel issue would be 
misleading, as the research questions in the quantitative analysis presented in chapters 3-
5 focus specifically on federal-state interactions under the SCHIP rubric (as opposed to 
Medicaid demonstration waivers). Because Tennessee did not have an operating SCHIP 
in the traditional sense for the majority of the years for which SCHIP was available to 
other states, its inclusion would be misleading. It can be noted, however, that Tennessee 
was among the few states that had public health insurance programs in place for low-
income children prior to the enactment of SCHIP legislation in 1997, and as such would 
appear to have had highly aligned goals with the federal program. Regulations governing 
                                                 
27
 Department of Health and Human Services, Innovative Sate Strategies to Insure Children, accessed on 
April 9, 2009 from http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/schip/states/Tennessee.html 
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use of SCHIP funds effectively prohibited Tennessee from participating in SCHIP for 
most of the study period. 
SCHIP Funding Formula 
The SCHIP funding formula for the original allotment provided to states includes four 
primary components: Number of low-income children without health insurance in the 
state, number of all low-income children in the state, an adjustment for national average 
cost of medical care/coverage, and a state-specific cost factor (calculated as a ration of 
the state’s average annual health services industry wages to the national average). The 
comparative weight of these four components has been relatively stable over time, with 
one adjustment occurring in 2000 and another in 2001 (Peterson, 2006; see table 2.1). 
These allotments are subject to floors and ceilings. In the first two funding years, the 
statutory floor for allotted funding is $2 million per state. In the following years, the floor 
was the greater of $2 million, 90 percent of the previous funding year’s allotment, or 70 
percent of the original allotment in 1999. In all funding years from 2000 on, the allotment 
ceiling was 145 percent of the original 1999 allotment (Peterson, 2006).  
SCHIP allotments did not determine the federal funding in a state, only the size of the 
funding for which states had prior authorization for eligible spending. States accessed 
funds based on an enhanced FMAP matching rate already in use for Medicaid funding. 
States that spend more than their allotment were additionally granted a reapportionment 
based on a redistribution of funds unspent by other states in a budget year. 
The states and waivers 
States may apply for various types of waivers to federal Medicaid and SCHIP 
guidelines. Two of these waivers in particular are relevant to this discussion. Research 
50 
and demonstration waivers are allowed under section 1115 of the Social Security Act 
(Baumrucker 2008) and were explicitly solicited as early as 2000 (Westmoreland 2000). 
Section 1115 provides authority to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
“authorize experimental, pilot, or demonstration projects likely to assist in promoting the 
objectives of the Medicaid (or SCHIP) statute. Flexibility under Section 1115 is 
sufficiently broad to allow states to test substantially new ideas of policy merit (HHS 
2001; Volden 2006). These projects are intended to demonstrate and evaluate a policy or 
approach has not been demonstrated on a widespread basis. Some states expand 
eligibility to individuals not otherwise eligible under the Medicaid (or SCHIP) program, 
provide services that are not typically covered, or use innovative service delivery 
systems” (CMS, 2008, parenthetical notes added). Section 1115 further authorizes the 
Secretary to waive rules governing the operation of SCHIP and/or to provide federal 
financial participation for benefits that would otherwise not be eligible for federal match. 
The second relevant type of waivers relevant to SCHIP policy are those granted under 
the Health Insurance  Flexibility and Accountability waiver initiative. HIFA waivers are 
an extension of section 1115 authority, granting the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services the ability to grant demonstration waivers authorizing use of 
SCHIP funds for broad enrollment of the uninsured. This is the authority to, for example, 
expand SCHIP coverage to adults (Baumrucker 2008). It is interesting to note that prior 
to the HIFA waiver initiative, enrollment of adults in SCHIP was considered so beyond 
the objectives of the program that separate authority had to be granted before adults could 
be admitted to SCHIP even under section 1115.   
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HIFA waivers were solicited in 2001 by DHHS under Secretary Thompson (CMS 
2001) and guidelines were subsequently provided to clarify the circumstances in which 
such a waiver might be granted. These included, among other provisions, the following: 
• Be in effect statewide; 
• Expand coverage to previously uncovered persons;  
• Coordinate or encourage private and public health insurance coverage for low-
income uninsured persons;  
• In states using SCHIP funds, maintain Medicaid eligibility levels for children that are 
no more restrictive than were in effect in June 1997;  
• Not cover adults in the demonstration at higher income levels than children in 
SCHIP;  
• Be budget neutral under Medicaid or allotment neutral under SCHIP (CMS 2007). 
 
The HIFA program, while prioritizing extant SCHIP goals over support for expansion 
populations, nonetheless indicates a departure from the original purpose of the program. 
Expansions related to HIFA and other 1115 demonstration projects were a major issue in 
the debate surrounding the 2007 SCHIP reauthorization attempts. Secretary Leavitt 
distanced himself and the Bush administration from the actions of his predecessor during 
the reauthorization debate in 2007, demonstrating a form of executive federalism through 
the rulemaking process (Leavitt 2007; Thompson and Burke 2007). The political 
dynamics of SCHIP are somewhat more nuanced and complicated than presented in 
broad strokes here; for additional context, see, e.g. the SCHIP reauthorization history 
assembled by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (KFF, 2008) and 
others (Grogan and Rigby, 2008; Oberlander and Lyons, 2009). 
As was made clear by President Bush during his veto of the two reauthorization 
attempts presented to him by Congress, he felt it inappropriate to spend federal funds to 
support non-targeted populations. Among the issues raised by governors who testified to 
the Health Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee during that 
debate was the issue of redistribution of unspent federal dollars. Under SCHIP funding 
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rules, states that have spent their original allotments are eligible for redistribution of 
unused funds that had been allotted to other states (Peterson 2006). States have two years 
after the allotment year in which to use their allotments. After this period, any unspent 
funds are redistributed based on funding formulae, to states that spent their entire federal 
allotments. This practice of reapportionment is one of the primary ways in which SCHIP 
has overcome the issue of potential funding shortfalls for some states, including very high 
enrollment, high population states like California, Florida and New York. Other 
governors testified against rules published under Leavitt’s direction in 2007 limiting 
future waivers that allowed enrollment of children living above 250 percent of poverty or 
adults without children from federal SCHIP matching eligibility (Smith 2007; Perdue 
2008). 
The SCHIP allotment formula determines how much of the total annual funding 
amount will be available to each of the states through its annual allotment. This formula 
is based on the number of low-income children there are in a state, and what proportion 
of those children are uninsured. It also takes into account the cost of healthcare in the 
state relative to the national average (Peterson 2006). This allotment ostensibly represents 
the upper limit of federal spending on the program in a particular state.  
States have three fiscal years in which to spend each annual allotment. After this 
period, unspent federal funds are reapportioned among states that did not have surpluses. 
This reapportionment is completed based, again, on a formula. States access federal funds 
via a matching rate that is analogous to the matching program as administered in the 
Medicaid program. Eligible expenditures (absent a waiver) are limited to expansion of 
health insurance services to targeted low-income children. Administrative costs and 
53 
program outreach expenditures are limited to 10 percent of total expenditures eligible for 
match. States spending their own funds on approved SCHIP expenses receive a federal 
match based on an “enhanced” FMAP matching rate.28 So, for example, for a state with 
an enhanced FMAP of 70, a one-dollar SCHIP expenditure in that state would result in a 
federal match of three dollars (Peters 2008). This federal match is referred to as the 
federal financial participation (FFP). With a mean enhanced FMAP of 72.33 percent, the 
incentive to spend state funds in order to receive federal monies is strong indeed. The 
FMAP is generated based on a formula involving a comparison of state wealth to national 
wealth.29  
With only four exceptions,30 any state that has ever spent more than the allotment 
provided for a given year (either by spending allotments from previous years or by 
receiving reapportionments) has remained a state that spends more than allotted in a 
given year. While all states except Alaska, Kentucky, Maryland, New York, and Rhode 
Island spent less than allotted in 2000, by 2006 only 10 states spent less than allotted.  
An overview of the states 
Table 2.2 presents a snapshot of the states in 2006 (the latest year in this analysis) 
including indication of the states that use SCHIP funds to insure higher-income children, 
adults, or both, and other relevant state characteristics including upper child Medicaid 
eligibility in 1997 (prior to SCHIP), upper child SCHIP eligibility, number of adults per 
child enrolled in SCHIP, percent of low-income children who are uninsured and percent 
of children in the state who are living at or below 200 percent of FPL. 
                                                 
28
 The enhanced FMAP is calculated as 70 percent of the traditional FMAP plus 30 points, not to exceed 85 
percent. 
29
 Social Security Act Sec. 1101(a)(8) [42 U.S.C. 1301] and sec. 1905(b) [42 U.S.C. 1396d]. 
30
 South Carolina, Utah, Texas and Wyoming. 
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Qualitative observations from the information in table 2.2 demonstrate a wide variety 
of state circumstances with regard to employment of SCHIP waivers. Adults are insured 
in states that have as few low-income (below 200 percent FPL) uninsured children as 6 
percent (Rhode Island; the lowest in the nation) and as high as 28 percent (Colorado; the 
third highest in the nation). This suggests that not only are waivers for the coverage of 
adults approved in states where the ostensible goals of SCHIP have been successfully 
achieved (indeed, Rhode Island’s percent of low-income uninsured children is the lowest 
in the nation) but also in states where many low-income children remain uninsured. 
While prior child eligibility under Medicaid was relatively high for many of the states 
with SCHIP eligibility above 200 percent FPL (as in the case of California, Rhode Island 
and Washington, which had eligibility levels of 200 percent FPL for at least some child 
populations under Medicaid in 1997, all of which have SCHIP child eligibility upper 
limits of 20 percent FPL), the highest SCHIP upper limits occur in states that did not 
cover children up to 200 percent of FPL under Medicaid. Rates of uninsured low-income 
children in states with very high upper SCHIP eligibility (300 percent FPL or greater) 
range from 9 percent (Connecticut) to 25 percent (New Jersey, which upper limit of 350 
percent is the highest in the nation). Several states have come under criticism for 
enrolling nearly as many adults as children in SCHIP, with Wisconsin, Minnesota and 
Arizona enrolling more adults than children in the program at some point after 2001. 
Though Wisconsin’s rate of uninsured low-income children is among the lowest in the 
nation, Minnesota’s 18 percent uninsured low-income children is roughly average (the 
mean in 2006 is 16.7 percent) and Arizona’s 26 percent uninsured low-income children is 
the sixth worst rate in the nation.  
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Data sources 
Data were assembled from a variety of primary sources, including the Center for 
Medicaid Services (CMS), the Kaiser Family Foundation, The US Census Bureau 
(including but not limited to use of the Current Population Survey), the University of 
Kentucky Center for Poverty Research, the Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, and the Congressional record. Data descriptions and sources are 
presented in table 2.3. 
As with any research endeavor, the data collected for this analysis exhibited some 
minor imperfections. Aside from the need to drop the state of Tennessee from the 
analysis, some other data issues arose. General concerns about the quality of proxy 
measures and instruments, endogeneity issues, and other characteristics of variables 
relevant to specific models will be discussed in the chapters in which these variables are 
employed. However, minor issues of missing data are addressed here. 
State SCHIP spending data for the year 2005 was unavailable for all states. However, 
data was available for the years before and after 2005, so the missing data were imputed 
as the average of the figures for the two adjoining years. State spending data was also 
missing for Florida for years 2000 and 2001. Regression and standard averaging 
techniques for imputation were unsatisfactory (yielding figures that were inconsistent 
with general trends in state SCHIP spending), so Florida spending for these two years 
was imputed by generating ratios of state spending to federal spending for all known data 
years, computing the average ratio, and using this average to impute a state spending 
figure using federal spending data.  
Child and adult enrollment figures were missing for Colorado in 2004 and Arkansas 
in 2003. The Colorado figures were computed by averaging the adjoining years. This 
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method was unusable for Arkansas in 2003, however, because enrollment in Arkansas did 
not trend upward between 2002 and 2004 as it had in Colorado (and, indeed, in many 
other states). In order to impute a reasonable estimate of the actual value for Arkansas in 
2003, monthly enrollment data from the Kaiser Family Foundation were used to generate 
comparison ratios between the monthly enrollment data and the ever enrolled in year data 
for all known years. The ratio for 2004 was then applied to the monthly enrollment data 
to generate a value for children ever enrolled in Arkansas SCHIP in 2003. Arkansas is not 
an adult enrolling state, so its number of adult SCHIP enrollees was inferred to be zero. 
Except where noted in the body of applicable chapters (as in the case of SCHIP funding 
formulae), there is no reason to believe that the definition or measurement of the 
variables as reported has changed over time. 
Dependent variables 
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on establishing the use of SCHIP waivers to enroll non-
targeted populations as conflicting with the original goals of SCHIP by examining the 
policies in the context of resource conflict and outcome conflict. Chapter 5 uses the 
broader goal conflict theory described in chapter 1 to see what factors influence and/or 
predict employment of these waivers by the states. These objectives necessitate 
employment of a modest complement of dependent variables. Descriptive statistics for 
these variables are presented in table 2.4.  
Independent variables 
The independent variables identified in tables 2.2 (variable descriptions) and 2.5 
(summary statistics) are used for a variety of purposes, including proxy representation of 
latent variable concepts, instrumenting endogenous variables, controlling for time-
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invariant state characteristics, and examining correlation between potentially related 
variables. The application of these variables is discussed in greater detail in the chapters 
in which they are employed. 
The complement of goal alignment variables representing belief, priority, and plan-
level potential conflict merits further discussion. These variables include citizen 
liberalism score, percent of state congressional representatives voting for the initial 
authorization of SCHIP, percent of state congressional representatives voting to 
reauthorize SCHIP in 2007, party of governor, citizen liberalism score, a dummy for the 
type of SCHIP program (Medicaid type against a comparison of SCHIP-only or 
combination types), dummies for continuous enrollment and presumptive eligibility 
practices, and various capacity/goal alignment variables including number of days to 
submission of initial SCHIP plan, number of days to implementation of the state SCHIP 
program, and number of amendments filed to date. 
Proxies for belief conflict include the citizen ideology score devised by Berry et al. 
(1998), and/or as the proportion of state Congressional representatives voting in support 
of the failed SCHIP reauthorization legislation. 
Priority conflict is represented as an extension of the concept described by Chubb 
(1985) and extended by Nicholson-Crotty (2004), in which fund diversion by the states 
(itself evidence of priority conflict) is represented in terms of elasticity of state spending 
with respect to incoming federal grant monies. Because federal funds are calculated 
based on state spending and an enhanced FMAP matching rate, the relationship between 
state and federal spending should be imminently predictable based on published state 
spending and FMAP figures. Federal spending caps, however, invoke the possibility that 
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a state that shares alignment with SCHIP goals may spend beyond the limitation of 
matched funds. This indication of alignment at the prioritization level is measured using 
residuals from a regression of state SCHIP spending on federal spending and the FMAP. 
These residuals would be expected to capture both the random error inherent to rounding 
and the portion of state spending that is unexplained by access to matching funds: priority 
alignment. 
Plan conflict is readily observed qualitatively in the SCHIP program and has been a 
major point of contention in debates regarding the reauthorization of SCHIP at the federal 
level. In particular, coverage of adults (including pregnant women, parents of children, 
and in some cases childless adults) has been a particular point of tension (Leavitt 2007).  
Other manifestations of plan conflict may include employment of enrollment practices 
that have been shown to be less-effective means of increasing enrollment. The measures 
here proposed include the number of waivers to federal program requirements filed by a 
particular state and a dummy variable for whether continuous enrollment or presumptive 
eligibility are employed by a state (Kronebusch and Elbel 2004). Though such measures 
can be counted, they represent fundamentally qualitative information and are blunt 
instruments for measuring the plan conflict concept in a quantitative setting.  
Given the apparent impact of state fixed-effects and the enrollment of non-targeted 
populations on SCHIP enrollment of targeted children, one final approach employed in 
understanding these concepts is an instrument employed to capture the potential of a state 
to eventually enroll either non-targeted children or adults in the SCHIP program, 
conceptualizing it as a time-invariant preference that merely manifests itself given the 
appropriate set of external circumstances, including the state’s political and economic 
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situation and/or federal inducements or regulations. Though it is not a perfect measure, 
specifically because it cannot capture unrealized potential in states that have not 
manifested a preference for enrolling adults or non-targeted children, a time-invariant 
dummy variable that indicates states that have ever enrolled children and states that have 
ever enrolled adults may provide a view of the role of state goals and preferences on 
outputs even when those preferences are as-yet unexpressed.  
Assumptions and limitations 
This research endeavor relies on the assumption that goal conflict exists and varies by 
state. It further assumes that the construct(s) of goal conflict can and should be measured.  
Establishment of appropriate state-level measures of goal conflict and outcomes for 
the SCHIP program is further challenged by data limitations. The best available estimates 
for uninsurance rates over the course of the SCHIP program are derived from the Current 
Population Survey, and problems with these estimates have been noted, particularly in 
states with especially small sample sizes (Winter and Moyer 1999). Further, data 
availability is a challenge even for the short duration of the SCHIP program. Some data is 
not available for all SCHIP program years, and some measures that have face validity as 
measures of goal conflict are measured only once, (e.g. legislative voting behavior, 
preexisting Medicaid expansion programs, enrollment practices) and must therefore be 
assumed static over the duration of the program. This is further complicated by issues of 
temporal precedence for some measures. Legislative voting behavior in SCHIP 
reauthorization, for example, is arguably a very strong measure of state-level goal 
congruence or conflict with the SCHIP program (particularly in comparison with other 
available proxies) but this measure is observed at the end of the SCHIP program rather 
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than the beginning. While this issue can be set aside by making the assumption that this 
voting behavior merely reveals the static true preferences of the state that have existed 
over time, this assumption nevertheless leaves the analysis open to internal validity 
concerns. Similar concerns affect state-level legislative action to move states toward 
universal health insurance coverage. In addition to temporal precedence and endogeneity 
concerns, these measures are also subject to peer/mimetic effects (Light 1978) 
Other measures, including program features and enrollment practices, are measured 
as dummy variables, the collection of which quickly depletes degrees of freedom while 
yielding results that may complicate interpretation.  
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Chapter 3: Resource Conflict in the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program 
Introduction 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program was passed as part of the 1997 
Balanced Budget Act with bipartisan Congressional support. The goal of the SCHIP 
program, as stated in the enacting legislation, is “to provide funds to States to enable 
them to initiate and expand the provision of child health assistance to uninsured, low-
income children in an effective and efficient manner that is coordinated with other 
sources of health benefits coverage for children.”31 President Bush ostensibly supported 
reauthorization and modest expansion of the program when it was due for reauthorization 
in 2007. In his veto message on October 3, 2007, he indicated that he was vetoing the bill 
“because this legislation would move health care in this country in the wrong direction. 
The original purpose of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) was to 
help children whose families cannot afford private health insurance, but do not qualify for 
Medicaid, to get the coverage they need. My Administration strongly supports 
reauthorization of SCHIP. That is why I proposed last February a 20 percent increase in 
funding for the program over 5 years… Because the Congress has chosen to send me a 
bill that moves our health care system in the wrong direction, I must veto it. I hope we 
can now work together to produce a good bill that puts poorer children first, that moves 
adults out of a program meant for children, and that does not abandon the bipartisan 
tradition that marked the enactment of SCHIP.”32 
                                                 
31
 Social Security Act Sec. 2101. [42 U.S.C. 1397aa] 
32
 Veto message, George W. Bush, The White House, October 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/10/20071003-2.html 
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A statement released by the OMB later in October reiterated the administration’s 
stance with regard to what would become the second bill sent to the President by 
Congress. “The Administration strongly supports reauthorization of the State Children’s 
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in a way that puts poor children first. However, H.R. 
3963 continues to allow states to expand coverage without assuring that poor children 
have coverage first; continues to provide coverage for some adults through 2012; 
continues to allow the use of income disregards to increase eligibility levels; continues to 
move children from private health insurance to government programs; provides 
insufficient safeguards to assure that funds will not be spent on ineligible individuals; 
and, remarkably, actually costs more than the earlier bill, not withstanding supposed 
improvements in policy….[T]he President will veto this legislation if it is presented to 
him without significant changes.”33 
The President’s refusal to sign into law either of two reauthorization attempts 
presented by Congress centered on a handful of specific issues. Press releases from the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and from the White House repeatedly 
identified three of these issues (HHS 2007), namely: 
• A government program intended for low-income children should not cover 
higher-income children 
• A government program intended for children should not cover adults 
• A government program intended for coverage of the uninsured should not 
cover individuals who would otherwise be covered by private insurance. 
Fourteen of the 49 states in this analysis have SCHIP programs have insured children 
whose family income exceeds 200 percent FPL and 11 states insure adults.34 Since only 
                                                 
33
  Statement of Administration Policy, OMB (10/25/2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/hr3963sap-h.pdf 
34
 Tennessee had a Medicaid demonstration waiver prior to the enactment of SCHIP allowing enrollment 
with no upper income eligibility limit.  
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four states engage in both of these practices, a total of 21 states enroll individuals who 
fall outside of the statutory target population for the SCHIP program as authorized in the 
1997 Balanced Budget Act. According to the legislation, which identifies the target of the 
program to be low-income children, “The term `low-income child' means a child whose 
family income is at or below 200 percent of the poverty line for a family of the size 
involved.” Though the act also allows for state discretion in determination of the meaning 
of “targeted low-income child,” administrative practice and executive policy statements 
consistently and repeatedly identified 200 percent FPL as the default upper limit for 
SCHIP eligibility and plan approval, even after the advent of HIFA waiver opportunities 
after 2001. 
Engagement in the practice of implementing a public program in a manner deviating 
from the apparent statutory intent, however, is only one form of goal conflict. Stated 
goals of a program and the political and administrative realities of the public finance 
process can cause divergence in purpose and outcomes (Rosenbaum and Johnson 1986). 
Given the multifaceted and ambiguous nature of public goals even for specific programs, 
it is useful to establish means of understanding whether this nominal goal conflict 
extends into the more practical sphere. Namely, whether public funds designated for a 
specific purpose are being spent on other priorities (Chubb 1985) and whether such 
practice negatively affects the ability of the government (federal or state) to accomplish 
the ends for which the program was established (GAO 2002). 
The reauthorization bills approved by Congress in 2007 provided means for 
expansions of the SCHIP program that would have significantly altered the purpose and 
targets of the program, in part by legitimizing the practices of enrolling children above 
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200 percent FPL and adults in state SCHIP programs. Objecting to this trajectory, 
President Bush insisted that he would veto any bill that did not remain true to the 
purposes outlined in the original SCHIP program (Bush 2007). President Bush vetoed 
two separate SCHIP bills and eventually temporarily extended SCHIP at current funding 
levels until March 2009, when the legislation will be again considered for renewal. 
Several scholars have tackled the crowding-out phenomenon, in which public 
programs provide free or low-cost health insurance to children who would otherwise have 
accessed private insurance (see, e.g. Feinberg and Goldstein 2002; Bansak and Raphael 
2006). Fewer scholars, however, have examined the implications of the target population 
issues raised during the 2007 reauthorization debate. This debate can be viewed from an 
institutional perspective as a question about the nature of federalism, the discretionary 
roles of the federal bureaucracy, and state administrative mechanisms in implementation 
of federal programs. Goal conflict deriving from federal and state administrative 
decisions in the implementation process raises issues regarding the role of states as 
administrators of federal programs, the role of federal agencies as a go-between for state 
officials and federal purposes, and the implications of state-administered federal policy.  
Ultimately, the implications of such semantic discussions of federalism lie in the 
outputs and outcomes of the programs administered in the federalist environment. The 
purpose of this chapter is to determine whether the practice of enrolling non-targeted 
populations—specifically, higher income children and/or adults—significantly increases 
the federal cost of the SCHIP program within a state. Chapter four will examine the effect 
of these practices on enrollment of targeted children. 
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Fiscal Federalism and SCHIP Implementation 
The issue of enrolling non-targeted populations in the SCHIP program does not in 
itself represent goal conflict. Indeed, a program of universal health care coverage for all 
Americans would accomplish the goal of enrolling targeted children in health insurance 
programs. However, the environment of American policy is constrained by limited 
resources, and thus goals are generally more refined, with the intent of maximizing the 
use of federal funds in a cost-effective, targeted manner. The selection of low-income 
children as a target population for the SCHIP program represents an ordering of priorities 
at the federal legislative level that suggests a desire for limiting federal expenditure and 
achieving cost-effective improvements in the enrollment of the target population in health 
insurance programs.  
It follows, then, that the impact of enrollment of non-targeted populations should be 
evaluated in a context of cost-effectiveness, and federal fiscal impact is an important 
component of evaluating administrative decisions that effectively widen the coverage 
population beyond the specifications outlined by Congress in the 1997 enacting 
legislation for SCHIP.  
Total annual federal funding of the SCHIP program is determined legislatively 
through the typical process of executive/legislative give-and-take. Once the total annual 
funding is determined, however, all remaining funding decisions are based on pre-
determined formulas. There are three potential explanations for the desire of states to 
enroll individuals who are outside of the target population in SCHIP. First, enrolling 
individuals outside the target area may be intended to increase enrollment rates within the 
target population (the presumption, for example, that enrolling low-income uninsured 
parents in SCHIP will increase the likelihood of the parents also enrolling their children). 
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Second, enrolling individuals outside the target population may represent a desire on the 
part of states to achieve state goals that may lie outside of the explicit federal goals for 
the program (if a state is concerned with health insurance rates for all children, for 
example, or has low insurance rates overall and has an interest in reducing the overall 
number of uninsured in the state). Third, a state may already have either low rates of 
uninsured within the target population or provide coverage to the targeted population 
through Medicaid, thus desiring funds for achieving other goals merely to make use of 
available federal funds. 
States, having sovereignty over their own practices of revenue generation and 
expenditure, have presumably reached some equilibrium of expressed preferences prior 
to federal government intervention in the form of grants or other inducements. The 
purpose of federal grants, then—including SCHIP— is to shift the preferences of the 
states more toward the preferences of the federal government (Volden 2007). In the case 
of SCHIP as enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the purpose of federal 
expenditures is to increase enrollment of low-income children in health insurance 
programs.  
In theory, the redistributive nature of federal government fiscal activity suggests that 
the federal government prefers to spend its funds in states where the greatest impact can 
be made toward reaching federal goals (Ingram 1997). Federal program expenditures that 
do not accomplish program goals are targets for reform (Heinrich 2002). By design, 
children eligible under extant Medicaid provisions (prior to 1997) are ineligible for 
SCHIP funds. Thus, some states may already have been effectively targeting low-income 
children for enrollment in federal health insurance programs prior to the enactment of 
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SCHIP. Indeed, SCHIP may be seen essentially as a federally mandated Medicaid 
expansion, and some state programs are explicitly designed as such. Federal expenditures 
allotted to states that already provided coverage for low-income children under Medicaid 
should therefore have either expanded coverage, improved enrollment rates, or been 
reapportioned to states with greater need. 
The reapportionment of a state’s allocated funds to other states is of course a 
politically unpopular prospect for state and federal representatives within states facing the 
loss of federal funds. It is therefore not surprising that states would engage in activities 
that would ensure that at least some portion of the federal SCHIP allotments remain 
within the states where they were allotted, despite coverage and eligibility levels that 
already meet federal preferences. 
This reapportionment to states provides incentive, in addition to whatever internal 
incentive already existed, to spend the original federal allotments in the interest of 
receiving additional SCHIP funding. From a federal target perspective, the purpose of 
these funds is to redirect federal funding from states that have already saturated 
enrollment of the targeted program population to states that have under-funded programs 
and thus have not been able to reach enrollment of all enrollable targeted children. 
Governors Perdue of Georgia and Barbour of Mississippi indicated that from their 
perspective, this is not how the reapportionment plays out; rather, states that enroll non-
targeted populations effectively drain their funding, and then receive additional funds 
from states that have focused their efforts on enrolling the targeted population but have 
not used all of their federal allotments (2008). In practice, this is exactly what occurs, 
though the question of motivation remains unanswered: Do states spend more money 
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because they are working harder toward the goal of enrolling more targeted children, or 
are they adopting expensive practices (including enrollment of non-targeted populations) 
in order to receive additional funding through apportionment? 
A more concrete question to be addressed is whether this environment of goal conflict 
and the resultant exceptions to federal policy negotiated between state and federal 
administrative bodies incurs a significant increase in federal expenditure within states 
thus engaged. 
Data and Methods 
The first burden of proof in an analysis purporting to explore the correlates of state 
policy decisions that conflict with federal goals is to establish that the state policies in 
question actually represent expressions of conflicting goals. Given that states have 
several incentives to engage in enrollment of non-targeted populations in order to 
facilitate capture of federal funds, the empirical question of whether federal SCHIP 
spending patterns are, in fact, significantly altered by these enrollment patterns provides a 
straightforward means for demonstrating the presence of federal-state goal conflict 
embodied in these practices.35 Here, we focus explicitly on the relationship between 
enrollment of non-targeted populations and federal expenditures within a state. 
 This chapter focuses on the actual quantity of the federal spending within a state as 
the dependent variable of interest. The actual federal spending within a state is 
determined by state spending patterns, weighted by a formula-derived federal matching 
rate that differs for each state. The size of federal allotment and the enhanced federal 
matching rate (FMAP) used for the SCHIP program are included in these models as 
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 The interrelationship of federal spending, low-income child enrollment, and enrollment of non-targeted 
populations in SCHIP will be explored in further detail in chapter five. 
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independent variables, thus controlling for the effect of these formula-determined 
elements and examining the effect of additional factors on spending patterns within 
states. Federal allotments are apportioned according to a funding formula based on 
SCHIP enrollment figures, total population, cost of health services in a state, number of 
targeted children, and uninsurance rates within the state.  By design, it is expected that 
the federal enhanced matching rate (FMAP) and the state’s own spending levels would 
affect federal spending. These are included in the analysis, as are other factors that appear 
in federal funding formulae for the distribution of SCHIP funds. These include number of 
children living at 200 percent of FPL or below, percent of children at 200 percent FPL or 
below who are uninsured, total SCHIP enrollees (including all child and adult enrollees), 
uninsurance rate in the state, and the state poverty rate. In addition to these variables, 
controls for total allotment size, state wealth (measured as gross state product), and state 
tax revenue.36 Though accounted for in the calculation of FMAP, a scale variable 
(population) has been included in the linear models presented in order to determine the 
independent effects of state size on federal spending patterns.  
One of the primary challenges of the analysis of the effects of state characteristics on 
federal program outcomes (including spending patterns) is that many of the state 
characteristics that are expected to impact these outcomes are latent variables that cannot 
be directly measured, idiosyncratic characteristics of the state (such as political ideology, 
culture, demand for social services, etc.), or state characteristics (e.g. population) that can 
be relatively stable within states but differ significantly between states. Generally, such 
comparative analysis involves all three of these issues. The latent and idiosyncratic state 
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 A set of dummies controlling for annual effects was included in earlier versions of this analysis but later 
dropped because neither individual time effects nor the group of time effects was statistically significant in 
any model. 
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characteristics have the potential to yield error term components that cause significant 
endogeneity issues and cause linear estimates to be biased.  
Though modeling remedies to this endogeneity problem exist, such remedies require 
explicit assumptions to be made about the nature of both the state-associated error term 
and the independent variables in the model. A fixed-effects model assumes that the state-
related error is essentially fixed for each state, and (in an LSDV approach to fixed-
effects) estimates intercepts for each state, thus removing the state-specific error from the 
error term and producing unbiased, consistent estimators for the independent variables. 
This approach assumes strict endogeneity of all regressors (Baltagi 2008), and has the 
disadvantage of lumping all time-invariant variables into one combined intercept term, 
rather than recognizing the potential nuances of variables that may be fixed within a state 
but whose variation across states may be significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable.  
An alternative approach assumes that state-level variation is not fixed, but rather a 
manifestation of sampling-related random deviations from a common population latent 
variable mean. Though it seems counterintuitive to suggest that states themselves are a 
sample of observations randomly selected from a larger population, this assertion could 
be considered true in the sense that the decisions, actions, and characteristics in each 
state-level observation are just one of a potentially infinite set of such manifestations 
(Haavelmo 1944). This random-effects approach further assumes strict exogeneity of the 
regressors. 
Theoretically, both the fixed-effects and random-effects models could reasonably be 
expected to apply here, despite the strong differences in their assumptions regarding the 
71 
nature of the error term. This is largely because the specific nature of the state error and 
its underlying characteristics is essentially unknown. The nature of the regressors, 
however, which cannot claim strict exogeneity, suggests preference for the fixed-effects 
model.  
A Hausman (1978) test is commonly used to select between the random-effects and 
fixed-effects specifications, and is employed here.37 The Hausman test rejects the 
hypothesis that the difference in estimates is not systematic; in other words, the test 
rejects the hypothesis of the random-effects specification in favor of fixed-effects (χ2(6) = 
34.68; p < 0.000). Regardless of the outcome of the Hausman test, the assumption of 
regressor exogeneity cannot have been reasonably made in the models below. Thus, the 
random-effects model is a defensible specification for the models in this chapter.  
A final approach to the presence of latent group effects is employment of a between-
effects model, in which the dependent variable is regressed on group averages for each 
variable rather than on individual group/time observations for each variable. This 
approach essentially removes within-group variation from the model and focuses instead 
on the differences between states on a given set of regressors. Though this approach 
results in a limited use of the data available, it is employed here to recreate elements of 
the federal spending formulas that determine how much federal funding will go to each 
state. Changes within individual states that are intended to yield increased capture of 
federal funds will essentially be invisible in the between-effects model, unless some 
spurious correlation is evident. This model will provide both a useful comparison and a 
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 The Hausman test is only employed for the one-stage linear panel data models described below. The 
hausman command with the sigmaless option was employed in STATA to specify use of the estimated 
disturbance variance from the consistent estimator for use in the covariance matrices. This option is 
recommended by the STATA corporation in comparison of fixed effect and random effect models in order 
to ensure a positive definite differenced covariance matrix. 
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qualitative understanding of how decisions made within states may be invisible to federal 
apportionment and spending formulae (that are made based on between-state 
information) but may nonetheless impact overall spending within a state. 
Embedded within state spending levels are a variety of factors that influence state 
spending decisions. Among these decisions is the enrollment of non-targeted populations. 
By introducing dummy variables for enrollment of adults or higher-income children to 
the model, we would expect to uncover intercept changes in federal spending levels by 
untangling these administrative choices from the state spending levels captured by the 
state spending and state spending/FMAP terms. It would naturally be expected that an 
expansion of the recipient population would increase spending levels, because enrollment 
of each additional individual bears a cost. A variable for total enrollment (a count of all 
enrolled adults and children, including enrolled higher-income children) is thus included 
as a control for costs merely associated with higher enrollment numbers.  
Despite the use of the fixed-effects model, a potential endogeneity issue remains 
regarding the potential simultaneity of state funding choices (which are associated with 
federal spending by formula) and state SCHIP policy choices regarding enrollment 
populations.  
To account for any spurious correlation resulting from correlation with the error term, 
an instrumental variable technique could be employed to remove any remaining 
endogeneity. 
A Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) test38 failed to reject the hypothesis that instrumental 
variables should be employed as specified (p = 0.3241). Therefore, the instrumental 
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 Using the dmexogxt command in STATA 
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variable estimates (which did not substantively alter the results)39 will not be reported 
here. 
Hypotheses 
Though it may seem that the enrollment of expanded populations leading to increased 
spending in a state might seem like a straightforward assertion, significant increases in 
federal funding based on increased statutory and procedural target populations is not a 
given, particularly if the explanatory model controls for the number of total enrollees 
(including both targeted and non-targeted populations) as this one does. Inclusion of this 
variable improves interpretation such that program expansions that correlate with higher 
federal spending do so independently of the raw number of beneficiaries of the program. 
This leads to some questions about mechanisms independent of raw enrollment that may 
lead to increased spending. One possible explanation for increased federal spending in 
states that provide SCHIP benefits to non-targeted populations is that these expanded 
populations cost more per person than does the targeted population. Estimates suggest 
that insurance coverage of adults is more expensive than coverage of children (KFF 
2008). This phenomenon could help to explain why insurance of adults increases federal 
spending while insurance of higher-income children does not. Further, higher-income 
children are more likely to be covered by private insurance (Feinberg et al. 2002) so a 
nonlinearity may exist in which the population of children in need of public health 
insurance increases to a particular income level and then begins to decline. Because 
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 Despite the employment of quantitative methods, the interpretation of the results from models presented 
in this and other chapters are limited to relatively qualitative conclusions. Thus, though changes in the 
estimators may result from varying specification of variables and/or functional form, the claim of 
“substantively similar results” is made when the focus of the interpretation remains similar in either 
scenario. 
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public insurance is always a secondary payer of incurred health care costs, higher-income 
children may also pose less burden on the SCHIP system because, for those who also 
carry private insurance, the private insurance pays the bulk of the medical bills. 
Models examining federal spending patterns between states should merely reflect the 
application of funding formulae, providing matching funds based on state expenditures. 
Independent variables other than state spending and FMAP should only appear to be 
statistically significant if these variables play an important role in either the FMAP 
derivation formula or the allotment formula. Even policy variables such as the binary 
variables for enrollment of adults or higher-income children should not affect between-
state spending effects. 
H1a: Enrollment of adults will not significantly affect federal spending 
between states (BE models) 
H1b: Enrollment of higher-income children will not significantly affect federal 
spending between states (BE models) 
Federal spending patterns in a within (fixed-effects) model, however, would be 
expected to demonstrate the effect on federal spending within a state when the state 
engages in different policy behaviors (i.e. enrollment of non-targeted populations). 
H2a: Enrollment of adults will significantly increase federal spending within 
states (FE models) 
H2b: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly increase federal 
spending within states (FE model) 
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Results 
Table 3.1 contains the results of population-averaged regression (between-effects) 
models40; in this table, model 2 controls for number of Medicaid beneficiaries, and model 
1 does not. As expected, the FFP variable is positive and significant in both models.41 
The coefficient for the state spending variable is also significantly different from zero in 
both models, with increases in state spending yielding a net reduction in federal spending, 
controlling for the structural relationship between state and federal spending as given in 
the FFP variable. A one dollar increase in state spending yields an estimated decrease in 
federal spending of $0.62 when controlling for number of Medicaid beneficiaries, or 
$0.38 when Medicaid beneficiaries are not included in the analysis. This relationship is as 
should be expected; states wishing to fund certain types of (non-match-qualified) SCHIP 
expansions must do so without the support of a federal match.42 Thus, state spending 
outside the structural (FFP) formula would be expected to have an inverse relationship 
with federal funding. The sign for the total enrollment variable is somewhat curious in 
this model; comparing a state with low (relative) enrollment to a state with high (relative) 
enrollment appears to significantly decrease federal spending after controlling for the 
other factors represented in the model. This finding could be considered consistent with 
state complaints about funding formulas that punish states with high enrollment rates 
(Perdue 2008; Collins and Gerber 2006; Blewett and Davern 2007), it nevertheless seems 
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 Note that these models assume linearity of the regressors and regressands; for alternate formulations 
including log-log and semilog approaches, contact the author. 
41
 It should be noted that given that FFP is the structurally expected value for federal spending given FMAP 
and state spending, its expected value in this regression is one. An f-test of this hypothesis f(1,39) yields a 
test statistic of 5.11, yielding a rejection of this hypothesis at alpha=0.05 (p=0.0295). This is a direct result 
of the inclusion of the FMAP and spending variables in the regression.  A comparable regression excluding 
the FMAP and state spending variables fails to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient value for FFP is 
one: f(1,41)=1.77; p=0.1908. 
42
 In the absence of the FFP variable, both FMAP and state spending have positive, significant coefficient 
values. 
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curious, particularly since the coefficient for this variable in the fixed-effects model is 
significant and positive. This may merely be an artifact of the limited information 
available, particularly given the employment of a population-averaged model. It is 
important to note in this model that though a very significant portion of the variation in 
the dependent variable is explained by the model, neither policy variable (adults or 
higher-income children enrollment dummies) is statistically significant. We thus cannot 
reject the hypotheses represented above as H1a and H1b. In other words, the between-state 
variation in federal SCHIP spending can be explained using formula factors alone; 
between-state variation is not explained by the choice of whether or not to enroll non-
targeted populations in SCHIP within a state.43  
This leaves us with the question of whether federal spending within states is 
significantly affected by the choice to enroll either adults or higher-income children. In 
order to answer this question, a fixed-effects (within) regression is employed to control 
for time-invariant state characteristics and isolate the effects of the independent variables 
on federal spending within the states (see table 3.2).44  
As before, FFP has a positive and significant relationship with the dependent federal 
spending variable. The value for the FFP slope coefficient is roughly 0.9, and an f-test 
shows that it is statistically indistinguishable from 1, the expected value for the 
coefficient, in both models (f(1,334) = 0.92, p=0.3372 in model 1). As in the between-
effects regression, the state spending variable is negative and significant. As expected, 
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 Note that with an R2 value of 0.997, only 99.7 percent of the variation in the model is explained despite 
the presence of all formula factors, which might be expected to yield a perfectly functional relationship. In 
addition to random error in rounding and reporting, some of this error is expected due to non-matched state 
spending and spending floors and ceilings. 
44
 An F-test rejects the hypothesis that the joint effect of the state fixed-effects is zero at the 0.05 level 
(F(48,334) = 2.62; p<0.0000). The fraction of the variance due to error associated with panel idiosyncrasies 
(rho) value is 0.8196 for the fixed-effects model. 
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within-state variation in a variety of other factors important to SCHIP funding formulae 
are significantly correlated with the dependent variable in the fixed-effects (within) 
regression. These include population, tax revenue, and initial federal allotment. 
Interpretation of these variables should be done with caution; SCHIP is essentially an 
expansion of the Medicaid program and the effect of raw state characteristics (including 
population and other factors) on SCHIP spending are likely mitigated by Medicaid 
program characteristics within those states. For example, states with large populations 
may have had particular focus on enrolling children (and adults) in Medicaid prior to the 
enactment of SCHIP. This relationship is supported by the results of model 2, which 
controls for number of total Medicaid beneficiaries in a state. In this model, population is 
no longer a statistically significant predictor of federal spending, though Medicaid 
enrollment is. Therefore, the relative number of child uninsured after Medicaid may 
cause state SCHIP characteristics to present in counterintuitive ways in the absence of 
child-specific Medicaid data. These variables are intended here as controls for the policy 
variables of interest, not as definitive estimates of the control variables themselves. These 
complicated relationships are further compounded by the presence of the FFP variable 
which, for all intents and purposes, essentially has a one-to-one explanatory relationship 
to the dependent variable. This too is included as a control, and is intended to insure that 
the effect, if any, of the included policy variables does not represent a merely spurious 
relationship. 
The intercept for the variable representing enrollment of higher-income children is 
statistically significant at the .05 level, and suggests that enrollment of higher-income 
children is correlated with a net decrease in within-state federal funding. This suggests 
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that the more higher-income children a state enrolls, the less funding they appear to 
receive from the federal government. Controlling for all other variables in the model, 
enrolling higher income children decreases federal spending within a state by roughly 
$31.7 million. This finding may be a result of non-match-eligible spending in a state 
(which would drive the federal spending down), a lack of need among lower-income 
children or smaller population of lower-income children (which would lead to a smaller 
SCHIP program and thus less federal spending, though a control for enrollment is 
included in the model) or programs that enroll higher-income children may cost less for 
other reasons. The intercept representing enrollment of adults is only marginally 
significant (p=0.074) and suggests that enrollment of adults may be correlated with a net 
increase in federal spending. The estimate derived from this model suggests that having a 
program that enrolls adults increases federal spending within a state by $8.2 million. 
The foregoing suggests support for further exploration of hypothesis H2a, as 
enrollment of adults does in fact appear to increase federal spending, though this finding 
narrowly fails to meet the standard for reaching this conclusion definitively. Indeed, the 
consistency of the negative intercept in both the between- and fixed-effects models 
suggests that further study is merited despite the marginal significance of the variable 
intercept coefficient in the fixed-effects model. In contrast, the results presented here 
suggest definitive rejection of hypothesis H2b;  though enrollment of higher-income does 
appear to significantly affect federal SCHIP spending within a state, this correlation is 
negative. As with the other independent variables in this analysis, however, this finding 
must be interpreted with caution given the intertwined relationship of the SCHIP and 
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Medicaid programs. Further discussion of this finding will be engaged below and again in 
chapter 5. 
Discussion 
Based on the discussion above, federal spending on SCHIP within a state is 
dependent on state spending behaviors and formulae Federal spending should be almost 
entirely explained by state spending, the enhanced FMAP rate, and/or the structural 
interaction between the two. Specifically, the FMAP/state spending interaction term is a 
variable defined in the same way that Federal Financial Participation (FFP) is 
determined.45  Any remaining variation would be the expected result of states that spend 
their own funds on SCHIP expenditures that are ineligible for federal match (exceeding 
caps on administrative expenses, state-funded program expansions, etc.), possible 
variations resulting from the reapportionment of unspent SCHIP funds, and measurement 
error. Indeed, a pooled linear regression of federal spending on the FFP46 yields an R2 
value of 0.95, suggesting that a majority of the variation can be explained by structural 
factors.  
Though the high upper eligibility policy variable is not causing significant net 
increases in SCHIP spending, the relationship between pre-existing Medicaid upper 
limits and the statutory requirement that SCHIP funds not be used to cover children 
eligible for Medicaid under pre-existing state law may suggest that while the practice of 
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 Total spending per state dollar is structurally equivalent to state spending divided by the state 
responsibility (1-FMAP). Federal Financial Participation is thus total spending (as derived here) per state 
dollar minus reported state spending. FFP is a measure of the expected federal spending based solely on 
variation in FMAP and state spending. This variable does not have perfect correlation with the dependent 
federal spending variable due to spending caps, state cost sharing programs, and other deviations from the 
standard matching formula. 
46
 The R2 rounds to 0.95 whether or not FMAP and state spending are included as independent variables in 
the pooled regression. 
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enrolling higher-income children does not appear to cause significant federal funding 
increases in state SCHIP, it nonetheless may be correlated with state preferences that led 
to higher Medicaid spending prior to the enactment of SCHIP. Medicaid funding levels 
over 185 percent of FPL require federal waivers, so any state with preexisting child 
eligibility of 200 percent of poverty or below is a state demonstrating the same kinds of 
characteristics explored in this analysis regarding SCHIP. In addition, Medicaid has been 
shown to have serious fund diversion problems (GAO 2007). In chapter 4 we will move 
beyond raw spending data to explore the impacts of enrollment of non-targeted 
populations on enrollment of low-income children in SCHIP. It may be that states 
exhibiting nominal goal conflict do not necessarily exhibit funding goal conflict, but it is 
also possible that they do demonstrate outcome conflict. 
As expected, higher enrollment (total adult and child enrollment), matching rate, and 
state spending have positive effects on the actual federal spending. Though it does not 
achieve statistical significance in this model, the intercept estimate for enrolling adults is 
negative, suggesting that in general, adults are enrolled in states with lower spending (z= 
-0.61, p=0.542); however, the actual count of adults enrolled (with the effect of enrolling 
adults vs. not enrolling adults already explained by the dummy variable) has a positive 
coefficient, suggesting (as would be expected) increases in federal spending for every 
additional adult enrolled. This finding is significant at the 0.05 level (z=6.38, p=0.000). 
The negative intercept coefficient on the adults variable suggests either that states with 
low spending (most likely due to low child enrollments, either due to failure to enroll 
eligible children or low need within the state)  are more likely to enroll adults, or that by 
enrolling adults, federal spending in the state is reduced. Though the model itself does not 
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suggest a causal direction, the significant increase in federal spending per additional adult 
enrolled suggests that the former hypothesis is most likely to be true. This observation is 
consistent with the assertion that states use federal money to achieve their own goals 
(reduction of uninsurance rates in the adult population or capture of more federal dollars 
for state initiatives) rather than supporting the redistributive aims of the SCHIP program 
as interpreted by GAO, President Bush, and arguably the enacting legislation.   
Estimates from the instrumental variable fixed-effects model support the qualitative 
conclusions of the previous models; namely, that enrollment of adults significantly 
increases the federal cost of the SCHIP program within a state, even after controlling for 
total number of enrollees. In other words, a state that enrolls adults will be more 
expensive than if it had not enrolled adults even after accounting for jumps in enrollment 
(regardless of whether the jump in enrollment is due to adults or children), increasing the 
federal cost of a state program, on average, by roughly $8.2 million. 
It may be that enrollment of adults is more costly than is enrollment of children. 
These estimates are consistent with cost estimates provided by the states in a phone 
survey conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures in 2000, in which 
total monthly costs for child enrollees ranged from $50 to about $120 per month ($600 to 
$1440 annually), depending on state (Oliver 2000).  It may be useful to compare these 
figures with cost estimates for Medicaid, from the Urban Institute and Kaiser 
Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates based on data from Medicaid 
Statistical Information System (MSIS) reports from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. These estimates put total (including Federal and State) annual 
Medicaid payments per enrollee at $1,617 per child and $2,102 annually per child, 
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averaging the 2005 reported state mean costs per enrollee, which ranged from $1,044 in 
Louisiana to $4,155 in Maine (KFF 2008).  
Variation within a state, then, has a significant impact on federal spending. The goals 
that undergird state funding decisions have a direct impact on federal spending. Given 
that federal spending is formula-based and not subject to federal discretion or review 
beyond the granting of waivers by HHS, state administrative decisions (and the goals that 
drive them) can derail accomplishment of the federal goal by funneling funds (as in the 
case of reapportionment) from states that remain true to the goals of the federal program 
to those that are spending federal and state funds on an expanded set of goals driven 
primarily by state interests. 
The positive coefficient for the variable measuring propensity to enroll adults 
suggests that enrollment of adults increases federal spending in a state, controlling for 
other factors. Conversely, the negative coefficient for the variable representing 
enrollment of higher-income children suggests that this practice lowers federal spending 
within a state. Despite the attempt to overcome the issue of endogeneity, the models 
presented here do not account for the possibility of reverse causation; that is, it may be 
that enrollment of adults or higher-income children is the result, not the cause, of federal 
spending. Alternately, there may be some mechanism or confounding factor as yet 
unaccounted for.  
In the case of enrollment of higher-income children, it does not seem reasonable that 
expansion of the SCHIP program would result in lower overall spending within a state. 
Given two identical states with identical enrollment of targeted children, an expansion of 
enrollment by one state to a greater number of children (i.e. expansion of the target group 
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to include higher-income children) should yield an increase in overall spending. This 
would be the case unless one of the following were true: 
1. Enrollment of additional children decreased the cost per child significantly 
enough that the end result was a net decrease in spending. 
2. The expanded population of children is less expensive to insure and the 
enrollment of members of this expanded group of children generates a replacement 
effect, essentially replacing expensive “targeted” children with children from the less-
expensive expansion group. 
3. The higher the income level, the fewer uninsured kids there are to enroll, 
causing any change in related spending to be statistically indistinguishable from no 
change at all.  
4. SCHIP expansions to higher income groups may be at least partially state-
funded rather than being fully subject to standard federal matches. This offset of 
federal costs may result in a null finding. 
Additional explanations can be derived by recognizing that correlation does not 
necessarily imply causality—the negative intercept coefficient for enrollment of higher 
income children may be an issue of reverse causality: States with low program 
enrollment (and thus lower spending) are more likely to expand coverage to include other 
populations of children. Reasons for low program enrollment (that would also support 
expansion) may include low levels of children in poverty, or low uninsurance rates 
among lower-income children (due, for example, to high pre-existing Medicaid eligibility 
levels and/or Medicaid expansions). 
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A qualitative look at the data supports the suggestion that enrollment of high upper 
enrollment limits correlate negatively with percent of children under 200 percent FPL and 
the percentage of low-income children who are uninsured. High upper SCHIP limits are 
also highly correlated with high pre-existing child Medicaid limits from 1997. In fact, all 
observations of states with a high upper SCHIP limit had 1997 Medicaid upper limits of 
185 percent FPL or greater. However, inclusion of these potentially confounding 
variables in the analysis47 does not substantively alter the conclusion that higher 
eligibility limits and federal spending are inversely related. 
Following a similar pattern of logic, it is possible that, despite efforts to remove 
issues of endogeneity from the model, the positive correlation between the administrative 
choice to enroll adults and increased federal spending is spurious.48 The reverse causation 
argument would suggest that states with high levels of federal spending were more likely 
to self-select SCHIP expansions to enrollment of adults. There are several additional 
factors that could correlate both with federal spending and the decision to enroll adults. 49 
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 Because 1997 upper Medicaid eligibility is a time-invariant variable that is dropped from the fixed-
effects model, two variables were generated and applied in its place. The first was a raw difference between 
the upper SCHIP limit in a given year and the 1997 Medicaid upper limit, and the second was an annual 
difference in eligibility, with the first observed SCHIP upper limit subtracting the 1997 Medicaid upper 
limit, and subsequent SCHIP limits subtracting the previous year’s value. Neither variable affected the 
finding of negative correlation between federal spending and expansion of SCHIP eligibility to higher 
income children. 
48
 Another competing hypothesis that could explain higher spending levels and the enrollment adults is a 
spurious correlation due to the omitted time variable. Because adults were never enrolled in SCHIP prior to 
2001, increases in state and/or federal spending over time could be captured in the adult dummy variable. 
To test this hypothesis, a dummy variable for observations occurring in 2001 or later was included in the 
model. This variable was not significant, and did not substantially alter the coefficient for the adults 
variable (in fact, it resulted in a slight increase in the coefficient value). Given this effect, the time dummy 
was subsequently dropped from the model. 
49
 It is possible that expansions, both to higher-income children and to adult populations, is intended to 
achieve improved enrollment of the target population, with the added benefit of providing additional 
services to populations outside the target group (Artiga and Mann 2007). If this were the case, increased 
federal expenditures resulting from enrollment of non-targeted populations might be justifiable if the result 
were an increase in enrollment of the targeted population. This topic will be further explored in the next 
chapter. 
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These include large populations of eligible children that might also suggest both higher 
spending and higher proportions of adult population in need of services; large proportions 
of targeted children who have been enrolled, which might suggest both higher spending 
and lower remaining child demand; and finally, a propensity to favor public provision of 
health insurance. 
Expansion to either adults or higher-income children suggests a statutory 
misalignment with federal goals. The reapportionment program suggests that it is the 
federal intent to redistribute funds from states that do not need help enrolling children to 
those that do. State desire to maximize capture of federal dollars suggests a goal that may 
be in conflict with the intent to enroll as many low-income American children in health 
insurance programs as possible. Enrolling a low-income child in Minnesota is ostensibly 
the same in the eyes of the federal government as enrolling a child in New York or 
Alabama; however, the SCHIP authorizing statute suggests that the federal government 
might prefer enrollment of a low-income child in Alabama to a higher-income child in 
New York or an adult in Minnesota.  
States, on the other hand, do not share the same redistributive goals unless they are 
themselves beneficiaries. Minnesota would reasonably be expected to prefer enrollment 
of its own children or adults to enrollment of individuals in other states, particularly if 
federal dollars are attached to the public benefit.   
This discrepancy in federal mandate and state execution is a principal-agent problem 
in the most classic sense; the primary aim of the agent is to improve its own utility; while 
this can initially be accomplished by pursuing the will of the principal (e.g. enrolling low-
income children), circumstances arise in which the benefit of the principal and that of the 
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agent may be in opposition. The evidence presented here suggests that in the case of 
enrollment of adults, federal-state goal conflict in SCHIP exceeds the mere appearance of 
goal conflict via enrollment of non-targeted populations, but has real-world effects on the 
stewardship of the federal purse. Regardless of the direction of causality or operant 
mechanisms linking enrollment of adults to higher federal spending within a state, this 
analysis has implications for understanding the nature of the relationship between the 
federal government and the state political and administrative bodies that serve as its 
agents in grant programs such as SCHIP.  
If the increase in federal spending within states that enroll adults is solely a causal 
impact of administrative choices on spending and/or other outcomes, that has serious 
implications for the practice of granting exception waivers to states for program 
expansions that do not accomplish program goals. Likewise, if the effect due solely to 
self-selection of states with particular situations or characteristics (including higher 
spending) to participate in administrative choices that expand services, that too has 
practical implications for the specification of future policy.
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Chapter 4: Outcome Conflict in the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program 
Introduction 
Enrollment of non-targeted populations, including adults and higher-income children, 
demonstrates some level of potential conflict with the purposes of SCHIP as outlined in 
the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (GAO 2002). Such nominal conflict, however, may be 
inconsequential if it does not strain the resources allocated by the federal government in 
pursuit of its goal to enroll otherwise uninsured low-income children in public health 
insurance programs. A final consideration in terms of the potential goal conflict 
associated with state administrative policy choices is whether or not they hinder the 
accomplishment of the intended outcomes sought by the federal government. It is 
possible that some approaches that extend outside the statutory boundaries of a program 
may provide an innovative way of accomplishing federal goals; indeed, this is the 
ostensible purpose of the waiver programs associated with Medicaid and SCHIP (CMS 
2001). In waiver applications seeking permission to enroll adults in SCHIP, some states 
cited a desire to improve enrollment of lower-income children by enrolling their parents 
(Artiga and Mann 2007). If such extra-statutory administrative procedures achieve 
outcome goals, nominal and even resource conflict may be moot—lost battles in a won 
war. However, not all states demonstrated an explicit intent to enroll additional low-
income children by extending program benefits to non-targeted populations. Some sought 
additional funds because they had been early leaders in child coverage under Medicaid 
and felt it unfair that they should have limited access to federal SCHIP funds (Strickland 
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2008; Gregoire 2008) and some purposefully sought health care coverage for populations 
other than low-income children (Artiga and Mann 2007).  
The empirical question to be addressed in this chapter is whether a state’s pursuit of 
goals outside the explicit goals of the SCHIP program (i.e. to provide public health 
insurance to low-income children who are ineligible for Medicaid) negatively affect the 
accomplishment of this federal goal within the state. In other words, does enrollment of 
higher income children (those living in families whose incomes are above 200 percent 
FPL) or adults (at any income level) have an effect on the enrollment of federally 
targeted children within a state? The impact of the state practice of enrolling non-targeted 
populations on accomplishment of the federal purpose of SCHIP has implications for 
altering (i.e. limiting or expanding, depending on the nature of the impact) federal 
procedures for granting waivers. If statutory goal conflict translates into outcome 
conflict, this may prescribe engagement in tighter quasi-contractual control on state 
agents by the federal principal in the political economy of the SCHIP grant program. 
Data and methods 
This set of analyses has the benefit of being divorced from the root causes of goal 
conflict, instead focusing on observable preferences as expressed by the states in 
administrative choices—enrollment eligibility of individuals outside the federally 
targeted population—that may be reasonably be expected to conflict with the explicit 
aims of the federal program. The empirical question of whether or not this conflict results 
in negative (or positive) impacts on the accomplishment of federal goals is the focus of 
this chapter. 
In terms of SCHIP program outputs, there are three dependent variables of interest: 
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• Number of children enrolled in the state SCHIP program (ever in year). 
• Percent of “targeted” children enrolled in the state SCHIP program, where 
“targeted” is defined as children at or below 200 percent FPL who are 
uninsured plus children who are enrolled in the program. 
• Percent of children at or below 200 percent of FPL who are uninsured. 
The first variable, number of children ever enrolled in SCHIP in a year, represents 
raw enrollment and, due to the method of annual reporting be the states to HHS, does not 
distinguish between low-income program enrollees and those who are higher-income 
children.50 However, these enrollment figures do not include adults who are enrolled in 
the program. 
The second variable is the percent of targeted children who are enrolled in SCHIP. 
The figure for “targeted” children is somewhat complicated by the inability to isolate 
low-income program child enrollees from higher-income child enrollees, and is thus 
constructed as the sum of low-income children who are uninsured and those who are 
enrolled in the program. It is acknowledged that the term “targeted” must thus be 
interpreted as those who are targeted not only by the enacting SCHIP legislation (in this 
case, low-income children who are uninsured and those who are insured under the usual 
SCHIP provisions) but also higher-income children eligible for SCHIP. The numerator in 
this proportion measure is number of children enrolled at any income level. 
The third measure is arguably the most straightforward output measure of the three 
examined here: A measure of the proportion of children living at or below 200 percent of 
FPL who are uninsured. Because the explicit purpose of the SCHIP program is to provide 
health insurance to low-income children, and thereby to reduce the number of uninsured 
                                                 
50
 HHS produced a template for state annual reports that requested data separating enrolled populations by 
income level. However, this template was either incompletely filled out or ignored completely by most 
states. In light of the 2007 reauthorization debates, the potential impact of SCHIP eligibility levels became 
salient. Data for enrollment by income level is now available for 2007 and will presumably continue to be 
available for future years. This does not help, however, with the present analysis. 
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low-income children, this measure provides a good indicator for program success within 
a state. 
The independent variables of interest in this analysis represent the two types of non-
targeted populations that have been enrolled by states: 
• Adults (including pregnant adults, parents/guardians of children, and 
childless adults, depending on the specific enrollment regulations within a 
state). 
• Children with family incomes above 200 percent of FPL. 
Each of these variables is constructed in two ways. First, dichotomous variables are 
used to indicate whether or not a state provides SCHIP coverage to the population 
indicated. Coverage of the non-targeted population is coded as 1, whereas a coding of 0 
indicates that the population is not eligible for coverage within a state. These measures 
vary both by state and year, according to the eligibility statutes of that year. A second 
measure for coverage adults is a count measure for number of adults ever enrolled within 
a state for a given year.51 Note that some states did not cover children up to 200 percent 
of FPL in some years.  
The first analysis to be performed focuses on the count of children enrolled in the 
SCHIP program as the dependent variable. Variables included in this model include total 
spending (the sum of states’ own-revenue spending and federal funding in a state in the 
given year), state wealth measured by GSP,52 poverty rate, and a variable measuring 
percent of the total state population that is uninsured. Two population variables are 
                                                 
51
 A second measure for child eligibility is the percent of FPL below which any children are eligible for 
SCHIP coverage. However, given that the dependent variable includes all children regardless of income 
and the lumpiness of the SCHIP eligibility levels, this did not prove to be a fruitful avenue for additional 
analysis. 
52
 It could be argued that a more pertinent measure of state wealth would be a measure of average personal 
income within the state. These variables have nearly perfect correlation (correlation coefficient of 0.997) 
and given the ubiquity of the GSP measure I selected this measure in order to improve comparability with 
the work of other researchers. 
91 
included, one for state population, and one for population of children living at or below 
200 percent of FPL.53  
The total enrollment model is estimated using a fixed-effects panel data model.54 For 
purposes of comparison and interpretation, models are estimated with only the dummy 
variables for enrollment of higher-income children and adults, with the count of adults (if 
any) enrolled, and with both.55  
The estimation of models with proportion-type dependent variables pose an 
interesting estimation problem as they are bounded between 0 and 1. Consistent with 
techniques proposed by Greene (2002) and Fleiss, et al. (2003), logistic transformation 
was performed on these variables and they were subsequently estimated with GLS to 
resolve the resultant induced heteroskedasticity. Despite the inherently different nature of 
these variables, they are treated here as alternate measures of the same underlying 
concept—SCHIP success—as the basic enrollment model. They provide some 
improvement over the enrollment model because models predicting the output measure--
raw enrollment—rely on control variables to adjust for varying levels of need in each 
state rather than attempting to measure outcomes (net reduction in low-income child 
uninsured) more explicitly (Heinrich 2002). These models should be considered basic 
checks on the substantive conclusions of the fixed-effects models; they are not intended 
to be exhaustive models in their own right.  This remains a direction for future work.  
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 This variable is omitted from the model of proportion of low-income children who are uninsured, as it is 
the measure used as the denominator for the dependent variable. 
54
 This model is preferred to random-effects on the basis of the same theoretical arguments discussed in 
chapter 3.  
55
 Alternate specifications of these models included a measure of actual SCHIP eligibility level in place of 
the dummy for limits over 200 percent FPL, but this did not have a substantive effect on the results. 
92 
The interrelationship of SCHIP funding, enrollment, and state administrative choices 
raises some important questions about the direction of causality in the models presented 
in this chapter and the previous. An initial attempt at creating a model accounting for 
simultaneity and causal direction is presented in the form of 3SLS estimates of a four-
equation model predicting SCHIP child enrollment, SCHIP (total) funding within a state, 
enrollment of adults, and enrollment of higher-income children. The equation predicting 
child enrollment is essentially identical to the models presented earlier in this chapter. 
The equation predicting total SCHIP spending is drawn from the specification outlined in 
chapter 3 (omitting variables that were specific to predicting only the federal portion of 
spending). A set of state dummy variables are included as regressors in the equations 
predicting SCHIP funding and enrollment in order to account for fixed state effects. 
Some discussion of the specification of the instruments in the two dichotomous 
endogenous policy variables is merited. Though other approaches to instrumental 
variable techniques in the presence of limited endogenous variables exist, the 
instrumental variable technique employed here relies merely on linear estimates. Though 
this approach is not strictly ideal because estimates of the instrumented variables are not 
bounded between 0 and 1, this technique is nonetheless supported by Heckman (1978, 
947)56 as an appropriate method, provided that a necessary shift in interpretation of the 
coefficients of the instrumented variables is employed and that consistent parameter 
estimates are not required. In such a case, the instrumented (now continuous) variable 
represents the propensity to enroll adults or higher-income children rather than the actual 
enrollment of such.  
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 The support of heckman is notable because he is the developer of more sophisticated methods but still 
maintains that the linear method is acceptable: QUOTE. 
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All models are estimated based on a population of 49 states (all states except 
Tennessee) for the eight years from 1999-2006.   
Hypotheses 
Despite evidence that enrollment of adults increases enrollment of children, goal 
conflict theory operates under the hypothesis that adult enrollment, as a nominally 
conflicting behavior, has the potential to yield outcome conflict. Thus, it follows that the 
operating hypothesis should be: 
H1a: Enrollment of adults will significantly decrease enrollment of children 
A similar argument suggests that enrollment of higher-income children has the 
potential to negatively affect enrollment of targeted children. However, we do not have 
the luxury of a variable isolating higher-income children from lower-income children 
enrolled in SCHIP. Therefore, due to data limitations we are unable to test the correlating 
hypothesis that: 
H1b: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly decrease 
enrollment of targeted children.  
However, the high enrollment policy variable is included in these models despite its 
impotence in this regard.  
Despite the inability to separate higher-income child enrollees from targeted 
enrollees, a proportion variable approach provides a potential means for overcoming this 
data limitation. This yields two additional sets of hypotheses, one for each proportion 
dependent variable, beginning with the proportion of targeted children who are enrolled 
in SCHIP: 
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H2a: Enrollment of adults will significantly decrease the proportion of targeted 
children who are enrolled in SCHIP. 
H2b: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly decrease the 
proportion of targeted children who are enrolled in SCHIP. 
And for the proportion of low-income children who are uninsured: 
H3a: Enrollment of adults will significantly increase the proportion of low-
income children who are uninsured. 
H3b: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly increase the 
proportion of low-income children who are uninsured. 
The four-equation 3SLS model employed at the end of this analysis is intended as a 
first attempt at establishing causal relationships between the policy variables and the 
resource and outcome measures presented in chapters 3 and 4. The hope is that 
employment of instrumental variable techniques will alleviate endogeneity problems that 
otherwise limit causal inference in standard estimation. Based on the idea that nominal 
goal conflict in enrollment of adults and/or high-income children may result in resource 
conflict and/or outcome conflict, we test the following relationships in the 3SLS models 
(note that these hypotheses are essentially repeats of the previous hypotheses): 
H4a: Enrollment of adults will significantly increase federal spending on 
SCHIP within a state (resource conflict) 
H4b: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly increase federal 
spending on SCHIP within a state (resource conflict) 
H4c: Enrollment of adults will significantly decrease child SCHIP enrollment 
within a state (outcome conflict) 
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H4d: Enrollment of higher-income children will significantly decrease child 
SCHIP enrollment within a state (outcome conflict) 
Results 
The models presented in table 4.1 demonstrate the cumulative effect of enrolling 
adults on child enrollment (model 1), the marginal effect of each additional adult enrolled 
(model 2) and both (model 3). The evidence from these three models summarily fail to 
reject hypothesis H1a, as all variables accounting for the enrollment of adults are both 
negative and statistically significant at α=0.05. The average decrease in intercept value 
for child SCHIP enrollment ranges in these estimates from roughly 40,000 child 
enrollees57 (model 1; not accounting for marginal effect of adult enrollment) to about 
16,000 child enrollees (model 3; accounts for marginal effect of adult enrollment). These 
intercept values must, of course, be tempered by the individual state intercepts that are 
estimated in these fixed-effects models but not reported here. Estimates for the marginal 
effect of enrolling one additional adult range from about -0.7 (model 2) to -0.6. This 
roughly translates to a decrease in enrollment of two children for every three adults 
enrolled.  
The dependent variable in the first set of models is a continuous raw enrollment 
measure that is not directly scaled for population and thus relies on the specification and 
functional form of the model to isolate the effects of enrollment of non-targeted 
populations from the effects of state size, spending capacity, and other key factors. The 
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 In a model including number of Medicaid beneficiaries, but excluding the year 2006 (due to data 
availability at the time of estimation), this model 1 estimate increases in magnitude to a decrease of roughly 
43,000 child enrollees. The model 3 estimate, however, decreases to roughly a 8,100 child decrease, though 
the marginal effect estimate in model 3 increases in magnitude to a .81 child decrease for every adult 
enrolled. The marginal effect in model 2 increases in magnitude to a 0.88 child decrease for every adult 
enrolled when controlling for number of Medicaid beneficiaries.  
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inability, due to data limitations, to isolate “non-targeted” children from the enrollment 
figures limits interpretation of the effect of high upper eligibility limits on enrollment of 
targeted children. As the variables are currently constructed, we would expect the effect 
of high eligibility limits on total child enrollment to be positive, as indeed it is, though 
this variable does not achieve statistical significance in this set of models.  
The models in table 4.1 suggest that the enrollment of adults has a significant and 
negative effect on the enrollment of children. This finding merits additional scrutiny. It is 
important to note that this approach does not distinguish between the types of adults 
enrolled in SCHIP; adults may be pregnant women, parents or guardians of children, 
childless adults, or some combination of these three adult populations. It is reasonable to 
expect that the effect of adult enrollment on children might differ based on the type of 
adults enrolled, but this information is presently unavailable in any consistent manner and 
thus this analysis is limited to the cumulative effect of enrollment of adults on the 
enrollment of children.  
The positive (albeit not statistically different from zero) intercept for the high upper 
SCHIP eligibility limit is understandable, and even predictable, given the nature of the 
dependent variable, which counts enrollment of all children. However, in the preceding 
analysis, the hypothesis that incremental increases in the upper SCHIP eligibility limit 
affect enrollment rates has not been tested. Indeed, one would expect increases in the 
SCHIP eligibility limit to positively affect enrollment rates.  
Despite their apparent basis in goal conflict theory, the findings from the above linear 
regressions are somewhat curious in light of a strong body of literature that supports the 
enrollment of adults as a means for increasing enrollment of targeted children 
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(Rosenbaum and Whittington 2007; Ku and Broaddus 2000; Dubay and Kenney 2003). 
These previous studies, however, justifiably focus on proportion data as dependent 
variables in their (primarily difference-in difference) analysis. Indeed, the raw linear 
model is sensitive to state-level variations despite the inclusion of control variables and 
state fixed-effects that are intended to improve confidence in the results. Furthermore, 
raw enrollment figures are mere outputs whereas proportion variables are better measures 
for understanding outcomes. 
Table 4.2 presents the fixed-effects regression of the proportion of targeted children 
who are enrolled on SCHIP on the same regressors employed previously. Model 1 
presents estimates produced on the raw dependent variable and model 2 presents the 
regression on the logistically transformed dependent variable (McDowell and Cox 
2004).58 
Considerably less variation is explained in these models than in the non-proportion 
models above. However, in the non-transformed model, enrollment of higher-income 
children and enrollment of adults both appear to increase the proportion of targeted 
children who are enrolled in the program. These estimates suggest that enrollment of 
higher-income children increases the proportion of enrolled targeted children by roughly 
9.4 percentage points59 (p=0.0550), and enrollment of adults increases the proportion of 
enrolled targeted children by roughly 8.6 percentage points (p= 0.0020). These findings 
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 GLS estimation (with dummy fixed-effects) of the logistically transformed proportion variable did not 
substantively change results from estimates produced by xtreg, re, which are presented here. 
59
 In a model controlling for Medicaid beneficiaries, enrollment of higher income-children has a smaller 
positive effect, increasing proportion of enrolled targeted children by only 5.6 percentage points. In this 
model, the effect of enrolling higher-income children on enrollment of targeted children is not statistically 
significant (t=1.02, p=0.309). In this model, enrolling adults increases the proportion of enrolled targeted 
children by 7.24 percentage points. This finding is significant at the .05 level (t=2.36, p=0.019). 
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are consistent with previous research regarding the role of adult enrollment on enrolling 
children.  
The percent of children at or below 200 percent of FPL who are uninsured is a 
relatively straightforward measure of the success of SCHIP. Unlike enrollment counts, 
this measure directly relates to the overarching aim of the SCHIP program, which is to 
reduce the number of uninsured children in poverty. While enrollment rates are clearly 
tied to this aim, they are merely an output measure, whereas percent of low-income 
children who have insurance—from any source—is arguably a better measure of program 
outcomes. This measure is not perfect; analysis using this dependent variable cannot 
describe public-private substitution effects nor can it isolate the effects of SCHIP from 
those of private insurance or public insurance from programs other than SCHIP. 
However, the substantive question to be answered is not focused solely on the impact of 
the SCHIP program, but rather whether or not a discernable impact of enrolling non-
targeted populations can be observed. Thus, the approach to these models will be similar 
to the approach used above, first by including only dummy measures for the enrollment 
of non-targeted adults and/or children. Note that in the following analysis, increases in 
the value of the dependent variable represent negative outcomes. 
As in the previous proportion analysis, the enrollment of adults is associated with 
program success. Table 4.3 presents the results, of the fixed-effects model of percent 
children under 200 percent of FPL who are uninsured. Model 1 suggests that enrollment 
of adults significantly decreases the proportion of low-income child uninsured by roughly 
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1.8 percentage points60 (p=0.0480). Interestingly, high upper eligibility is associated with 
increases in the low-income child uninsurance rate, though this finding does not achieve 
statistical significance (p=0.6900). This is a finding of note, however, as this is the first 
model that does not suffer from the issue of including high-income child enrollees in the 
measure used as the dependent variable. It is also, whether coincidentally or not, the first 
model presented61 in which enrollment of higher-income children may be found to have a 
negative effect on outcomes.  
Despite the shadows cast on the linear output model presented in table 4.1, the final 
approach in this chapter returns to the output model and explores the interrelationship of 
the funding model introduced in chapter 3, the output model presented in table 4.1, and 
the two policy variables of interest. A simultaneous equation approach (three-stage least-
squares) is employed to address the simultaneity issues addressed in the discussion 
portion of chapter 3 and to acknowledge the temporal interrelationships of the policy and 
output variables of interest. Table 4.4 presents the results. Model 1 presents the 3SLS 
regression results in the absence of state dummy variables. Models 2 and 3 employ 
dummy variable fixed-effects to control for idiosyncratic error. Model 2 differs from 
models 1 and 3 in that it omits the variable for actual count of adults enrolled in SCHIP, 
leaving the dummy policy variable to account for all variation resulting from enrollment 
of adults. The policy variables are instrumented on a set of variables drawn from the 
discussion to be presented in chapter 5.  
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 When controlling for Medicaid beneficiaries, this estimate lowers a decrease of 1.47 percentage points, 
and the finding is no longer statistically significant (t=-1.44, p=0.151). There is almost no substantive 
change in this model regarding the impact of enrolling higher-income children. 
61
 The author has found some other evidence to suggest that the enrollment of higher-income children may 
have a negative impact on program outcomes, though these efforts continue to be stymied by the data 
limitations causing fits and starts here. 
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Though the models for child enrollment and total spending achieve relatively high R2 
values, the models predicting the policy variables do not fare so well. In particular, 
variation in the adult enrollment variable is poorly predicted (R2=0.41 in model 1 and 
0.54 in models 2 and 3). This difficulty in predicting policy adoption is discussed in 
chapter 5. The model predicting high child eligibility limits is somewhat more successful 
(R2=0.85). 
This set of exploratory models serves essentially one purpose: to make some attempt 
at determining the causal direction of any correlations between the policy and output 
variables. For these models, the continuous, linear output measures presented first in 
chapters 3 and 4 are utilized, in part because of their simplicity and in part because these 
are the models in which relationships between the policy variables and outputs were 
strongest. These were also the models in which causal direction was the most 
questionable.  
The contrast between model 2 and model 3 with regard to enrollment of adults are 
interesting; in the absence of the count variable for number of adults enrolled in a state, 
the coefficient for the adult enrollment policy intercept is negative, as it has been in 
previous models. In model 3, however, this variable shifts to a positive value, and the 
count of adults enrolled variable has a negative and statistically significant coefficient of 
roughly -1.2, suggesting that for every additional adult enrolled in SCHIP, at least one 
fewer children enrolls. This finding is also interesting in contrast with model 3 in table 
4.1, in which the policy intercept is both negative and significant. This difference may be 
a favorable and more accurate representation due to the simultaneous modeling approach 
or may be unfavorable bias resulting from poor instrumentation of the endogenous policy 
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variable. The sensitivity of the adults policy variable to functional form and to the means 
of measuring the concept of “enrollment success,” conclusions drawn here are tenuous. 
However, there is at least moderate support that when SCHIP outputs are measured in 
raw child enrollment, high enrollment of adults has a negative impact. Whether the policy 
of enrolling adults has this impact independent of the number of adults enrolled or the 
resources spent on those adults is as yet inconclusive. 
The high eligibility policy variable, the coefficient of which had been positive 
(though not significant) in the previous enrollment output models, is positive in the model 
that does not account for state fixed-effects but negative in both models that include 
them. Though this finding does not achieve statistical significance at α=0.05, the change 
in sign that appears to be due to a resolution of remaining endogeneity is worthy of note. 
Greater confidence can be assigned to this finding than in the adults variable because the 
instruments appear to be more effective in predicting this policy variable. However, the 
same caveats regarding the questionable quality of the instruments remain. 
Child and adult enrollment both have significant and positive effects on total program 
spending as expected. Accounting for fixed-effects and these enrollment effects (model 3 
in table 4.4), the adults policy variable does not appear to have an independent effect on 
total spending. Having high child eligibility limits, however, has a significant and 
positive intercept coefficient (β=205.39, p=0.0300) suggesting that having a policy of 
enrolling higher-income children increases total SCHIP spending independent of the 
number of total children enrolled.  
The coefficients for child and adult enrollment (model 3, table 4.4) suggest that for 
every additional enrollee, costs increase by $1,600 and $1,500 respectively. Most 
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estimates demonstrate that enrolling adults is more expensive that enrolling children in 
health insurance programs (KFF 2008). This casts some doubt on the quality of these 
estimates. This may be an artifact of the instrumentation of the adult enrollment policy 
variable and may be resulting in some multicollinearity issues.62 The figures themselves, 
however, are reasonably close to estimates of cost per enrollee in analysis of the 
Medicaid program (KFF 2008). Regardless, the conclusion that enrollment of adults 
increases federal spending within a state remains intact, though no additional information 
about the mechanism can be conclusively drawn from this model, except to suggest that 
the number of adults enrolled, rather than the policy of enrolling adults, appears to be the 
primary causal factor. 
Models predicting the employment of policies that enroll non-targeted populations in 
SCHIP will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5. However, the models presented 
here do suggest that some reverse causation is at play with regard to the interplay 
between the policy variables and the output variables.  
All three models estimated by 3SLS suggest positive relationships between child 
enrollment, total spending, and the practice of having high upper eligibility limits. For the 
models that include controls for fixed-effects, these findings are statistically significant at 
0.10.63  This is the case even after controlling for a time-invariant “propensity” variable 
that identifies each state that ever enrolls higher-income children from 1999-2006. 
Likewise, child enrollment and total spending are positive and significant (α=0.05) 
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 The 3SLS estimates presented in model 1 below suggest estimates of $1000 for child enrollees in federal 
spending per year and $1400 per adult. The shift in cost estimates between models 1 and 3 is a result of the 
employment of fixed state effects in the latter. 
63
 These findings are significant at α = 0.05 except for the total spending variable in model 3, which has a 
p-value of 0.0870. 
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predictors of whether a state will enroll adults. Simultaneity is thus an important factor to 
consider in models relating non-targeted enrollment policies and program outcomes.  
Discussion 
The State Children’s Health Insurance Program was created with a single, 
unambiguous objective: To provide states with enhanced means for enrolling low-income 
children in public health insurance programs. Chapter 3 discussed the financial output 
consequences of state expansions to non-targeted benefit populations, and this chapter 
has focused on the impacts of these expansions on enrollment of low-income children.  
The findings in this chapter are very sensitive to the outcome measurement used, and 
as such are somewhat inconclusive. The empirical reality in which SCHIP operates is 
complex and involves endogenous factors, group effects and data limitations that make 
conclusive analysis difficult. However, the corrective techniques employed in this chapter 
provide some evidence (particularly from the final model presented) to suggest that 
enrollment of non-targeted populations has a negative correlation the enrollment of low-
income children in SCHIP. The direction of causality here is not effectively established, 
however, due to the absence of child Medicaid enrollment figures to determine whether 
low-income children are not enrolling in SCHIP because they are already eligible for 
Medicaid. 
If the purpose of SCHIP (in combination with Medicaid) is to reduce the total 
percentage of low-income child uninsured within a state, this chapter presents modest 
evidence to suggest that the enrollment of adults in SCHIP may actually lower the rates 
of low-income child uninsurance. This finding is consistent with previous studies on 
family coverage expansions. However, the same model suggests that enrollment of 
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higher-income children has a positive correlation with child uninsurance rates. This 
makes sense given that there is no clear causal mechanism for enrollment of higher-
income children positively affecting enrollment of lower-income children. 
If the outcome of interest is the proportion of targeted children (including higher-
income child enrollees, low-income child enrollees and low-income uninsured children) 
who are enrolled in SCHIP, this chapter suggests that enrollment of adults and higher 
income children have positive correlations with the outcome. This outcome measure is, 
however, somewhat flawed in that it includes the non-targeted population as a group of 
desirable beneficiaries. This is not necessarily an interpretation that is consistent with the 
stated purpose of SCHIP. This outcome measure was primarily employed due to data 
limitations that prohibited the isolation of high-income child enrollees from the SCHIP 
child enrollment figures available through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS).
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Chapter 5: Goal Conflict and Enrollment of Non-targeted 
Populations 
Introduction 
The 2007 SCHIP reauthorization debate identified the enrollment of non-targeted 
populations in the SCHIP program as a form of conflict between the goals of some states 
and the goals of the federal institutions that authorized SCHIP as part of the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997 (GAO 2002). This goal conflict was of such import to the 
policymaking process that it effectively prevented the reauthorization of the SCHIP 
program and resulted in two presidential vetoes of bills passed by Congress (Bush 2007).  
This chapter focuses on the prediction of state administrative decisions regarding the 
enrollment of two non-targeted populations in SCHIP: adults and higher-income children. 
Enrollment of either of these groups represents a manifestation of goal conflict based on 
the purpose of SCHIP stated at its inception (GAO 2002). This face conflict, however, is 
further augmented by the effects of enrollment of non-targeted populations on federal 
funding patterns (resource conflict) and outcomes (outcome conflict).  
Clearly, state-level characteristics affect the decisions of states regarding 
administrative choices about the use of SCHIP funds. Some states have an ideological 
culture that supports expansion of public health insurance programs, others face issues 
related to high rates of poverty, immigration, or both; some states have greater 
administrative capacity for seeking and receiving waivers from the federal bureaucracy, 
and still others face state funding constraints that affect decisions about the expansion of 
state-administered programs like SCHIP. 
106 
The state-level characteristics that create the environment for state-level decisions 
about SCHIP administration can be classified in terms of belief, goal and plan arenas and 
may generate conflict with the federal purposes of SCHIP within a state. Ultimately, 
these conflicts manifest themselves in programmatic choices including the decision to 
enroll populations outside of the federal target of children living at or below 200 percent 
of FPL.  
No clear patterns exist in the approval of waivers allowing states to enroll non-
targeted populations in SCHIP.64 If the legislative goal for SCHIP is to increase 
enrollment of low-income children in health insurance programs, we could expect to see 
demonstration waivers used to encourage enrollment of the target population. Indeed, the 
language of section 1115 of the Social Security Act, which grants the authority for the 
HIFA waiver initiative, provides that exceptions to standard federal policy is acceptable 
“[i]n the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the judgment 
of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of SCHIP (CMS, 2001). 
HIFA, however, expands this objective to include more than the explicit SCHIP target 
population: “Our goal is to give governors the flexibility they need to expand insurance 
coverage to more Americans through innovative approaches” (CMS, 2001). It appears 
that states that have been successful at insuring low-income children have sought other 
ways to capture and spend federal monies through enrollment of non-targeted populations 
rather than redistributing them to states with lower success rates, and states with low 
success rates are enrolling non-targeted populations despite their failure to enroll low-
income children. It stands to reason that states with the lowest success rates may be 
motivated to find alternative means of reaching the targeted population—thus seeking 
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 See discussion on this topic in chapter 2. 
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demonstration waivers for innovative approaches—but neither Texas nor Florida, whose 
uninsurance rates are the lowest in the country, insure adults or higher-income children to 
improve enrollment of targeted children. Of the 16 states with low-income uninsurance 
rates of 20 percent or higher, 6 insure adults and 5 insure children outside the target 
population.  
Nor does coverage of non-targeted populations appear to be the key to low 
uninsurance rates; four of the states with among the lowest low-income uninsurance 
rates, Iowa, Ohio, and West Virginia, do not use SCHIP funds to cover adults or higher-
income children.  
In this chapter, we seek to use the theory presented in chapter one to derive variables 
that may help to predict enrollment of non-targeted populations. As seen in chapter two, 
no obvious qualitative conclusion can be drawn regarding the underlying motivations of 
states to engage in these policy behaviors, though some researchers have been willing to 
take the statements of the states themselves at face value (Artiga and Mann 2007).  
In the subsequent analysis, variables operationalizing concepts of belief conflict at the 
citizen/population level, priority conflict at the legislative and institutional level, and plan 
conflict at the administrative level will be used to predict the plan variables that 
demonstrate federal-state goal conflict in this analysis. Limited dependent variable 
estimation techniques will be employed to model several outcomes related to the 
enrollment of non-targeted populations in the SCHIP program. Specifically, this analysis 
will attempt to predict or describe correlates of the following dependent variables: 
• Whether or not a state enrolls adults in a given year (logit) 
• Whether or not a state enrolls higher-income children in a given year 
(logit) 
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Goal conflict is conceptualized in these models as a latent variable that has a 
significant impact on states’ decisions regarding the plan-level implementation of SCHIP. 
Goal conflict theory suggests that goal conflict may be comprised of multiple types of 
conflict that fall into three broad categories: belief conflict, priority conflict, and plan 
conflict (Barber et al. 1998). In the policy context, conflicts that result from fundamental 
underlying citizen beliefs or the aggregation of preferences at different levels are defined 
as contributors to belief conflict. Conflict that arises out of a prioritization of other issues, 
projects, or programs (generally at the legislative level) over the priorities associated with 
SCHIP are characterized as priority conflict. SCHIP program implementation decisions 
or program specifications that may be at odds with other potential implementation 
decisions or program specifications (generally at the administrative level) are defined as 
plan conflict. Thus, the latent variable for goal conflict is essentially subdivided into three 
separate but intertwining latent variables. To assist in analysis, plausible specific types of 
goal conflict at each of these three levels are identified and measures or proxies proposed. 
These are discussed in more detail below. 
The question to be answered in this analysis is whether or not state-level conflict with 
federal goals—a latent variable that cannot be directly measured but that has great 
potential to affect implementation of state-administered federal policy-- can be 
effectively identified and/or predicted using observable state characteristics. In other 
words, can application of goal conflict theory enhance our ability to understand state 
implementation of federal policy? Though substantive policy-specific findings will result 
from this analysis, the research question goes beyond the specific SCHIP policy context, 
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with implications for federal grant programs and related issues of intergovernmental 
management (Goggin 1986; Moe 1984; Nicholson-Crotty 2004). 
The dependent variables in this analysis represent nominal goal conflict: Plan 
specification decisions that explicitly conflict with the legislative goals of SCHIP as 
identified in the 1997 Balanced Budget Act and as interpreted by President Bush in the 
2007 policy statements regarding his decision to veto two separate Congressional SCHIP 
reauthorization attempts. Specifically, these dependent variables embody the decision to 
enroll populations outside of the target population of children whose family incomes are 
200 percent of the federal poverty level or below. This plan specification decision may be 
made in one of two ways: enrolling higher-income children or enrolling adults.65  
Enrollment of adults and enrollment of higher-income children each represent a 
departure by the implementing states from the stated goals of the SCHIP program, and as 
such are good representatives of the goal conflict concept. These binary measures, 
however, are themselves proxies for the latent variable of goal conflict. The presence of 
two different policy outcomes as responses to goal conflict identify the multidimensional 
nature of state-federal goal conflict; states may have beliefs and priorities that result in a 
wide variety of goals that have the potential to conflict with federal aims.66 Some state 
administrative decision outcomes may be more easily predicted than others based on state 
characteristics and demonstrable goal conflict in other policy areas.  
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 Or both. 
66
 Not all of these goals are directly related to the policy as are demand for enrollment of adult or higher-
income populations. Goals may include fiscal goals (such as a desire for capture of federal funds) or others. 
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A latent variable approach 
The binary dependent variables representing enrollment of adults and enrollment of 
higher-income children may actually be thought of as proxy measures for latent 
propensities to enroll these non-targeted populations (Von Eye and Clogg 1994; 
Heckman 1978). This latent propensity may be described as a taste or preference for 
enrollment of adults or higher-income children, and is among the factors that contribute 
to the larger, multi-dimensional concept of state conflict with federal goals. As such, a 
potentially significant endogeneity issue arises: The dependent variable is a measure for 
one dimension of the same latent variable that theoretically undergirds the variables used 
to predict it. In other words, this approach uses several indirect measures of a multi-
dimensional latent variable to predict another indirect measure of the same latent 
variable. By definition, the latent variable itself cannot be directly measured, resulting in 
error-term variation (caused by the latent variable) that correlates with both the dependent 
and independent variables. While this endogeneity may cause spurious correlation and 
bias the coefficient values in the models presented below, the spurious correlation 
resulting from capture of the latent goal conflict variable in the regressors may prove 
useful: the goal is to see whether observable characteristics or decisions of states can be 
used to capture the unobservable state preferences that undergird state policy 
implementation decisions. Thus, the only endogeneity issues that require resolution are 
those arising from error term omitted variables other than goal conflict. That said, care 
must be taken in interpretation of the following empirical models, with explicit 
recognition that coefficient estimates for independent variables cannot merely be taken at 
face value, but must be interpreted as potentially being impacted by the latent 
(endogenous) goal conflict concept.  
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It is important to note that during the process of determining state implementation 
procedures for SCHIP and similar programs with sufficient discretion, state priorities are 
weighed and prioritized (Goggin 1986). This prioritization of multiple interests results in 
simultaneous decisions regarding enrollment populations, enrollment procedures, and 
other program characteristics due to the zero-sum environment in which these policy and 
implementation decisions are made. Endogeneity therefore exists when considering plan-
level factors that may affect decisions regarding enrollment of non-targeted populations, 
as states may be selecting among what are essentially mutually exclusive administrative 
choices. Some delicacy in interpretation is thus required when considering plan-level 
independent variables, as they are dually endogenous: the selection of some plan 
characteristics may be the result of response to a latent set of state preferences and 
characteristics that embody goal conflict and simultaneously represent policy 
implementation decisions that are structurally linked to the dependent variables due to 
practical limitations. That said, the selection among policy options that are thus 
structurally linked is arguably driven by state preferences and characteristics; thus, goal 
conflict based on those preferences and characteristics is the most important source of 
endogeneity even in these plan-level variables. 
High Upper SCHIP Eligibility Limits 
Prediction of high child SCHIP upper eligibility limits provides insight into the 
potential reasoning of states regarding expansion of SCHIP eligibility beyond the stated 
federal goals of the program.67 The focus here is on state policy decisions for three 
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 Procedurally, states must receive approval from HHS in order to use federal matching funds to support 
programs that target children outside of the federally identified range (which later expanded from the 
statutory 200 percent FPL to 250 FPL, and now includes an institutional provision allowing upper limits 
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reasons. First, states must initiate waiver applications if exceptions are to be made by the 
federal administrative body. The first responsibility for the decision to expand eligibility 
thus lies explicitly with the states. Second, federal motivations are here assumed to be 
constant across states (politics and state capacities notwithstanding) and general 
procedures and guidelines for approval of waivers are outlined in various HHS 
publications. This (assumed) lack of variation shifts the type of analysis required from 
quantitative to what would essentially be a qualitative case study of the internal function 
of HHS regarding approval of SCHIP waivers, and remains a direction for future work.68 
Third, this analysis is particularly concerned with state-level goal alignment and its 
effects on federal goal outcomes, rendering the state-level analysis the most relevant for 
answering the question at hand. 
By the end of 2006, 14 of the 49 states in this analysis (roughly one third) were 
engaged in the practice of enrolling children whose family incomes exceeded 200 percent 
of FPL. Of these, more than half enrolled children above the 250 percent FPL mark. Over 
the eight years from 1999 to 2006, 25 percent of observations enrolled higher-income 
children.  
High SCHIP eligibility and Medicaid 
One major factor contributing to the enrollment of higher income children was the 
pre-existing child eligibility limits under Medicaid. By design, states are barred from 
                                                                                                                                                 
within 50 points of the highest Medicaid eligibility rate). So the question is not merely one of state 
motivations, but also of the motivations of the federal administrative body. 
68
 Some researchers have begun to question the assumption that federal agencies respond similarly to all 
states with regard to discretionary matters including distribution of federal grant monies. Political variables 
have been shown to be significant in administrative decisionmaking that had been previously assumed to be 
relatively formulaic. While political and capacity variables are included in this analysis as state-level 
indicators of goal alignment, I cannot effectively rule out the possibility that these indicators demonstrate 
political collusion between the federal agency and the states. 
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enrolling children in SCHIP if they were eligible for Medicaid under state rules prior to 
enactment of SCHIP. Prior to SCHIP, five states had child Medicaid upper eligibility 
limits of 200 or above, and 21 states enrolled at least some children at 185 percent FPL or 
below. 185 percent of FPL was the highest Medicaid upper eligibility limit that did not 
require a waiver from HHS under Medicaid rules. The qualitative correlation between 
high upper Medicaid eligibility limits and high upper SCHIP eligibility limits is clear. All 
5 of the states that had enrolled children above 185 percent FPL prior to SCHIP enrolled 
higher-income children in SCHIP by 2006. All 23 states that had Medicaid eligibility 
limits of 150 FPL or below did not have SCHIP programs that enrolled higher-income 
children by 2006. These correlations may indicate issues of goal alignment, capacity, or 
need. What is more qualitatively interesting, however, is the relatively equal distribution 
of states that had upper Medicaid eligibility limits of 185 percent: Of these states, 12 had 
2006 upper SCHIP eligibility limits of 200 percent FPL or below, and 9 had limits above 
this level.  
The correlation coefficient between the binary variable for high SCHIP eligibility 
levels and the variable for the highest 1997 SCHIP Medicaid eligibility level, computed 
over all 392 observations, is .6363. The correlation between the 1997 highest SCHIP 
child Medicaid eligibility level and the 1999 SCHIP eligibility level dummy is 05968 and 
between the upper Medicaid 1997 limit and the continuous (though lumpy) SCHIP upper 
limit in 1999 is 0.3700. The correlation between the 1997 highest Medicaid eligibility 
level and the 2006 dummy for high SCHIP upper limit is 0.6557 and the continuous 
measure in 2006 has a correlation coefficient of 0.5932. All of these correlations are 
significant at the 0.01 level. With the exception of Washington, which did not yet have an 
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approved SCHIP plan, all states with high upper Medicaid child eligibility limits already 
had SCHIP eligibility limits above 200 percent FPL by 1999. By 2000, even Washington 
had an upper SCHIP eligibility limit of 250.69 
The correlation between the decision to enroll higher income children and the pre-
existing level of child Medicaid coverage reflects the structural limitation on use of 
SCHIP funds to children who were previously ineligible for Medicaid. Several states had 
demonstration waivers under Medicaid that allowed them to enroll children above 185 
percent of FPL, the highest eligibility level allowable under Medicaid in 1997 without a 
demonstration waiver.70 This level of previous Medicaid coverage played a role in 
granting SCHIP waivers to allow some states to increase their eligibility limits above the 
200 percent limit and thereby access SCHIP funds for which they would otherwise have 
been ineligible. The motivation to grant these waivers was ostensibly to avoid punishing 
states for having had pre-existing demonstration waivers under the Medicaid program 
that already provided coverage to the SCHIP target population. Denial of SCHIP funds to 
these states due to their technical ineligibility would have been politically unpopular. 
These waivers were allowed prior to the availability of waivers under HIFA. 
The relationship between the upper Medicaid child eligibility limit and SCHIP 
eligibility suggests that they could easily be considered measures of the same latent 
variable for propensity to enroll higher-income children. This propensity to enroll 
children at levels higher than those outlined by federal programs is certainly a shared 
characteristic between the high child Medicaid eligibility limits in 1997 and the 
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 Tennessee, which is not included in the analysis, had no upper child Medicaid eligibility limit based on a 
Medicaid demonstration waiver granted in 1994.  
70
 Notably, 21 states had 1997 upper child Medicaid eligibility limits of 185. Of these, 5 had SCHIP 
eligibility limits over 200 percent FPL by 1999 and 9 had SCHIP eligibility limits over 200 percent FPL by 
2006. 
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successful negotiation of demonstration waivers allowing enrollment of higher-income 
children in SCHIP. States with demonstration waivers in place to enroll higher income 
children in the Medicaid program (despite ostensible federal limits on upper eligibility 
limits) may have been responding to the same dimension of goal conflict under Medicaid 
as they later expressed by having increased eligibility limits under SCHIP.71 Further, the 
qualitative and structural relationship between upper child Medicaid limits and SCHIP 
upper eligibility limits renders the two observables virtually indistinguishable, 
particularly when the SCHIP upper limit dependent variable is coded in a binary manner 
(1=eligibility limit above 200 percent FPL, 0=eligibility limit of 200 percent FPL or 
below).  
Independent Variables 
Chapter one provides a framework for identifying variables that may predict the state-
level goal elements that could lead to state implementation decisions that conflict—either 
directly or indirectly—with the federal goal of enrolling low-income children in SCHIP.  
The three levels of goal conflict—belief, priority and plan—provide a general framework 
for the identification of proxies that capture latent state-level characteristics that might 
otherwise be unobserved. 
Belief conflict 
Belief conflict refers to the underlying belief patterns and preferences that may or 
may not manifest themselves in structured institutions that aggregate preferences. Belief-
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 A plausible competing explanation is that these states have a desire to capture more federal funds by 
increasing eligibility limits. Given that there were no options other than increasing child eligibility limits 
for accessing increased SCHIP funds prior to 2001 (when HIFA waivers became available), it is difficult to 
distinguish between preference for child enrollment and preference for capture of federal funds as 
motivations for the goal conflict. However, the manifestations of the latent conflict are evident, and likely 
to be consistent from the Medicaid program to SCHIP. Another competing hypothesis is that states with 
greater administrative capacity are more able to seek and receive waivers. 
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level conflict is relatively passive; differing belief systems and preferences can easily 
coexist among actors and only cause conflict indirectly through ordering of priorities and 
development of plans. In the policymaking context, belief conflict is most analogous to 
the passive preferences of the citizens in a jurisdiction. In this analysis, belief conflict is 
operationalized using the citizen liberalism score developed by Berry, et al (1998). The 
party of governor is also included (1=Democrat, 0=other) as a proxy measure for the 
belief status of a state. 
Priority conflict 
In the policymaking context, priority conflict manifests itself through the ordering 
and prioritization of multiple objectives. This ordering is primarily the responsibility of 
elected officials, who must discern the beliefs and preferences of their constituents and 
act accordingly (Pagen and Shapiro 1983). This process may require prioritization not 
only of some issues above others, but also the ordering of constituencies themselves, as 
elected policymakers and bureaucratic rulemakers are beholden to multiple constituencies 
at once (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Chubb and Moe 1990; Furlong 1998; Balla and 
Wright 2001). Priority conflict thus occurs when one actor prioritizes issues or 
constituency needs in a manner that conflict with the ordering preferred by another actor. 
These priority differences do not always yield conflict; it is possible that priorities are 
sufficiently matched to allow for mutual accomplishment of differently prioritized goals. 
However, in the zero-sum environment of intergovernmental legislative action, priority 
differences have the potential to yield direct conflict (Feldman et al. 1994).  
Because the primary question of priority conflict in this analysis lies in the potential 
conflict between states and the federal legislative intent of the SCHIP program, priority-
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level variables include percent of Congressional delegates from the state that voted in 
favor of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (the SCHIP authorizing legislation), and the vote 
to override the veto of the second  SCHIP reauthorization bill. This measure is intended 
to capture discernible priority conflict that existed at the time of the legislation. The 
reauthorization bill is the better measure of the two because it explicitly focuses on 
SCHIP, whereas the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 included a wide variety of budgetary 
provisions in several areas of federal fiscal operation. 
The SCHIP program as initially conceived targets a relatively limited portion of the 
US population: low-income children without health insurance. Whether or not health 
insurance coverage of this population within a state is a priority to that state—as 
compared with coverage of the uninsured population as a whole or some other population 
segment—is a question that may affect administrative decisions regarding enrollment of 
non-targeted populations. This priority conflict is operationalized by including variables 
for the percent of children at 200 percent FPL or below who are uninsured and the total 
population uninsurance rate for a state.  
State demand for health spending may also indicate a priority conflict. States with 
low demand for health spending may have different preferences for the use of federal 
SCHIP monies than do states with high demand for health spending. The log of health 
spending is included to account for this potential variation. 
Plan conflict 
Plan conflict in the policymaking context is conflict in the specification of a policy or 
its implementation. More than in priority conflict, plan conflict generally occurs in a 
zero-sum environment where limited resources are allocated based on specific sets of 
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procedures. When these procedures conflict, resolution of the conflict is generally 
requires one procedure or the other to acquiesce; limited resource availability does not 
allow for accomplishment of both plans at once. In the SCHIP program, plan conflict 
manifests in a variety of administrative choices made by the states in implementing the 
SCHIP program. Among these decisions are the selection of upper income limits, 
decisions regarding the enrollment of adults, and enrollment and eligibility procedures. 
Enrollment of adults or higher-income children are the plan variables that form the 
dependent variables in this analysis. However, additional plan-level variables are selected 
by the states in implementation of SCHIP. Therefore, these other implementation 
decisions may be expected covariates of plans that allow enrollment of non-targeted 
populations. The plan-level variables included in this analysis are a dummy variable for 
use of SCHIP funds in a Medicaid expansion program (as opposed to stand-alone SCHIP 
or combination programs), a dummy variable for employment of presumptive eligibility 
or continuous enrollment (or both), and a dummy variable for enrollment of the non-
targeted population not already entering the model as the dependent variable (in models 
of adult enrollment, a dummy variable for enrollment of higher-income children is 
included and vice versa). 
Controls 
Several variables are included in the analysis to control for a variety of important 
state-level factors that may influence decisions regarding state implementation decisions. 
These include population, gross state product, total SCHIP spending (including federal 
and state funding),  
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In addition to the controls listed above, the implementation literature suggests that 
state administrative capacity influences decisions regarding policy specification within 
the states (Goggin 1986). In order to control for state capacity, three variables have been 
included: The number of days to submission of the state’s initial SCHIP proposal for 
federal administrative review, the total number of days to state implementation of the 
program, and the number of program amendments to date submitted to the federal 
administrative body by a state (Goggin 1999).  
It is important to note that though these variables are ostensibly included as measures 
of administrative capacity, they could also serve as potential indicators of state-level goal 
conflict. Rapid submission of a plan and/or implementation of the SCHIP program could 
suggest high alignment with the intent of the program as well as high capacity to 
complete the administrative tasks required for submission and implementation. Likewise, 
a high amendment count might suggest, in addition to capacity for refining program 
implementation plans, jockeying by the state to overcome goal conflict while maximizing 
the acquisition of federal dollars. For models using enrollment of adults as a variable (and 
not controlling for time otherwise), the limitation on enrollment of adults that existed 
prior to 2001 is addressed by limiting the sample only to observations occurring in or 
after 2001. 72 For comparison purposes, the pooled logit model estimated using the time-
invariant variable for whether adults were ever enrolled in a state is also estimated on the 
full sample of observations. 
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 Four states, Minnesota, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Wisconsin, enrolled adults in SCHIP in 2001, the 
year that HIFA waivers were introduced. 
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Data and methods 
The data in this chapter is a balanced panel of annual observations for 49 states over 
the eight years from 1999-2006. Based on the theory outlined in chapter one, it is 
hypothesized that belief-level, priority-level, and plan-level variables will impact a state’s 
decision to enroll children above the 200 percent limit. While some states may have the 
potential for goal conflict but have not expressed that conflict by enrolling higher-income 
children to-date, it is reasonable to expect that at least those states with the strongest 
desire to either enroll higher-income child populations or to access additional federal 
funds will have done so by the end of 2006, given that 2007 marks the statutory sunset 
year for the program. 
Selection among modeling approaches must focus on where the latent goal conflict 
variable is observed, if at all. An ideal model would capture goal conflict in observable 
regressors while ameliorating any resultant endogeneity problems arising from 
unobserved variation in the latent variable. 
The first approach to be considered is the fixed effect approach. Given that relevant 
fixed-effects occur on both the state and time dimensions, the assumption in the 
following model is that the slope coefficients are constant over individuals and time but 
that the intercept values for individuals (state-level fixed-effects) vary. This results in the 
following general specification:73  
dit= α1 + Σβitxit + Σγixi +uit 
Where dit is a policy/implementation decision for a state in a given year, xit is a set of 
exogenous factors observed in the state/time dyad, xi is a set of state dummies and uit is 
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 The initial formulation of the fixed-effects and subsequent models for this analysis included time fixed-
effects, but the year-specific dummies were found to be statistically insignificant both as individuals and as 
a set. They were therefore dropped from this formulation. 
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assumed to be random error. The dit variable may be considered, as it is here, a latent 
variable representing propensity to engage in a policy or policy implementation decision. 
The distinction made here from previous applications is that the particular type of policy 
implementation decision is to engage in a policy action that is expressly contrary to the 
goals of the federal policy on which it is predicated. 
This approach allows exploration of the relationship between exogenous factors and 
the selection of policy decisions, holding state- and time-specific variation constant. In 
many circumstances, this is a useful arrangement because state idiosyncrasies can be 
“differenced out” yielding an improvement in the efficiency in coefficient estimates for 
the set of exogenous variables. However, one problem with this approach is that the latent 
goal conflict variable (which has a significant time-invariant component) is grouped with 
all other time-invariant variables in a state-specific intercept term. This approach treats 
state-level time invariant characteristics as completely idiosyncratic whereas important 
commonalities in the factors causing state-level fixed-effects may exist across states. 
Traditionally, time invariant state characteristics are seen as “nuisance” variables that 
cause undesirable endogeneity if relegated to the error term (thus making the fixed-
effects approach appear desirable). While fixed-effects modeling is a straightforward 
solution to the issue of state-level fixed-effects, it does not allow for explicit observation 
of the effect of time-invariant proxies for the latent goal conflict variable. 
One alternative approach is to explicitly measure time invariant state-level effects, but 
to do so in terms of deviations from group means. This “between-effects” approach 
effectively ameliorates the problem of group correlation among state observations, but 
limits inference to differences between states and has no predictive value for changes that 
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occur within states. In essence, this approach reduces the rich set of pooled data to merely 
a collection of state averages, effectively isolating the impact of between-state effects and 
resolving the issue of differences across time. While this approach may be favorable for 
some situations, it is not particularly useful in an inquiry that seeks to discern how highly 
nuanced shifts in state circumstances (either within or between states) affects state policy 
outcomes. If goal conflict were assumed to be solely time-invariant, within-state 
comparison would be moot and a between-effects approach would be favorable. 
However, some variables that change over time are (at least theoretically) important 
components of the latent goal conflict concept. A fundamental component of this query 
asks, “why would a state that previously did not engage in a particular policy activity 
later choose to do so?” Given that in the between-effects approach variables that change 
over time are essentially reduced to averages, this is also not an ideal model specification.  
The random-effects approach, generally a matrix-weighted average of the previous 
two approaches, is a favorable solution in analysis of many policy decisions. The primary 
assumption of this model is that the effects observed at the state level are not in fact 
fixed, but rather manifestations of a latent random variable. For the random-effects model 
to apply, we must assume that the state-level effects are merely random deviations from a 
single fixed (mean) intercept value. This assumes that state-level observations represent 
random selections from a larger population of state-level observation. Though this may 
not be true in the sense that the states themselves are selected from a larger sample, but is 
true in the sense that the decisions, actions, and characteristics in each state-level 
observation are just one of a potentially infinite set of such manifestations (Haavelmo 
1944 from baltagi). State-level deviation from this mean intercept value can be collected 
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in an error term εi, and this error is grouped with the uit error term to yield the combined 
error wit. While state-level error can be conceptualized as a random variable, it is the 
assumption of this analysis that some important time invariant idiosyncratic factors that 
may otherwise be embedded in the εi error term (and thus the wit error term) are in fact 
correlated with the dependent variable. These fixed state-level effects must therefore be 
explicitly included in the model in order to ameliorate, as much as possible, the 
endogeneity issue. The challenge is that the particular fixed state-level effect in question 
is a component of the latent variable (the concept of “goal conflict”) and thus cannot be 
directly measured. This latent variable is also likely to be correlated with at least some of 
the independent variables in the model. This presents the same problem for the random-
effects model that it would for the pooled model: inefficiency in the coefficient estimates. 
The random-effects model, however, relies on strict exogeneity of the regressors, a 
condition that cannot be met. In the case of correlation between the error term and the 
regressor(s), bias in the estimates may also result.  
Though the fixed state-effects model is inappropriate for this inquiry because it does 
not provide the substantive information we seek, this model nonetheless provides a useful 
comparison. 
What is sought here is a more nuanced approach in order to capture the important 
state-level characteristics—including seemingly idiosyncratic, time-invariant goals and 
preferences as well as state characteristics that may change over time--that have 
important impacts on the policy implementation decisions of states. It is also the intent of 
this analysis to determine whether any such idiosyncrasies represent observable 
characteristics that exist in multiple states and impact policy similarly in different state 
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contexts. Such an aim clearly cannot embrace a methodology that merely lumps all state-
level characteristics into a single variable as does fixed-effects modeling, nor is a 
between-effects approach entirely appropriate because it limits within-state inference.  
Formulating the problem as a standard random-effects model:74 
dit=α2 + Σβitxit + [Σεi + uit] 
The summation term for the group error recognizes that deviations from the mean 
state intercept are really a sum of latent variables and true random error collected together 
in the error term. Expanding out the components of this error term to represent the three 
components of goal conflict (belief, priority and plan conflict) and allowing for additional 
time-invariant confounding variables (other) in addition to the purely random group error 
component, we have: 
dit= α2 + Σβitxit + [εibelief+ εipriority + εiplan + εiother + εi + uit] 
In this model, we can see that components of the Σεi term (which includes latent goal 
conflict variables) may be expected to correlate with the dependent variable (which is a 
policy expression or potential outcome of goal conflict). It is also reasonable to expect 
the possibility of correlation between components of this error term and components of 
the Σβitxit regressor term. By selecting proxies intended to explicitly capture the variation 
from belief, priority and plan-level conflict as well as important time-invariant 
confounding variables, this model becomes:  
dit= α3 + Σβitxit + γixi belief+ γixi priority + γixi plan + γixi other + [εi +uit] 
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 Note the changing subscript on the regression constant α. Though a discussion of the intercept term is not 
included here, it is nonetheless useful to note that the nature of the regression constant changes with each 
specification. For the sake of simplicity I have merely collected the various components of the constant for 
each specification into a single regression constant. 
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This model is preferable to the previous because it reduces endogeneity while 
simultaneously capturing the latent goal conflict variable in observable measures. 
Collapsing the time-invariant state characteristics into a single collected term and making 
the substitution of wi for εi +uit in the random-effects model, we obtain:75 
dit= α3 + Σβitxit + Σγixi + wit 
Thus the primary modeling approach used here is a combination of approaches 
yielding a mixed-model approach. State fixed-effects are divided among two 
components, a random-effects component and a latent variable component captured 
primarily by time-invariant proxies.76  
The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable (enrollment of non-targeted 
population, 1; otherwise, 0) further complicates issues; though linear methods of 
estimating latent variable models produce a workable solution to the limited dependent 
variable problem (Heckman 1978), it is nonetheless preferable to employ estimation 
methods that account for the nature of limited dependent variables. This class of 
models/estimation techniques is widely used explicitly to deal with the issue of latent 
dependent variables (Long 1997; Von Eye and Clogg 1994; Heckman 1978). While a 
mixed-effect logit model procedure does exist, it is computationally demanding and our 
sample does not meet the requirements for convergence. Therefore, we will handle each 
issue separately and draw what conclusions we may given the assumptions and 
limitations of each functional form.  
                                                 
75
 Note that any error resulting from the failure of the proxy variables to fully capture the latent goal 
conflict variable is now collected in the εi component of the wit term. 
76
 The time-invariant variables included in this collected term that correspond to the γixi other term from 
above but that do not represent goal conflict concepts are variables intended to capture potentially 
confounding variables that would otherwise cause further endogeneity issues.  
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The mixed-effects models estimated here will executed using the xtmixed command 
in STATA 10. The dependent variables will be measures of, first, enrollment of any 
children with family incomes above 200 percent of poverty and second (enrollment of 
higher-income children, 1; otherwise, 0), and enrollment of any adults (enrollment of 
adults, 1; otherwise, 0).77 These models will be compared with comparable mixed-effects 
models estimating the (relatively) continuous measures for actual SCHIP upper eligibility 
limit and number of adults enrolled. 
Logit comparison models are estimated for the binary dependent variables. In these 
models,  standard errors are estimated using a clustered sandwich estimator, relaxing the 
assumption of independence within clusters (states) but maintaining the assumption of 
independence between clusters.78 A second set of pooled logit models is estimated with 
dependent variables coded explicitly for the latent, time-invariant propensity to enroll 
adults (if adults were ever enrolled from 1999-2007, 1; otherwise, 0) or higher-income 
children (if higher-income children were ever enrolled from 1999-2007, 1; otherwise, 
0).79 
This second pooled comparison approach shifts the focus of the dependent variable 
away from a time-sensitive variable that captures only the explicit manifestation of the 
goal conflict policy to a measure that captures the presence of the latent underlying goal 
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 Models predicting time-variant dependent variables related to enrollment of adults are limited to the time 
period from 2001 to 2006 because prior to HIFA, enrollment of adults in SCHIP was prohibited. The time-
invariant dependent variable measuring whether adults were ever enrolled in the period from 1999-2006, 
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dependent variables are available upon request. 
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conflict variable if it is ever observed.   The dependent variable in this approach is thus a 
characteristic of the state rather than its policy in a given year.  
Included in all models are various measures of belief-level state goal indicators, 
including the citizen liberalism score, governor party affiliation, and the state uninsurance 
and poverty rates. State capacity variables include total days to initial SCHIP proposal 
submission, total days to SCHIP program implementation, number of waiver applications 
submitted to date. Plan-level variables include dummies for whether or not the state 
enrolls adults, whether or not the state employs continuous enrollment or presumptive 
eligibility, type of SCHIP plan (Medicaid or other). Controls include the highest pre-
existing Medicaid eligibility level, two population variables (state population and 
population of children living at or below 200 percent FPL), a state wealth variable 
measuring GSP, and a measure of total SCHIP spending (state and federal). 
Results 
The two mixed-effects regression models of the highest SCHIP child eligibility limit 
in a given year (table 5.1) are remarkably similar despite the exclusion of the 1997 
Medicaid upper child eligibility limit from model 2. The fact that the mixed-effects 
model appears to somewhat mitigate the effects of omitted variable bias in model 2 is 
useful because not all policies have immediate predecessors on which to base 
expectations about implementation. Thus, the relative similarity of the models even 
absent the additional explanatory power provided by the Medicaid upper limit variable 
increases confidence that policy predictive modeling has the potential to provide useful 
predictions even when no immediately related policy information exists. 
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Six variables are significant predictors (other than Medicaid upper limit) of the upper 
SCHIP limit in a given year: Liberalism, Medicaid type, continuous or presumptive 
eligibility, amendments, low-income child uninsurance rate, and state tax revenue per 
capita. The relationships of these factors to the dependent variable are not always as 
expected based on goal conflict theory, suggesting some alternative causal mechanisms 
between the variables. Citizen liberalism, for example, was expected to have a positive 
relationship with SCHIP upper limits, as liberalism is associated with expansion of 
government programs and championing of public social welfare programs in particular. 
This variable, however, is negatively correlated with high upper eligibility limits (β=-
0.5065, p=0.0410).80  
Having continuous enrollment or presumptive eligibility practices negatively 
correlates with the dependent variable (β= -31.24, p=0.0060), which suggests either that 
there is some substitution effect between policy options for enrolling children or that 
states seeking higher enrollment of targeted children employ a different set of policy 
techniques than states that are pursuing other goals. It is instructive to note that before 
granting some types of SCHIP waivers to states, the federal government requires that a 
set of implementation practices, selected from a variety of options including presumptive 
eligibility and continuous enrollment, must first be employed. It comes as some surprise, 
then, that the relationship between high upper eligibility limits and these policy options is 
not positive.  
The Medicaid-type SCHIP program has a strong negative correlation with upper 
SCHIP eligibility limits (β=-34.46, p<0.0000). This is likely a structural artifact of the 
rules governing various types of SCHIP programs, and suggests that states seeking high 
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upper SCHIP eligibility limits are less likely to specify their programs as Medicaid 
expansions. Medicaid expansion SCHIP programs are subject to Medicaid provisions in 
order to be eligible for SCHIP funds, and are required to be budget-neutral whereas 
SCHIP expansions need only be allotment-neutral (CMS 2007). 
The number of SCHIP amendments filed to date has a positive, significant 
relationship with upper SCHIP eligibility limit (β=2.105, p=0.0300). There are two 
potential explanations for this finding. The first is based on the argument that states with 
greater conflict with the federal goal will seek to alter their program as much and as often 
as possible in order to best achieve state goals. The second is a capacity argument 
suggesting that states with greater administrative capacity are more likely to find ways of 
accessing greater federal funds or achieving waivers to standard federal policy. Both 
explanations are likely true, though additional qualitative inquiry would be useful in 
bearing this question out. 
Low-income child uninsurance rate and state tax revenue per capita both also 
significantly correlate with the upper SCHIP eligibility limit. The positive correlation of 
per capita tax revenue (β=21.26, p<0.0000) suggests that wealthier states are more likely 
to expand their programs to higher-income children, which makes sense given that 
SCHIP is a matching program and fiscal capacity of the states is a strong factor in 
whether or not they are able to access funds. States willing to expand enrollment 
populations would also be expected to have the revenue necessary to fund those 
expansions.  
A shift in focus from the raw upper SCHIP eligibility limits to explicit focus on 
whether or not states have SCHIP eligibility limits above 200 percent FPL highlights the 
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continued importance of the continuous enrollment/presumptive eligibility variable and 
the amendment count (see table 5.2).  As before, the former is negatively related with 
high eligibility limits (β=-0.1913, p=0.0560) and the latter is positively related 
(β=0.0200, p=0.0010). Outside of the significance of the 1997 Medicaid upper eligibility 
variable, these are the only variables that have significant impacts on both the continuous 
and dichotomous (“propensity”) upper SCHIP eligibility variables.  
Two additional variables appear to be significant in predicting whether or not a state 
will engage in enrollment of higher-income children: Party of governor and percent of 
Congressional representatives from a state voting in support of SCHIP reauthorization.  
Controlling for state effects through the mixed-effects regression, having a Democrat 
governor appears to significantly decrease the propensity of a state to enroll higher-
income children (β=-0.0455, p=0.0100). Two possible explanations are that governors 
who are Democrats prefer to focus state dollars on enrollment of lower-income children 
(as opposed to expanding programs to benefit higher-income children, which may be 
seen as providing benefits to higher-income families at the expense of poorer families) or 
that Republican governors have greater interest in capturing federal dollars in order to 
decrease state tax burdens. Qualitative analysis of the policy positions of governors over 
this time period would prove an interesting avenue for future research. 
The positive and significant relationship of state support for SCHIP reauthorization 
and the propensity to enroll non-targeted children (β = .0035, p=0.0670) is interesting in 
the principal-agent goal conflict context. Does the support for SCHIP reauthorization 
represent fixed state preferences that manifest both as support for reauthorization and 
expansion of the program, or is support of the program contingent upon expanded support 
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and the presence of additional funds for enrollment of higher-income child population 
within these states? As with the influence of governors, the precise causal mechanism 
remains to be explored.  
The mixed-effects linear regression approach has the advantage of being able to 
include time-invariant effects while also accounting for residual state (group) error. 
However, this method of estimating a dichotomous dependent variable is also subject to 
estimation issues even when the predicted dependent variable is interpreted as a 
propensity. Though the ideal functional form in this case exists, it is unavailable to this 
analysis due to practical concerns. However, it seems only responsible to report a 
comparison model in which the limited nature of the dependent variable is accounted for. 
To this end, random-effects logistic regression is employed and the results reported in 
table 5.3. Model 1 in table 5.3 presents, as before, the full model including 1997 child 
Medicaid eligibility; model 2 omits this variable. Whereas in the previous model the 
variable omission was somewhat mitigated by the estimation approach, this is not the 
case here. In the logistic regression, the coefficient values, including signs, vary 
significantly between models and hypothesis tests yield wildly varying results. Model 1, 
however, produces some results that are at least comparable enough with the previous 
models to discuss.81  
As before, continuous enrollment/presumptive eligibility has a significant and 
negative correlation with the policy of enrolling high-income children. Having a 
Medicaid-type SCHIP program is also negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 
                                                 
81
 I will not, however, interpret the control variables that are intended to account for measurable state-level 
variation, including population, GSP, uninsurance and poverty rates, etc. 
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This model does, however, suggest significant relationships between time to first 
SCHIP program submission and time to SCHIP implementation and high upper SCHIP 
eligibility limits. Specifically, this model suggests that the faster a state submits its 
application for program approval, the more likely it is to enroll higher-income children. 
On the other hand, the faster it actually implements its SCHIP program, the less likely it 
is to enroll higher-income children. Though both plan submission and implementation 
could be interpreted as capacity variables, the expectation under a capacity argument 
would suggest that faster submission and faster implementation, both suggesting greater 
capacity, would be correlated with increased likelihood of enrolling higher-income 
children. The goal conflict argument, on the other hand, would predict faster submission 
(in order to access federal funds as rapidly as possible) but would also be consistent with 
delays in implementation, particularly if those delays are associated with amendment of 
SCHIP plans in pursuit of their own goals.  
A mixed-effects approach to the estimation of a model predicting a latent 
(dichotomous) variable indicating enrollment of adults suggests that some of the same 
factors affecting the policy choice to enroll high-income children also may affect 
decisions regarding enrollment of adults (see table 5.4). However, not all of these 
variables have the same effects for prediction of the two policies. Interestingly, the 
logistic regression approach to predicting enrollment of adults yields some qualitative 
findings that are similar to the mixed-effects approach, unlike the models predicting 
upper SCHIP eligibility limits.  
The mixed-effects regression of the adult enrollment policy variable suggests that 
having a Democrat governor increases the propensity to enroll adults (β=.0797, 
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p=0.0040), that rapid SCHIP plan submission increases the propensity to enroll adults 
(β=-0.0011, p=0.0006), and that the number of amendments filed to date also has a 
positive correlation with the dependent variable (β=0.0261, p=0.0160). As with 
enrollment of higher-income children, having a Medicaid expansion-type SCHIP 
program decreases the propensity to enroll adults (β=-0.1848, p=0.0060). 
The random effects logistic regression model presented in table 5.5 supports the 
conclusion that having a rapid submission time and number of amendments filed increase 
the likelihood of enrolling adults. However, none of the other goal conflict-related 
variables appear to have an effect in the logistic regression model. 
Discussion 
Overall, prediction of the propensity of states to enroll higher-income children was 
more successful using the goal conflict proxies than was prediction of the propensity to 
enroll adults. This was true even in the absence of the 1997 Medicaid eligibility variable. 
One possible explanation for the difference in the success of these models to explain 
variation in these policy variables is the multifaceted nature of the enrollment of adults in 
SCHIP. Not all adult SCHIP enrollees are the same, nor does enrollment of these groups 
of adults achieve the same aims; enrollment of pregnant women may be considered an 
extension of child eligibility benefits to the unborn. Enrollment of parents has been 
shown to improve enrollment patterns and outcomes for their children. Enrollment of 
adults who are not parents, however, demonstrates an extension of SCHIP benefits 
significantly beyond the child population. The absence of discrimination between these 
adult populations is a major potential confounding factor in an analysis focused on the 
goals of SCHIP. 
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Two variables consistently appeared as significant predictors of SCHIP eligibility 
levels. Being a Medicaid expansion program significantly decreased the likelihood of 
having a higher upper SCHIP eligibility limit in both the continuous mixed-effects model 
and the logit model predicting upper limits above 200 percent FPL. This may be an 
artifact of the rules governing Medicaid and section 1115 waivers, which require 
expansion programs to adhere to Medicaid regulations and also to be budget neutral. 
Budget neutrality is a significant requirement to consider when the objective is to expand 
coverage eligibility. For SCHIP-only or combination programs, waiver-based expansions 
are only required to be allotment-neutral. Because states have no direct control over their 
allotments—which are derived based on apportionment formulas—“allotment neutrality” 
has virtually no real meaning, and can be easily demonstrated. A selection problem is 
thus likely in effect: States with preferences for expanding eligibility are less likely to 
select Medicaid expansion as the SCHIP format. Some states change format through 
amendments to their original SCHIP plans. Programs wishing to apply for section 1115 
waivers may thus also change their SCHIP type designation in order to select a set of 
rules more amenable to enrollment of non-targeted populations. 
A second plan-level variable consistently demonstrated a negative relationship with 
the propensity to expand eligibility to higher-income children. The employment of 
continuous enrollment or presumptive eligibility appears to have some kind of 
substitutive relationship with the enrollment of higher-income children. The proven 
success in these implementation procedures in increasing enrollment of targeted children 
suggests that states whose primary goal is enrolling more low-income children in SCHIP 
engage in these procedures, whereas states that—for whatever reason—prefer to expand 
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coverage to include higher-income children are less likely to use these techniques to 
improve enrollment of low-income children. This is a particularly surprising result in that 
the guidelines describing the burden of proof required of states seeking section 1115 
expansion waivers suggests, among other options, that employment of continuous 
enrollment or presumptive eligibility are means of demonstrating the state’s obligation to 
target low-income children before expansion populations. 
Belief-level goal conflict variables yielded inconsistent and sometimes conflicting 
results in the three sets of upper eligibility models. Citizen liberalism had a negative 
relationship with the continuous upper eligibility variable, suggesting that the more 
liberal the citizenry, the lower the upper SCHIP eligibility limit. Shifting focus to 
propensity to enroll children above 200 percent FPL, however, showed a positive and 
significant relationship with enrollment of higher-income children. These models handled 
state-level variation through employment of random-effects, and in the logit model that 
did not control for state effects, liberalism had no discernable effect on the propensity to 
enroll higher-income children. 
Though the citizen liberalism belief-level variable was not statistically significant in 
either of the adult enrollment models, the presence of a Democrat governor was 
significant in both. As with enrollment of higher-income children, rapid submission of 
SCHIP plans and more plan amendments both had positive relationships with expansion 
to non-targeted populations. This compounds questions about the meaning and 
interpretation of these variables—what is the relationship between administrative 
capacity and goal conflict? Will states with the capacity to seek additional federal funds 
or expansions always do so, simply because they have the ability, or are agencies more 
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directly beholden to the political entities that purport to oversee them? The complexity of 
the principal-agent relationships muddies the waters regarding administrative capacity, 
because it is unclear on whose behalf this enhanced capacity is being employed. This is a 
question that may be answered in future qualitative research endeavors. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Directions 
Authors from multiple disciplinary frameworks agree that goal conflict plays a role in 
intergovernmental implementation of public programs. The prominent role of goal 
conflict in the rhetoric of the SCHIP authorization makes goal conflict particularly visible 
in the SCHIP policy context and demonstrates nominal conflict. Inasmuch as the role of 
goal conflict has a significant and empirically observable effect on state-level 
implementation decisions and has the potential to impact spending patterns (resource 
conflict) and program outputs and outcomes (outcome conflict), focus on this single 
policy though the composite lens of multiple frameworks allows for refinement of 
measurement issues that have previously been barriers to empirical analysis of this 
important concept. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that evidence of goal conflict and fund diversion 
in public programs is neither straightforward nor simple. Even goal conflict in a program 
with a relatively unambiguous, single goal—like SCHIP—is difficult to assess. The 
approach to identifying the three primary components of goal conflict (nominal, resource, 
and outcome), however, demonstrates that goal conflict analysis can be constructed in a 
manner that is both instructive and useful.  
Programs and policies can be assessed for their nominal conflict with the aims of an 
elected principal, and this nominal conflict yields important fodder for public discourse 
and debate. For a more quantitative approach, goal conflict can be analyzed in terms of 
the financial impact of goal conflict, yielding conclusions about programs and policy 
choices that may impact interactions between government principals and agents. Finally, 
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programs and policies can be assessed in terms of their achievement of the goals of the 
principal.  
Outcome conflict analysis should be undertaken with care and attention, however, as 
conclusions can be highly sensitive to the outcome measures used. Furthermore, it is 
often the nature of public goals to be ambiguous, immeasurable, and/or difficult to 
accomplish, so a lesser public outcome achieved by a public agent may not indisputably 
identify goal conflict or poor policy. Thus, it is best to undertake all three components of 
goal conflict analysis and carefully examine the results before making sweeping claims or 
significantly altering policy on the grounds of goal conflict. 
The research proposed here has implications both for the development of theory in 
various frameworks that rely on concepts of goal conflict, and has more concrete 
implications regarding the practice of using federal grants to the states as a policy tool.  
Carefully constructed analysis of goal conflict in a single context bound by extant 
intergovernmental institutions provides a prototype for similar analysis in other policy 
areas and opens the door for careful comparison across policy contexts and environments. 
In a similar vein, the selection of a program that lies comfortably within the policy realm 
previously explored by scholars of implementation and intergovernmental relations 
allows this work to build tidily on the work that has gone before. 
This research endeavor has borrowed concepts related to goal conflict and 
intergovernmental relations from several theoretical frameworks that span multiple 
disciplines. Theory derived from the principal-agent paradigm and its political economy 
counterpart has been employed as a framework for understanding the ways in which 
hierarchical relationships have the potential to affect the set of goals and objectives that 
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are pursued in the policy realm. Intergovernmental theory has provided a contextual 
framework for the application of principal-agent concepts to issues faced in a federal-
state administrative setting. Finally, theory derived from work in systems analysis has 
provided an operational framework for understanding the underpinnings of goal conflict 
in terms of belief, priority and plan conflict. 
The concepts derived and borrowed from these frameworks were then applied to 
identify and describe the potential loci for conflict in a particular state-administered 
federal policy: The State Child Health Insurance Program. The stated objective of SCHIP 
is “to provide funds to States to enable them to initiate and expand the provision of child 
health assistance to uninsured, low-income children in an effective and efficient manner 
that is coordinated with other sources of health benefits coverage for children”.82 Federal 
motivations are here assumed to be constant across states (politics and state capacities 
notwithstanding) and general procedures and guidelines for approval of waivers are 
outlined in various HHS publications. This (assumed) lack of variation shifts the type of 
analysis required to quantitative (with variation only at the state level) from what would 
essentially be a qualitative case study of the internal function of HHS regarding approval 
of SCHIP waivers if federal motivations were assumed to be fluid. 
This program was selected for analysis because it operates in an intergovernmental 
(federal-state) context, and has not only the potential for goal conflict based on theory, 
but is a program in which this goal conflict has actually manifested through policy 
choices exhibiting nominal goal conflict (i.e. waivers allowing enrollment of non-targeted 
populations) and this conflict presented legitimate challenges for the successful future of 
the program by causing gridlock between the federal legislative and executive branches 
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during the 2007 SCHIP reauthorization attempts. This conflict was further complicated 
by the role of states both as constituencies and agents of the federal government. This 
manifestation of theoretical problems in the real world suggests that the theory presented 
here is more than a mere academic exercise, and could potentially lead to mechanisms or 
policy tools that could improve the design and administration of intergovernmental 
policy. 
Three sets of goals exist in the policies and procedures surrounding the SCHIP 
program. The first is the set of goals identified by SCHIP legislation itself, identifying the 
target population for that program as children with household incomes at or below 200 
percent FPL. The second is the 1115 waiver option of the Social Security Act, expanded 
by HHA via the HIFA program to include both Medicaid and SCHIP funds. The 
identified target population for HIFA is also people at or below household incomes of 
200 percent FPL or below, but as the primary goal of the 1115 waiver/HIFA program is 
to encourage state-level innovation, the target population takes a backseat to testing 
unproven measures. The third conflicting message comes from the federal funding 
formulas for the SCHIP program. The FMAP formula provides fewer funds to states with 
lower percentages of uninsured children, leaving states with less funds to finance the 
children already enrolled in the public SCHIP and/or Medicaid programs. This funding 
structure could be interpreted as a “weaning” of states from federal funds, encouraging 
increases in state SCHIP spending in order to prevent shortfalls or enrollment freezes.  
The state administrative policy choices identified in this research as representing nominal 
goal conflict—the practice of enrolling adults and children who are outside the target 
population for which SCHIP was designed—has been evaluated in terms of resource 
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conflict and outcome conflict in addition to the nominal conflict described by governors, 
legislators and other actors during the reauthorization debate. Enrollment of higher-
income children and of adults was examined in terms of fiscal impact on the federal 
government and impact on various measures of program success including enrollment of 
low-income children in SCHIP. Enrollment of adults was found to increase federal costs 
within a state (federal funding formulas notwithstanding). Analysis in chapter 4 showed 
that rules governing the fiscal impact of enrollment expansions significantly affected the 
choice to engage (or not engage) in these activities. 
In examining the effect of enrollment of non-targeted populations on federal spending 
between and within states, the analysis presented in chapter 3 demonstrated that while 
formula factors—not enrollment choices—drive federal spending between states, 
enrollment of adults increases spending within states and enrollment of higher-income 
children appears to decrease spending within states, even after controlling for number of 
Medicaid beneficiaries within a state. This suggests that nominal goal conflict does not 
necessarily lead to resource conflict in all cases. In other words, a state program can 
operate outside the bounds of what appears to be its federal statutory limitations without 
necessarily increasing cost to the federal taxpayer.  
Like with resource conflict, outcome conflict does not necessarily follow from nominal 
conflict. In the fixed-effects models estimating the effects of enrollment of adults and 
higher-income children on enrollment of targeted children, enrollment of adults was 
consistently found to negatively impact enrollment and enrollment of higher-income 
children was found to improve enrollment of targeted children. When low-income child 
uninsurance rates are considered, enrollment of adults in SCHIP appears to lower the 
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percentage of low-income children who are uninsured, though enrollment of higher-
income children had a negative effect in this model. Additionally, once the inherent 
endogeneity issues were addressed in a three-stage model, the positive effect of enrolling 
higher-income children that had appeared in the fixed-effects models no longer appeared 
conclusive. The inability to separate higher-income child enrollees from low-income 
child enrollees renders outcome analysis inconclusive. Claims regarding the impact of 
adult enrollment on child outcomes is also tempered by the multiplicity of adult 
populations enrolled in SCHIP—including pregnant women, parents of eligible children, 
and childless adults. Data and modeling issues inherent to the SCHIP policy context 
exacerbated incongruities in the findings and rendered much of the analysis inconclusive. 
However, the possibility of negative impacts cannot be ruled out by this analysis.  
Regardless of the role of enrollment of non-targeted populations in affecting federal 
spending and accomplishment of federal goals, the mere appearance of goal conflict 
based on these policy actions was a major cause for debate and consternation during the 
2007 SCHIP reauthorization attempts. This demonstrates the power of nominal goal 
conflict in affecting intergovernmental policymaking and administration. This suggests 
that goal conflict, particularly in state-administered federal programs, is still a viable 
avenue for additional theory development and future empirical analysis. Other programs 
with similar administrative profiles (including Medicaid, Community Development 
Block Grants, and other intergovernmental initiatives) may provide useful foils for 
discerning the mechanisms of intergovernmental administration that are common and 
those that are unique to the SCHIP context.  
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Chapter 5 focused on enrollment of adults and enrollment of higher-income children as 
evidence of nominal conflict and sought to apply theory from the operational framework 
for goal conflict in multi-actor systems in order to uncover correlates of these policy 
choices that might have been used to predict state behaviors. Belief and plan conflict 
variables, in addition to capacity variables, were shown to be significant predictors of 
these state policy choices even after controlling for state (random) effects. Enrollment of 
higher-income children was modeled with better fit than was enrollment of adults. This 
may have been because adults were not distinguished based on parental status in the 
analysis—previous research suggests that enrollment of pregnant women and parents of 
eligible children improves child enrollment rates, whereas no such evidence exists for the 
enrollment of adults who are not parents. It is reasonable to surmise, then, that enrollment 
of adults may be manifestations of very divergent state goals—some aligned with federal 
aims and some not. 
The conceptual and contextual frameworks have also been useful in understanding the 
SCHIP reauthorization conflict. Though federal agencies are ostensibly an extension of 
the executive branch and thus the presidency, it is clear from the waiver granting 
behavior of the Department of Health and Human Services until August of 2007—and 
the subsequent statements from President Bush suggesting that this behavior was 
inconsistent with federal (Congressional and Presidential) goals for the program—that the 
principal-agent problem is alive and well in the executive branch. Alternately, viewing 
HHS as an extension of Congress, the HIFA waiver program initiated by HHS may be 
seen as a means of bypassing the objections of the President and achieving the true 
preferences of Congress without being subject to the veto power of the President. If the 
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expressed intent of Congress, to insure children living at or below 200 percent of FPL, is 
merely an expression of a compromise reached between the legislative and executive 
branches, then the HIFA program may be seen as a more true expression of the wishes of 
congress.  
Alternately, based on the discussion in chapter 1, the federal HHS agency may be seen as 
a partner with state agencies in a “fourth branch” of government view, in which the 
agencies collude together to pursue their own set of interests until checked by one of the 
other branches. These checks could come from Congress, through legislation mandating 
firm limits on coverage or removing the 1115 allowances from the Social Security Act, or 
from the president, who could exert his authority by selecting new appointees who more 
closely share his vision—whose goals are more aligned—for the SCHIP program.  Given 
the debate surrounding the reauthorization of SCHIP, it seems unlikely that Congress 
would object to the 1115 waivers; indeed, it demonstrated strong support for expansions 
of the SCHIP program.  The President’s veto, however, accompanied by strong rhetoric 
against use of SCHIP funds to cover adults and higher-income children, demonstrates 
that Congress’ expressed “goal” of insuring children at or below 200 percent of FPL is 
actually a repressed preference for public health insurance expansions that is limited by 
Congress’ ability to get its true preferences enacted into law.  
Despite the inconclusive nature of the resource and outcome analyses, the presence of 
nominal goal conflict is clear as evidenced by the 2007 SCHIP reauthorization debate. On 
this basis, chapter 5 explored the application of goal conflict theory to the prediction of 
policy choices within the states. Plan-level variables were shown to be significant 
predictors of both enrollment of adults and of higher-income children, and provided 
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substantive insight to administrative choices regarding plan specification within SCHIP, 
specifically suggesting that rules governing the administrative freedom of state SCHIP 
implementation has significant impact on the policy options available to, and selected by, 
those states. It was also shown that some plan-level tradeoffs may be made between 
program implementation choices that improve enrollment of low-income children (i.e. 
presumptive eligibility and continuous enrollment) and those that expand benefits to 
broader populations. 
Implications 
The analysis presented in this dissertation suggests two sets of implications. The first set 
of implications relates to development of intergovernmental theory and management as it 
relates to state administration of federal policy. The second set of implications is specific 
to SCHIP policy and relates to the effect of enrollment of non-targeted populations in the 
program. 
The relationship between theory and empirical findings in the preceding analysis suggests 
that while intergovernmental frameworks—including the one presented in chapter 1 of 
this work—may be useful in identifying areas of potential conflict and may appear very 
descriptive, it is imperative to determine not only the units and levels of analysis before 
applying such frameworks, but also to identify the dimension of analysis. In terms of goal 
conflict, which was mapped to specific loci in a federate intergovernmental framework in 
chapter 1, this dimension of analysis requires identification of one of the three types of 
goal conflict discussed at the end of that chapter. Different conclusions can be reached if 
one examines, for example, nominal conflict as opposed to resource conflict or outcome 
conflict. Two theoretical contributions made by this dissertation are the identification of 
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locations where goal conflict may be observed, described, or even predicted within an 
intergovernmental policy framework, and an identification of three important types of 
conflict that may be manifest. Policy analysts, federal and state legislators, and public 
administrators should be aware of the potential points of conflict in state-administered 
federal policy and determine what effects nominal, resource and outcome conflict may 
have on their ability to successfully pursue and achieve their goals in any of those three 
areas. Actors pursuing victories in the nominal arena, for example, by successfully 
implementing popular programs may be stymied by nominal conflict that creates political 
discord between levels of government and may poison potential victories with negative 
allegations rooted in nominal goal conflict. Resource conflict may play a key role in the 
allocation of resources within a state and may affect the quantity of funds available from 
the federal purse. Outcome conflict ultimately relates to the effectiveness of a program in 
achieving the federal aim, and should be analyzed with an understanding of the potential 
for conflicting state aims. If such outcome conflict exists, states may be using federal 
funds for programs or outcomes unintended by the federal government, or may even be 
pursuing avenues that are counterproductive in accomplishing the goals for which federal 
programs were established. Surely such action should be predicted and avoided whenever 
possible. 
The second set of implications resulting from this analysis is the set of substantive 
findings related to enrollment of non-targeted programs in SCHIP. While these results 
were not uniform across the dimensions of analysis (i.e. enrollment of non-targeted 
populations represented nominal conflict, though only enrollment of adults appeared to 
yield resource conflict and outcome conflict was highly sensitive to the measure used), 
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conclusions could be drawn within dimensions of analysis. Namely, enrollment of adults 
in SCHIP increases the federal cost of those programs, but does not nominally contribute 
to their goal. Enrollment of higher-income children decreases the federal cost of state 
SCHIPs and also appears to positively affect enrollment of targeted children despite its 
apparent nominal conflict with the purpose of the program. Such nuanced discussion of 
policy implications should enter the discussion surrounding SCHIP and like federal-state 
programs. At present, policy debates focus largely on nominal conflict but do not extend 
into robust debate about the true resource and outcome implications of nominally 
conflicting policies. While this deeper discussion certainly adds complexity to the 
discussion, it shifts the focus from where it currently lies—the appearance of 
inconsistency or conflict—to discussions about the actual impact of policy conflicts in 
terms of financial resources and accomplishment of the ultimate state and federal aims.   
Future work 
Exploration of the theoretical, structural and institutional underpinnings of nominal goal 
conflict in the administration of SCHIP have provided a favorable case in which to 
explore questions that arise regarding the political economy of intergovernmental 
administrative arrangements. The questions raised and observations made regarding this 
unique administrative environment yields a host of unanswered questions that provide a 
rich set of potential future research endeavors. 
Future work should include the remedies to some of the data issues that have proven to be 
roadblocks in the preceding analysis. This includes collection of data regarding the 
income levels of SCHIP enrollees and the parental status of adult enrollees. Inclusion of 
148 
enrollment counts, by income level, of adult and child enrollees in the Medicaid program 
would also be beneficial in removing potential confounding effects from the models.  
The empirical approach, however, may be less fruitful than further qualitative 
investigation of the nature of the agency relationships that are comprised of the 
constituencies to which state and federal agencies are beholden. The process of 
negotiation and rulemaking inherent in the intergovernmental administration of SCHIP 
and like programs is an interesting and complex nexus of institutional relationships. Goal 
conflict and ambiguity are particularly focused on this one set of interactions between the 
federal and state agencies, and qualitative analysis of those interactions may be more 
instructive than quantitative techniques that are somewhat insensitive to the nuances of 
the plan approval process. Such a case approach could be replicated by observing 
approval of plans in other intergovernmental policy areas, providing a more rich 
contribution to the understanding of federal-state relationships. 
Among the questions to be addressed in future work include whether, given the statutory 
differences between the coercive powers of the federal government over states (limited 
coercion; aims accomplished primarily through incentives such as grants) and over 
federal agencies (more direct principal-agent relationship with bureaucratic design much 
more standard), the states and federal government co-principals, yielding the federal 
agency an agent that must select between or balance the interests of the two co-principals; 
or, whether the federal agency and state government are both agents to the federal 
principal. An important component of the distinction between these two alternative 
conceptions in the question of under what circumstances these agents (federal and state) 
149 
collude to subvert the desires of the federal principal, as appears to have occurred—in 
terms of nominal conflict—in the case of SCHIP waivers. 
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Appendix B: Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1.1: Agency Problem Loci in Federate Policy Framework 
 
 
 Figure 1.2: Adaptation of Matland’s (1995) Conflict/Ambiguity Implementation 
Framework 
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Table 2.1: SCHIP Allotment Funding Formula 
State’s original allotment = “number of children” x “state cost factor”* 
“Number of children” in 
2104(b)(2) is the sum of the two 
factors below multiplied by the 
associated percentage 
“State cost factor” in §2104(b)(3) 
is the sum of the two factors below 
multiplied by the associated 
percentage 
Number of low 
income 
Children 
without health 
insurance 
Number of all 
low income 
children 
Constant 
(national 
average) 
Ratio of state’s 
average health 
services industry 
annual wages to 
national average 
1998-1999 100% 0% 15% 85% 
2000 75% 25% 15% 85% 
2001-2007 50% 50% 15% 85% 
* Subject to floors and ceilings. 
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) analysis (Peterson, 2006)
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Table 2.2: Selected state policy and demographic characteristics for 2006 
State H
ig
h 
up
pe
r 
SC
H
IP
 
lim
it 
In
su
re
s 
ad
ul
ts
 
u
n
de
r 
SC
H
IP
 
U
pp
er
 
ch
ild
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
 p
rio
r 
to
 S
CH
IP
 
U
pp
er
 
ch
ild
 S
CH
IP
 
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
 in
 2
00
6 
A
du
lts
 
en
ro
lle
d 
in
 S
CH
IP
 
pe
r 
ch
ild
 e
n
ro
lle
e 
Pe
rc
en
t c
hi
ld
re
n
 li
v
in
g 
at
 
o
r 
be
lo
w
 
20
0 
pe
rc
en
t F
PL
 
Pe
rc
en
t l
o
w
-
in
co
m
e 
ch
ild
re
n
 w
ho
 a
re
 
u
n
in
su
re
d 
Alabama     133 200 0 38 14 
Alaska     133 175 0 32 13 
Arizona   x 140 200 1.14 47 26 
Arkansas   x 133 200 0 56 15 
California x   200 250 0 41 20 
Colorado   x 133 200 0.04 34 28 
Connecticut x   185 300 0 25 9 
Delaware     133 200 0 33 17 
Florida     185 200 0 39 30 
Georgia x   185 235 0 40 23 
Hawaii x   185 300 0 30 12 
Idaho   x 133 185 0.02 43 16 
Illinois   x 133 200 0.67 34 17 
Indiana     150 200 0 33 10 
Iowa     185 200 0 37 7 
Kansas     150 200 0 39 12 
Kentucky     185 200 0 45 13 
Louisiana     133 200 0 45 24 
Maine     185 200 0 34 10 
Maryland x   185 300 0 25 21 
Massachusetts     185 200 0 29 15 
Michigan   x 185 200 0.86 37 9 
Minnesota x x 275 280 6.42 28 18 
Mississippi     185 200 0 53 28 
Missouri x   185 300 0 40 15 
Montana     133 150 0 38 25 
Nebraska     150 185 0 34 20 
Nevada   x 133 200 0 40 27 
New Hampshire x   185 300 0 21 15 
New Jersey x x 185 350 0.73 27 25 
New Mexico x x 185 235 0.23 42 25 
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New York x   185 250 0 40 12 
North Carolina     185 200 0 45 18 
North Dakota     133 140 0 35 18 
Ohio     133 200 0 38 9 
Oklahoma     150 185 0 49 19 
Oregon   x 133 185 0.23 38 23 
Pennsylvania     185 200 0 37 12 
Rhode Island x x 250 250 0.83 33 6 
South Carolina     185 200 0 44 11 
South Dakota     133 200 0 38 14 
Texas     185 200 0 47 31 
Utah     133 200 0 39 22 
Vermont x   225 300 0 26 11 
Virginia     133 200 0.01 32 20 
Washington x   200 250 0 30 8 
West Virginia     150 200 0 46 8 
Wisconsin   x 185 185 1.95 33 7 
Wyoming     133 200 0 32 10 
*Arkansas was approved for inclusion of adults in 2006 but did not insure 
adults in that year. 
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Table 2.3: Variable descriptions, sources and notes 
Variable Units Type Source Notes 
     
Federal SCHIP spending Millions of dollars Continuous KFF 
 
Total SCHIP spending Millions of dollars Continuous KFF 
 
SCHIP upper eligibility limit Percent of FPL Continuous CMS 
 
Adult enrolling state n/a Dummy CMS Time-invariant; 1=State enrolls adults at 
any time during 1999-2006 
High upper SCHIP eligibility limit n/a Dummy CMS 1=Upper SCHIP eligibility exceeds 200 
percent FPL; Eligibility levels may 
differ by age, figure is the highest 
eligibility level for any child aged 18 or 
younger83 
Child SCHIP enrollees Enrollees Continuous CMS Includes high-income child enrollees; 
ever enrolled in year 
Proportion of targeted children who are 
enrolled in SCHIP 
Percent of targeted 
children 
Proportion Calculated “Enrolled” includes only child 
enrollees. “Targeted” includes low-
income uninsured children and child 
enrollees. 
Percent low-income children who are 
uninsured  
Percent of low-
income children 
Proportion US Census 
 
                                                 
83
 Generally, if there is a difference in eligibility levels, infants receive the highest eligibility levels and teens receive the lowest. 
166 
 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentage 
(FMAP) 
Millions of dollars Proportion DHHS Enhanced FMAP used for SCHIP match 
determination 
State SCHIP spending Millions of dollars Continuous Milbank State own-source spending 
Federal financial participation (FFP) Millions of dollars Continuous Calculated Estimated FFP based on state SCHIP 
spending and enhanced FMAP. 
Assumes all state expenditures qualify 
for full match. 
Total SCHIP enrollees Enrollees Continuous CMS Includes adult and child enrollees; ever 
enrolled in year 
Population Thousands of people Continuous CPS 
 
State tax revenue Millions of dollars Continuous US Census 
 
Federal SCHIP allotment Millions of dollars Continuous Federal 
Register 
Does not include rollover allotments 
from previous years 
Children at or below 200 percent FPL Thousands of 
children 
Continuous CPS 
 
Poverty rate Percent of total 
population 
Proportion UKCPR 
 
Gross state product (GSP) Millions of dollars Continuous BEA 
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Uninsurance rate Percent of total 
population 
Proportion CPS84 
 
Adult SCHIP enrollees Enrollees Continuous CMS Ever enrolled in year 
High eligibility state n/a Dummy CMS Time-invariant; 1=Upper SCHIP 
eligibility limit exceeds 200 percent 
FPL at any time during 1999-2006 
Percent of children living at 200 percent FPL 
or below 
Percent of all 
children 
Proportion US Census From the Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (formerly 
called the March Supplement) 
1997 Upper child Medicaid eligibility limit n/a Continuous CMS Time-invariant 
Citizen liberalism scale n/a Continuous ICPSR Scale developed by Berry, et al. 
(1998) and annual measures made 
available by ICPSR. 
Universal coverage proposed n/a Dummy KFF Time-invariant; 1=Universal health 
coverage proposed or enacted by a state 
before 2008 
Amendments to date Amendments Count CMS Number of total state amendments to 
original SCHIP plan submission 
                                                 
84
 CPS was unable to estimate uninsurance rates for some states in some years (base was too small for CPS estimates). For these years, estimates from the Kaiser 
Family Foundation were used. These include Vermont, Wyoming and North Dakota for 2005 and Vermont for 2006. 
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Reauthorization support Percent of 
Congressional 
representatives 
Proportion Congress Time-invariant; Generated from online 
voting records. Percent of 
Congressional representatives from a 
state voting “yes” on the veto override 
for the second SCHIP reauthorization 
bill.  
Democrat governor n/a Dummy UKCPR 1=Governor is a Democrat 
Days to submission Days Continuous CMS Time-invariant 
Days to implementation Days Continuous CMS Time-invariant 
Medicaid type n/a Dummy CMS 1=Medicaid-type SCHIP program; 
0=SCHIP only or combination 
SCHIP/Medicaid program 
Continuous enrollment or presumptive 
eligibility 
n/a Dummy KFF Time-invariant; 1=State employs 
continuous enrollment or presumptive 
eligibility 
Total SCHIP spending per capita Thousands of dollars 
per person 
Continuous KFF/CPS 
(Calculated) 
Calculated from total SCHIP 
spending and population estimates 
provided above 
Total state health spending per capita Thousands of dollars 
per person 
Continuous UKCPR/CPS Calculated from total state health 
spending and population estimates 
provided above 
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Tax revenue per capita Thousands of dollars 
per person 
Continuous US 
Census/CPS 
(Calculated) 
Calculated from population and tax 
revenue estimates provided above 
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Table 2.4: Dependent variable descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Federal spending 71.96 114.10 0.00 1150.90 
Total spending 103.32 175.49 0.00 1770.60 
Adults (1999-2006) 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Adults (2001-2006) 0.19 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Eligibility limit 208.86 50.33 0.00 350.00 
High eligibility 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Child enrollment 102270.60 183912.60 0.00 1391405.00 
Enrolled of targeted 44.37 19.89 0.00 87.14 
Enrolled of targeted (logit) -0.35 1.22 -7.97 1.91 
Low income child uninsurance rate 17.23 6.68 2.00 40.00 
Low income child uninsurance rate (logit) -1.65 0.50 -3.89 -0.41 
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Table 2.5: Independent variable descriptive statistics 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FMAP 392 72.33 5.88 65.00 83.96 
State spending 392 31.36 63.26 0.00 619.70 
FFP 392 71.61 122.57 0.00 1150.87 
Total enrollment 392 110137.40 186572.80 0.00 1391405.00 
Population 392 5756.33 6397.33 479.60 36457.55 
Tax 392 11649.73 14444.53 811.65 111346.90 
Allotment 392 76.43 116.72 3.52 850.61 
Low income children 392 586.96 761.89 36.00 4463.00 
Poverty rate 392 11.75 3.12 5.00 21.00 
GSP 392 217366.90 261776.70 15931.00 1742172.00 
Uninsurance rate 392 13.96 3.87 6.00 26.00 
Adult enrollment 392 7866.81 28304.97 0.00 211114.00 
High eligibility state 392 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Low income child uninsurance rate 392 37.06 7.89 19.00 59.00 
Medicaid upper limit 392 167.06 32.84 133.00 275.00 
Liberalism 392 49.99 15.49 8.45 95.97 
Universal 392 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Amendments 392 3.55 2.81 0.00 16.00 
Reauthorization 392 67.18 28.61 0.00 100.00 
Democrat Governor 392 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Submission 392 209.69 137.68 -5.00 673.00 
Implementation 392 304.57 206.89 0.00 1004.00 
Medicaid type 392 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Continuous/Presumptive 392 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Adult state 392 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00 
Total spending per capita 392 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 
State health spending 392 0.60 0.57 0.04 6.25 
Tax per capita 392 2.03 0.49 0.89 4.12 
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Table 3.1: Between (population-averaged) random-effects regression of federal SCHIP spending ($ 
millions) by state, 1999-2006 
Model 1  Model 2 
β SE p-value  β SE p-value 
FMAP -0.1848 0.2288 0.424  -0.0529 0.2491 0.833 
State spending -0.3825 0.2039 0.068  -0.6186 0.2322 0.011 
FFP 1.2407 0.1065 0.000  1.2601 0.1131 0.000 
Total enrollment -0.0001 0.0000 0.000  -0.0001 0.0000 0.054 
Population 0.0011 0.0010 0.284  0.0015 0.0011 0.161 
Tax 0.0003 0.0004 0.547  0.0009 0.0006 0.143 
Allotment 0.0454 0.0302 0.140  0.0318 0.0314 0.318 
Medicaid benefic. -- -- --  1.1722 3.9179 0.766 
Adults 2.7606 3.2943 0.407  1.8213 2.6222 0.492 
High eligibility -0.4461 2.3928 0.853  -0.0109 0.0081 0.188 
Constant 11.3303 17.0523 0.510  1.1612 18.6125 0.951 
    
Within R2 0.852  0.818   
Between R2 0.997  0.996   
Overall R2 0.948  0.939   
    
    
For model 1, n=392; N = 49 states, T = 8 years . For model 2, n= 343; N=49 states, T=7 years (excludes 
2006). 
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Table 3.2: Fixed-effects regression of federal SCHIP spending ($ millions) by state, 1999-
2006 
Model 1  Model 2 
β SE p-value  β SE p-value 
FMAP -0.2327 1.390 0.867  -1.2929 1.5607 0.408 
State spending -0.8168 0.185 0.000  -1.2728 0.1863 0.000 
FFP 0.9034 0.101 0.000  1.0760 0.1006 0.000 
Total enrollment 0.0003 0.000 0.000  0.0003 0.0000 0.000 
Population -0.0141 0.006 0.027  -0.0025 0.0080 0.757 
Tax 0.0043 0.001 0.000  0.0008 0.0009 0.376 
Allotment -0.0714 0.034 0.035  -0.0250 0.0327 0.444 
Medicaid benefic. -- -- --  0.0441 0.0101 0.000 
Adults 8.2073 4.587 0.074  11.8372 4.6539 0.012 
High eligibility -31.7452 8.222 0.000  -29.8007 8.4642 0.001 
Constant 57.926 102.685 0.560  75.3559 116.2401 0.517 
    
Within R2 0.918  0.911   
Between R2 0.863  0.972   
Overall R2 0.860  0.935   
    
    
For model 1, n=392; N = 49 states, T = 8 years . For model 2, n= 343; N=49 states, T=7 years 
(excludes 2006). 
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Table 4.1: Fixed-effects estimation of child SCHIP enrollment (n=392) 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Total spending 545.145 21.530 0.000 593.841 21.908 0.000 590.808 21.820 0.000 
Population 113.630 10.857 0.000 105.274 10.390 0.000 107.449 10.373 0.000 
Low income 
children 6.041 26.734 0.821 15.003 25.598 0.558 13.771 25.451 0.589 
Poverty rate -284.758 1263.942 0.822 121.677 1210.624 0.920 274.978 1205.336 0.820 
GSP -0.363 0.078 0.000 -0.377 0.075 0.000 -0.379 0.074 0.000 
Uninsurance rate -176.703 1161.070 0.879 -450.573 1110.625 0.685 -378.286 1104.466 0.732 
High eligibility 6207.896 11552.000 0.591 5192.497 11049.830 0.639 4602.187 10987.030 0.676 
Adults -40094.100 6469.510 0.000 -- -- -- -16371.540 7296.134 0.025 
Adult enrollment -- -- -- -0.684 0.080 0.000 -0.570 0.094 0.000 
Constant -522667.900 50488.050 0.000 -483090.800 48208.130 0.000 -495138.800 48220.270 0.000 
   
Within R2 0.868 0.879 0.881   
Between R2 0.871 0.876 0.875   
Overall R2 0.791 0.799 0.798   
 
  
N = 49 states, T = 8 years   
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Table 4.2: Fixed-effects estimation of proportion of targeted children who are enrolled in 
SCHIP 
Model 1: Percent Model 2: Logit transformed 
β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Total spending 0.02794 0.00910 0.0020 0.0011053 0.0005206 0.0340 
Population 0.00850 0.00459 0.0650 0.0005005 0.0002625 0.0570 
Low income 
children -0.01647 0.01129 0.1460 -0.0009720 0.0006465 0.1340 
Poverty rate 1.56127 0.53394 0.0040 0.0742081 0.0305652 0.0160 
GSP 0.00001 0.00003 0.8160 0.0000007 0.0000019 0.6960 
Uninsurance rate -2.65865 0.49048 0.0000 -0.1230403 0.0280775 0.0000 
High eligibility 9.38124 4.88004 0.0550 -0.0661938 0.2793552 0.8130 
Adults 8.58404 2.73298 0.0020 0.7430777 0.1564483 0.0000 
Constant 15.76827 21.32821 0.4600 -2.1805110 1.2209230 0.0750 
Within R2 0.2895 0.2619 
Between R2 0.0131 0.0037 
Overall R2 0.0188 0.0081 
N = 49 states, T = 8 years 
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Table 4.3: Fixed effects model of percent children under 200 percent FPL who are uninsured 
(n=392) 
 Model 1: Percent Model 2: Logit transformed 
β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Total spending -0.00048 0.00293 0.8690 -0.0000304 0.0002436 0.9010 
Population -0.00162 0.00144 0.2610 -0.0000495 0.0001196 0.6790 
Poverty rate -0.39914 0.16720 0.0180 -0.0316686 0.0139222 0.0240 
GSP -0.00001 0.00001 0.5420 -0.0000008 0.0000009 0.3930 
Uninsurance rate 1.62108 0.15827 0.0000 0.1177787 0.0131786 0.0000 
High eligibility 0.63663 1.59450 0.6900 0.0375480 0.1327650 0.7770 
Adults -1.77523 0.89347 0.0480 -0.0945982 0.0743943 0.2040 
Constant 10.14974 6.91031 0.1430 -2.4628170 0.5753837 0.0000 
Within R2 0.2628 0.2061 
Between R2 0.0035 0.0790 
Overall R2 0.0109 0.0811 
N = 49 states, T = 8 years  
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Table 4.4: Three stage least squares models of child enrollment, total spending, and enrollment of non-targeted populations (n=392) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2* Model 3* 
Equation 1  
Dependent variable: Child enrollment 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Total spending 948.0015 31.42 0.0000 778.1734 77.94 0.0000 793.2280 65.1265 0.0000 
Population 2.4164 1.75 0.1670 52.5618 13.94 0.0000 52.6010 12.0131 0.0000 
Low income kids 11.5722 5.81 0.0460 37.6154 27.02 0.1640 38.0503 21.2419 0.0730 
Poverty rate 323.9793 331.10 0.3280 -114.5548 1111.78 0.9180 322.2679 847.8317 0.7040 
GSP 0.0115 0.04 0.7920 -0.2413 0.10 0.0150 -0.2352 0.0794 0.0030 
Uninsurance rate -66.5592 250.88 0.7910 -559.8643 973.52 0.5650 -757.3539 800.4371 0.3440 
High eligibility 515.1981 6315.33 0.9350 -111523.6000 80239.91 0.1650 -97769.490 61685.1700 0.1130 
Adults -11167.640 15359.93 0.4670 -41987.5000 31339.42 0.1800 23419.3800 36222.2500 0.5180 
Adult enrollment -1.3173 0.15 0.0000 -- -- -- -1.2253 0.2910 0.0000 
Constant -9893.8450 5534.77 0.0740 -1307143.000 433108.40 0.0030 43194.0000 62574.8900 0.4900 
178 
 
Equation 2 
Dependent variable: Total spending 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Child enrollment 0.0010 0.00 0.0000 0.0016 0.00 0.0000 0.0016 0.00 0.0000 
Adult enrollment 0.0014 0.00 0.0000 -- -- -- 0.0015 0.00 0.0000 
Population -0.0038 0.00 0.0000 -0.0889 0.03 0.0020 -0.0969 0.03 0.0000 
High eligibility 0.1675 7.38 0.9820 144.3051 106.97 0.1770 205.3935 94.88 0.0300 
Adults 11.3132 17.53 0.5190 63.7621 41.43 0.1240 -46.5561 55.62 0.4030 
FMAP -0.1632 0.27 0.5510 1.7257 2.31 0.4560 1.6560 2.15 0.4400 
Allotment -0.0160 0.02 0.4930 0.1877 0.07 0.0100 0.1804 0.07 0.0100 
Constant 19.4137 21.39 0.3640 2165.6730 827.75 0.0090 2381.7310 807.07 0.0030 
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Equation 3 
Dependent variable: High eligibility 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
High eligibility 
state 0.8486 0.03 0.0000 0.8506 0.03 0.0000 0.8526 0.03 0.0000 
Child enrollment 0.0000 0.00 0.4370 0.0000 0.00 0.0010 0.0000 0.00 0.0300 
Total spending 0.0002 0.00 0.5020 0.0006 0.00 0.0040 0.0003 0.00 0.0870 
Pct kids low 
income -0.0004 0.0013 0.7300 0.0001 0.00 0.9380 -0.0002 0.00 0.8670 
Med. upper limit 0.0007 0.00 0.0420 0.0007 0.00 0.0380 0.0007 0.00 0.0480 
Liberalism -0.0023 0.00 0.0010 -0.0023 0.00 0.0010 -0.0022 0.00 0.0010 
Universal 0.0691 0.02 0.0010 0.0660 0.02 0.0010 0.0670 0.02 0.0010 
Amendments 0.0098 0.00 0.0160 0.0086 0.00 0.0330 0.0119 0.00 0.0020 
Constant -0.0416 0.08 0.5930 -0.0630 0.08 0.4180 -0.0573 0.08 0.4600 
180 
 
Equation 4 
Dependent variable: Adults 
β SE p-value β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Adult state 0.3487 0.0352 0.0000 0.4646 0.03 0.0000 0.4310 0.03 0.0000 
Child enrollment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00 0.0020 0.0000 0.00 0.0000 
Total spending 0.0033 0.0004 0.0000 0.0006 0.00 0.0470 0.0017 0.00 0.0000 
Post 2001 0.0987 0.0294 0.0010 0.1458 0.03 0.0000 0.1392 0.03 0.0000 
Liberalism -0.0002 0.0008 0.7770 0.0001 0.00 0.9330 0.0001 0.00 0.9490 
High income 0.0455 0.0374 0.2240 0.0490 0.03 0.1400 0.0278 0.03 0.4030 
Universal 0.0603 0.0264 0.0230 0.0750 0.03 0.0110 0.0750 0.03 0.0110 
Amendments 0.0108 0.0056 0.0530 0.0164 0.01 0.0070 0.0061 0.01 0.3070 
Submission -0.0003 0.0001 0.0030 -0.0003 0.00 0.0060 -0.0002 0.00 0.0150 
Constant -0.0212 0.0516 0.6820 -0.0918 0.06 0.0960 -0.0685 0.06 0.2170 
Child enrollment R2 0.9290 0.9629 0.9692 
Total spending R2 0.9130 0.9212 0.9117 
High eligibility R2 0.8483 0.8447 0.8479 
Adults R2 0.4087 0.5380 0.5359 
N = 49 states, T = 8 years  
*Fixed-effects dummy variable coefficients not reported 
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Table 5.1: Mixed effects REML regression of upper child SCHIP eligibility limit (n = 392) 
Model 1 Model 2 
β RSE p-value β RSE p-value 
Medicaid upper limit 0.5695 0.1794 0.0020 -- -- -- 
Liberalism -0.5065 0.2475 0.0410 -0.4094 0.2484 0.0990 
Reauthorization 0.2319 0.2223 0.2970 0.3622 0.2379 0.1280 
Democrat Governor 1.7489 3.0515 0.5670 1.5884 3.0623 0.6040 
Submission -0.0720 0.0547 0.1880 -0.0537 0.0600 0.3710 
Implementation -0.0090 0.0343 0.7940 -0.0144 0.0378 0.7040 
Medicaid type -34.4613 5.9376 0.0000 -35.2462 6.0010 0.0000 
Continuous or 
presumptive -31.2430 11.2974 0.0060 -42.5345 11.7640 0.0000 
Adult state 7.4302 12.6869 0.5580 10.9021 13.9425 0.4340 
Amendments 2.1048 0.9702 0.0300 2.2152 0.9809 0.0240 
Population 0.0013 0.0022 0.5470 0.0030 0.0023 0.1800 
GSP 0.0000 0.0001 0.9410 0.0000 0.0001 0.7550 
Total spending per capita -49.2865 163.1425 0.7630 -54.6856 164.2749 0.7390 
Low-income child unins. 
rate -0.5899 0.3226 0.0670 -0.5660 0.3235 0.0800 
Uninsurance rate -0.2631 0.9979 0.7920 -0.7479 1.0003 0.4550 
Poverty rate -0.8961 0.9236 0.3320 -0.8445 0.9361 0.3670 
State health spending 0.3310 2.6324 0.9000 0.5810 2.6353 0.8260 
Tax -0.0008 0.0010 0.4310 -0.0006 0.0010 0.5820 
Tax per capita 21.2637 5.7602 0.0000 22.0166 5.8088 0.0000 
Constant 139.2281 37.3768 0.0000 221.8794 28.2375 0.0000 
N = 49 states, T = 8 years 
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Table 5.2: Mixed effects REML regression of high eligibility limit (dummy) policy variable (n 
= 392) 
Model 1 Model 2 
β RSE p-value β RSE p-value 
Medicaid upper limit 0.0068 0.0016 0.0000 -- -- -- 
Liberalism -0.0028 0.0015 0.0580 -0.0023 0.0015 0.1160 
Reauthorization 0.0035 0.0019 0.0670 0.0055 0.0022 0.0110 
Democrat Governor -0.0455 0.0176 0.0100 -0.0457 0.0177 0.0100 
Submission 0.0001 0.0005 0.8610 0.0003 0.0006 0.6230 
Implementation 0.0001 0.0003 0.8110 0.0000 0.0004 0.9890 
Medicaid type -0.0385 0.0352 0.2740 -0.0400 0.0355 0.2600 
Continuous or presumptive -0.1913 0.1003 0.0560 -0.3211 0.1122 0.0040 
Adult state 0.0896 0.1149 0.4350 0.1243 0.1354 0.3590 
Amendments 0.0200 0.0058 0.0010 0.0205 0.0058 0.0000 
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.7320 0.0000 0.0000 0.1790 
GSP 0.0000 0.0000 0.4850 0.0000 0.0000 0.2590 
Total spending per capita 0.1900 0.9525 0.8420 0.1813 0.9576 0.8500 
Low-income child uninsurance rate 0.0023 0.0019 0.2150 0.0025 0.0019 0.1810 
Uninsurance rate -0.0065 0.0059 0.2750 -0.0091 0.0060 0.1280 
Poverty rate -0.0022 0.0055 0.6910 -0.0021 0.0056 0.7030 
State health spending -0.0054 0.0151 0.7210 -0.0049 0.0152 0.7450 
Tax 0.0000 0.0000 0.3350 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 
Tax per capita 0.0089 0.0339 0.7920 0.0131 0.0341 0.7000 
Constant -0.9513 0.3111 0.0020 0.0267 0.2371 0.9100 
       
N = 49 states, T = 8 years 
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Table 5.3: Random-effects logistic regression of high eligibility policy variable (n=392) 
Model 1 Model 2 
β RSE p-value eβ β RSE p-value eβ 
1997 Child Medicaid eligibility 1.6856 0.5077 0.0010 5.3959 -- -- -- -- 
Liberalism -0.0216 0.0792 0.7850 0.9786 0.0212 0.0496 0.6700 1.0214 
Reauthorization 0.0847 0.0650 0.1930 1.0884 0.0544 0.0366 0.1370 1.0559 
Democrat governor -0.7509 1.1309 0.5070 0.4719 -0.5131 0.7579 0.4980 0.5986 
Submission -0.0613 0.0203 0.0030 0.9406 0.0021 0.0057 0.7100 1.0021 
Implementation 0.0156 0.0072 0.0290 1.0157 0.0036 0.0036 0.3170 1.0036 
Medicaid type -9.4033 4.0297 0.0200 0.0001 -1.9798 1.3503 0.1430 0.1381 
Continuous/presumptive -11.7232 4.3646 0.0070 0.0000 -7.5749 1.6164 0.0000 0.0005 
Adult state 0.5908 1.7021 0.7290 1.8054 1.6111 1.3525 0.2340 5.0085 
Amendments 0.3214 0.2648 0.2250 1.3790 0.3745 0.2098 0.0740 1.4542 
Population -0.0039 0.0014 0.0050 0.9961 -0.0016 0.0009 0.0700 0.9984 
GSP 0.0000 0.0000 0.0500 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.5500 1.0000 
Total spending per capita 66.7376 70.7274 0.3450 big -3.7235 37.8840 0.9220 0.0241 
Low income child uninsurance rate -0.0743 0.1354 0.5830 0.9284 -0.0043 0.0854 0.9600 0.9957 
Uninsurance rate 1.0156 0.4598 0.0270 2.7609 0.0154 0.2287 0.9460 1.0156 
Poverty rate -0.8431 0.4016 0.0360 0.4304 -0.3155 0.2284 0.1670 0.7295 
State health spending 1.5857 1.5326 0.3010 4.8828 0.9119 0.8515 0.2840 2.4891 
Tax 0.0006 0.0004 0.0850 1.0006 0.0008 0.0003 0.0110 1.0008 
Tax per capita -1.8691 2.6778 0.4850 0.1543 -1.3237 1.5431 0.3910 0.2661 
Constant -300.9516 92.5878 0.0010 -3.1329 4.3614 0.4730 
 
        
N = 49 states, T = 8 years 
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Table 5.4: Mixed-effects regression of adults policy variable 
(n=294) 
β SE p-value 
Liberalism 0.0035 0.0027 0.1910 
Reauthorization -0.0011 0.0024 0.6310 
Democrat governor 0.0797 0.0280 0.0040 
Submission -0.0011 0.0006 0.0490 
Implementation 0.0003 0.0004 0.4290 
Medicaid type -0.1848 0.0674 0.0060 
Continuous/presumptive -0.1126 0.1239 0.3630 
High eligibility state 0.1085 0.1455 0.4560 
Amendments 0.0261 0.0108 0.0160 
Population 0.0000 0.0000 0.8640 
GSP 0.0000 0.0000 0.3110 
Total spending per capita 2.7642 1.6269 0.0890 
Low income child uninsurance rate 0.0010 0.0037 0.7860 
Uninsurance rate 0.0001 0.0099 0.9890 
Poverty rate 0.0085 0.0091 0.3500 
State health spending 0.0049 0.0223 0.8270 
Tax 0.0000 0.0000 0.7290 
Tax per capita -0.0426 0.0513 0.4060 
Constant 0.1858 0.2748 0.4990 
    
N = 49 states, T = 6 years from 2001-2006 
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Table 5.5: Random-effects logistic regression of adult enrollment (dummy) 
policy variable (n=294) 
β RSE p-value eβ 
Liberalism 0.0697 0.0567 0.2200 1.0721 
Reauthorization -0.0134 0.0383 0.7270 0.9867 
Democrat governor 1.0163 0.7822 0.1940 2.7629 
Submission -0.0262 0.0082 0.0020 0.9742 
Implementation 0.0035 0.0040 0.3870 1.0035 
Medicaid type -0.2150 1.2255 0.8610 0.8066 
Continuous/presumptive -1.1465 1.4213 0.4200 0.3178 
High eligibility state 0.4615 1.5078 0.7600 1.5864 
Amendments 0.4143 0.2338 0.0760 1.5133 
Population 0.0000 0.0006 0.9900 1.0000 
GSP 0.0000 0.0000 0.3510 1.0000 
Total spending per capita 69.7170 42.9631 0.1050 big 
Low income child uninsurance rate 0.0713 0.0940 0.4480 1.0739 
Uninsurance rate 0.1602 0.2063 0.4370 1.1738 
Poverty rate -0.0823 0.1963 0.6750 0.9210 
State health spending -0.1836 1.0138 0.8560 0.8323 
Tax 0.0001 0.0002 0.5420 1.0001 
Tax per capita 0.4466 1.4517 0.7580 1.5631 
Constant -6.6600 4.5448 0.1430 0.0013 
N = 49 states, T = 6 years from 2001-2006 
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